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NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

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NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

FRIDAY, JANUARY 29, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES FOR NATO DEFENSE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Stennis, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Glenn, Wirth, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Cohen, Quayle, Gramm, Symms, and Stevens.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dailey, Sherri Wasserman Goodman, John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, professional staff members; Colleen M. Getz, research assistant; Tiffany E. Berger, Barbara B. Brown, Mary J. Kampo, Kathleen L. McGuire, and Pamela G. Powell, staff assistants.

Also present: Francis J. Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory J. Weaver, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order. Our committee meets this morning to conduct its fifth hearing on NATO defense and the INF Treaty. After two hearings on Wednesday on the NATO-Warsaw Pact Military Balance and NATO conventional force improvements, the committee returns to the broader subjects of strategy and capabilities for NATO defense included in the implications of the INF Treaty.

The committee has already held two hearings on these broader topics. The first was on this past Monday with Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe. On the following day, Dr. James Schlesinger presented an outside perspective on these subjects.

Today the committee will receive a second outside perspective. Our witness is Dr. Harold Brown, a former Secretary of Defense, now chairman of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute. On behalf of the committee I extend a warm welcome to you this morning, Dr. Brown. As always, the committee looks forward to your testimony.

I think it is particularly appropriate for Dr. Brown to testify during these hearings which in part are focused on the implications for NATO of the INF Treaty. Dr. Brown was serving as Secretary of Defense in 1979 when the alliance decided to develop and deploy U.S. INF forces in Europe. Accordingly, he brings a long term perspective to this issue, which will certainly be valuable to our committee's deliberations.

One of the more important features of this treaty is that it indicates something about continuity in U.S. foreign policy when we are able to have a transition between one administration and another, particularly when the administrations represent different political parties and still adopt the same policy. It happens so infrequently that we do not have a lot of experiments to measure against.

Nevertheless, the INF deployments started in 1979. They were started under the Carter administration, continued vigorously under the leadership of President Reagan and under our NATO allies. So we are delighted, Dr. Brown, to have you here this morning. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I have had the privilege of knowing the witness since 1969 when I went to the Department of Defense and he was then Secretary of the Air Force. I have followed his career with great interest. I also appreciate his expressions and I completely support the statement that you have made in prepared testimony regarding the importance of sustaining and modernizing the NATO triad, theater nuclear, conventional and strategic nuclear forces.

I too believe that this triad is a vital element that helps maintain the strategic stability and the credibility of our concept of extended deterrence. Moreover, as your testimony points out, there does appear to be a growing anti-nuclear sentiment in West Germany, and elsewhere in Europe. We must ensure that in the wake of the INF Treaty we do not promote in any way this movement. A commitment on the part of the United States and our allies to maintain the NATO triad will do much to prevent the weakening of the alliance and the concept of extended deterrence.

We thank you, doctor, for joining us this morning.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. Senator Stennis, do you have any opening remarks this morning?

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any opening remarks. I remember Dr. Brown well. I do not want to flatter him.

I remember when he was Secretary of Defense with a rare combination of knowledge and understanding, both on the military side and the other side.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. Senator Quayle.

Senator **Quayle**. I just join in the flattering statements made about Dr. Brown, and I have no other constructive observations at this point.

Chairman **Nunn**. Any of another category?

Senator **Quayle**. I am saving those.

Chairman **Nunn**. Dr. Brown, the platform is yours. We would be delighted to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF DR. HAROLD BROWN, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Dr. **Brown**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. It is a great pleasure to be here today to testify before you on the intermediate range nuclear force treaty and related subjects.

I fear that after those flattering remarks, anything I say today can only diminish your opinion of me, but I nevertheless feel constrained to give some testimony.

The U.S.-Soviet treaty on INF along with future arms control and reduction agreements, both for short and long range nuclear forces and for conventional forces, along with force structure planning and burden sharing, need to be seen as part of a wider picture. The relevant context comprises the nature and needs of U.S. security and our alliance relationships both in NATO and elsewhere in the world.

These subjects are covered briefly and I fear sketchily in the written submission. I will be dealing with some but not all of them in my oral presentation today, but will be happy to answer questions on any of them.

American objectives in NATO and in our political and military relationships elsewhere in the world are not substantially different from what they have been over the past 40 years. That this is the case is a tribute to the vision of those, who in the aftermath of World War II displayed the wisdom, the political skill and in the United States the required bipartisan will to devise an alliance that has faced successfully the challenge of time.

Yet because these objectives must now be sought in a world clearly different and significantly more complex than it was 40 years ago, we ought to revisit them. And given such changes and complexities, the methods that we should follow to achieve these goals need adjustment at the least, and even possibly some revision.

These changes from 40 years ago in the world condition the ways in which the United States and its allies should seek to preserve and to promote stable international security, democratic political institutions, world economic growth, and access to markets in and to raw materials and product from the rest of the world.

Such changes involve both sides of the Atlantic and the Pacific, as well as the Soviet bloc and the Third World. The post war American political objective of promoting European unity as a way to increase the coherence of the alliance members has met with considerable success over the past 40 years. The further pursuit of that unity is likely to be of great significance during the next 40 years. There is an alphabet of European integration (the Western European Union, the European Monetary System, the European Economic Community, to cite but a few) is also an important tribute to the vision of the policy makers of yesteryear.

Simultaneously, political change has occurred in Europe. There used to be sharp divisions within many of our European allies including strong Communist and extreme right wing parties. Some of them had authoritarian governments. Divisions remain, but there is now a clearer coherence, defined in terms of democratic institutions, market economies (which include various mixtures of government and private sectors, of capitalistic and social democratic approaches), and a loosely but recognizably shared set of attitudes toward the ordering of the international community and its security.

Another big change. The United States no longer has the economic dominance or the military predominance that we enjoyed after World War II. The U.S. share of industrial production and services that was in the neighborhood of 50 percent then stands now at less than 25 percent. And though U.S. nuclear capability equals and deters that of the Soviet Union, and U.S. force projection capabilities into distant areas exceed that of the U.S.S.R., Soviet conventional military capability gives it a distinct edge on its own periphery, including key areas of Eurasia.

Compared to the developments in the West, we see what was once thought to be a monolithic Soviet bloc, has lost its most populous member. China adopts an independent approach in foreign policy, recently very anti-Soviet, and even now on better terms with the United States than with the Soviet Union.

China's revisionist approach to its economic system threatens to erode the Communist party's political control, or at least it could. Such an economic policy, even in milder form, both tempts and frightens Soviet leaders, who have recognized the stagnation of their own economy and a corresponding threat to future Soviet political and even military strength.

Those Soviet leaders are casting about for radical new approaches in economic terms and in political processes, while determined at the same time to preserve full political control by the Communist party. Eastern Europe has experienced comparable economic failure, and is ruled by Communist regimes that with few exceptions lack even as much legitimacy as the Soviet regime has in the eyes of its people.

Eastern Europe, likely to experience both less detailed control by and less economic help from the Soviet Union, is a potential source of significant instability. Given these changes and complexities, it should not be surprising that, now as before, there are differences of view and of attitudes on many matters among the various members of the alliance, or between Japan and the United States. And that individual members of the alliance should differ with the United States about policies within the alliance or in parts of the world far from themselves or their perceived interests.

Of course such differences are not new. But the boundaries of cooperation and competition between the United States and Europe, as well as Japan, have become increasingly blurred. Today, for example, the principle economic rivals and partners of the United States are its industrial allies in Western Europe and Japan.

Moreover, the Third World has become a highly disparate and contentious arena for economic competition and political conflicts. We now see economic competition from newly industrializing countries, either allied with or reasonably friendly to the United States in political and military terms.

Military and political conflicts in the Third World involve the United States and its allies, the Soviet bloc and numerous indigenous and usually nondemocratic regimes and world views, including Islamic fundamentalism, left and right wing military dictatorships, both disillusioned and unrepentant Marxism-Leninism, other forms of authoritarianism, and even some incipient democracies.

But in this complex and diverse world, NATO comprises two of the three industrialized democratic regions that together produces 60 percent of the world's product and lead in technology and in living standard. The combined economic, political and military weights of its North American and European partners should make feasible the achievement of allied economic, political and military goals, providing that those are reasonably defined.

Let's talk about the military objectives of the United States and its allies. I think those should continue to be to deter Soviet nuclear attack through appropriate nuclear doctrine and adequate nuclear forces at various levels. The alliance doesn't have to match Soviet forces precisely at every imaginable level to reach adequate nuclear deterrence. Soviet achievement of nuclear parity in the early 1970s made the threat of the use of U.S. nuclear forces, tactical or strategic, in response to a conventional attack less of a deterrent than once it was. In other words, so-called extended deterrence has been somewhat eroded.

Other factors continue to provide a deterrent to conventional war in Europe. These include the likelihood of nuclear escalation inherent in the political commitment in the United States. That is to say, a form of extended nuclear deterrence still exists.

The disposition of allied conventional forces, including over 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe is another deterrent, as is the position and presence of the alliance's nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic. A robust deterrent requires NATO conventional forces that give high confidence of being able to deny the Soviets the quick victory they might hope to gain by rapidly overrunning most of Western Europe in a blitzkrieg launched either without warning or after rapid mobilization.

Let me turn now to the INF Treaty itself and let me begin by saying that I judge the treaty to be in the interests of U.S. security, and that I urge its ratification without actions that would open it to reinterpretation or renegotiation from either side.

Now I would have to say that it is possible unilaterally to write a treaty that would be better, if we were beginning from scratch and we did not have to negotiate it with anyone else. I myself would have preferred non zero equal numbers, or at least the right to non zero equal numbers. But there are good arguments on the other side of that. Verification is easier at the zero level, and it is also easier if the agreement covers both range categories.

There are also certain political problems flowing from the agreement. There will be pressures for a rush to denuclearization at the battlefield level. There are European concerns about a perceived decoupling of the U.S. nuclear deterrent from the defense of Europe, and there is also a need to reexamine targeting so that the targets that would have been covered by U.S. INF forces are covered by other systems.

But these are manageable, and I will deal with them in my subsequent testimony. The political disadvantages of not having a treaty or not ratifying the treaty that has been signed, are much greater. And negotiation and ratification of the treaty and its provisions also produce significant political advantages.

The course of events has shown that alliance unity in responding to Soviet military deployments with deployments of our own can encourage and in this case has produced a fair arms reduction agreement. The elimination of a category of nuclear weapons, land-based ballistic and cruise missiles of range 500 to 5,500 kilometers, and the evidence that the alliance is prepared to negotiate nuclear arms reductions encourages public support of allied military efforts by convincing allied publics that their governments have a believable arms control policy.

That in turn helps to legitimize their defense policies and programs. The December 1979 decision, to which the chairman has referred, to develop and to deploy U.S. INF forces in Europe, made with our NATO partners, was in part a response to the Soviet build up of intermediate range missiles, especially the SS-20. It was also in part a response to European concerns about the need for additional coupling of the U.S. nuclear capability to the defense of Europe by strengthening the INF rung of the escalation ladder. These objectives were pushed initially by the U.S. allies, but as usual it fell to the United States to orchestrate the complex political arrangements that went with the decision, both then and in the 1980's.

Now if we look back on that process, we see that in military terms, the Soviet SS-20's, SS-4's and SS-5's and the undeployed SSC-X-4 cruise missiles, will be eliminated. That means about four times as many deployed Soviet warheads in the INF category will be eliminated as on the U.S. side.

Comparing the situation to that of 1979, when we had zero in that category and the Soviets had a couple of hundred SS-20's, we will be where we were then, and they will have removed all of their missiles in that category.

With respect to the shorter range INF forces, 500 to 1,000 kilometers, the Pershing I's of the Federal Republic will be removed, not as part of the treaty but in a parallel action, along with a substantially larger number of Soviet SRINF systems, the SS-12's and SS-23's. And the asymmetric reductions on the two sides in numbers—very substantially so—are a useful precedent for future strategic arms reductions and conventional arms reductions.

Moreover, so is the INF and SRINF elimination being extended to Asia. That is an arrangement that affects Soviet forces, but no U.S. systems.

It is still true that the Soviets can attack all the targets that have been targeted by the eliminated missiles with other forces of their own. For example, those that could have been hit by SS-20's can still be hit by Soviet ICBM's. And similarly, targets in Eastern Europe or the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union that could have been hit by the Pershing II's or the GLCM's can now be hit by U.S. ICBM's, SLBM's, SLCM's, or weapons carried in tactical aircraft. Such targets for example could be airfields, conventional forces, and foreign military command posts.

We could still cover those targets or threaten them in order to deter Soviet actions or attack as part of a program of escalation. It's true that the particular rung of the escalation ladder will not be covered as well by other existing delivery systems. That is true for us and for the Soviets. But in fact U.S. strategic forces have adequate precision and can arrive almost as fast.

One concern sometimes expressed is that a President of the United States would be less likely to use those forces than he would be to use theater forces. That is an argument that can be argued from both sides. It would depend a lot on the circumstances under which the crisis had arisen, the detailed military situation that prevailed, and the degree of cohesion between the United States and its allies at the time.

My own view is that a President probably wouldn't be much more willing to use land based theater forces than he would to use either the submarine launched ballistic missiles committed to SACEUR, 400 warheads if I remember correctly, or to use U.S. based ICBM's.

Still there are arguments for instead covering those targets from the theater. And there are alternatives that would allow this. And I have mentioned what they are. So I think that that concern can be managed.

You will recall that coupling was one of the reasons for the introduction of the Pershing II's and ground launched cruise missiles. Does the INF Treaty decouple the United States from the defense of Europe, will it lead to denuclearization and heighten the danger from what almost everyone agrees to be a significant conventional imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces? (Although we have some disagreement on the degree of imbalance.)

These questions are political issues. They go to the heart of the alliance relationship. My own answer is that the United States is and will remain tightly coupled to the defense of Europe after the ratification of the INF Treaty. It will be coupled in terms of battlefield and other tactical and theater nuclear weapons in Europe. It will in my view be very tightly coupled by the presence of over 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe. Those would be immediately involved in combat by a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack. And to think that the American nuclear capability would not be invoked to defend them is to suggest that the United States is not coupled to its own military forces.

Finally, and not least by any means, the U.S. nuclear and other military capabilities is coupled to the defense of Europe by its alliance with and commitment to the security of its NATO allies, underlined by the United States's own self interest.

If this is all so, why have there been so many expressions of concern about the INF Treaty by pro-American European conservatives and why have there been indications by American opponents of the treaty of private objections by European military and political leaders?

The answer I think lies in a series of other events. The Reykjavik summit meeting in October of 1986 in which President Reagan enthusiastically agreed to the elimination of all ballistic missiles, and perhaps (the stories vary) to the elimination of all nuclear weapons, an alteration which would clearly make the shaky conventional balance the decisive military-political element in the European balance, is certainly one of the events.

An event of a completely different kind, but one which must equally have affected European attitudes was the stock market collapse in October of 1987. That strongly suggested chickens coming home to roost after a spree involving hundreds of billions of dollars of consumption, with the money borrowed mostly from outside the United States and resulting in a potential worldwide financial and economic crisis.

When the fundamental basis of both their military security and their economic well being is called into question by the policies and actions of a U.S. administration, and related events in the United States, the stage is set for substantial allied concerns about other individual actions by the United States.

It is only fair to add that this is not the first U.S. administration to raise such concerns among our allies. But it is also fair to note that the scope of the Reykjavik summit negotiations as well as the magnitude of the stock market collapse were unprecedented.

Confidence is further eroded when the very administration whose actions are the immediate concern of our allies becomes weaker in its domestic political grip as happened both in 1986 and 1987: the Iran-Contra scandal, the 1986 elections, various legal problems of administration figures, and domestic economic concerns.

Political problems for European leaders result from the INF Treaty through increased pressure to denuclearize Europe entirely, which would be in my judgment a dangerous mistake politically and militarily. Those pressures are especially visible in the Federal Republic of Germany. The French worry about German resolve and the loss of value of their own nuclear forces through denuclearization. They also worry about U.S. resolve.

But despite all of this, the leaders of European governments of whatever political stripe have embraced the INF Treaty. They know it is popular with their own publics, and indeed an important element in sustaining the consensus in favor of continued strong European military capability.

They have also concluded that it is in the best interest of their own countries, and of the alliance, in military and political terms. What European political leaders need to do, and few have done it (American political leaders generally have been more realistic in this regard), is to face up to nuclear weapons as a fact of life and as a necessary part of the deterrence of war, even as the alliance works both to stabilize the nuclear balance by modernization and reduction and to build up its conventional capability to raise the nuclear threshold. Reykjavik was no help in this regard and I think that SDI isn't either.

But other actions such as modernizing battlefield nuclear weapons of ranges less than 300 miles would be an effective way of demonstrating an appreciation of this fact of life. That would be a difficult move politically for some European governments. If it were combined with reductions in the number of battlefield weapons, which would be militarily sensible, if the ranges of those battlefield weapons were increased from a few tens of miles which they now are to a couple hundred miles, it could be done as an alliance initiative and would be an effective move politically and militarily.

It would be one way of preempting a likely Soviet proposal for the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the two Germanys or indeed all of continental Europe except France and the Soviet Union.

Where does INF fit in U.S.-Soviet relations? Militarily, it is a side show to the issues of strategic weapons—START, SDI, and the ABM Treaty. But it is significant in U.S.-Soviet relations in political terms. It reintroduces arms control as an accepted element in the relationship, and it abolishes a category of weapons. Some of the verification arrangements, including cooperative activities and on-site inspections, could be helpful precedents in START and strategic defense agreements. So is the precedent of asymmetric reductions on the two sides.

We shouldn't overestimate the verification advantage. INF arrangements are a lot simpler than the ones for strategic weapons would have to be for equivalent confidence in compliance. The INF verification for example doesn't include the right to inspect just anywhere, only in designated areas. But we can afford to have them simpler in the case of INF because there is so little incentive to cheat on INF.

As I have been saying, the missions of these forces can be carried out by other forces. And because the United States has declared the SALT II agreement limiting the number of Soviet ICBM's no longer operative, the Soviets can build as many SS-25's as they wish to carry out the role of the dismantled SS-20's. Why should they instead choose to cheat on INF? Even if they were planning, after the SS-25's are limited in START, to gain by having some extra SS-20's, why shouldn't they hide SS-25's instead before any such treaty goes into effect?

As to the political effects, I would judge the Soviets do want to encourage differences between the United States and its European partners, in strategy, in political views, and in military planning. They probably see some chances to do these things as a result of the INF agreement. I have already referred to some allied concerns and divisions on these matters. But on the whole, I do not think that the Soviets have so far gained in these terms.

The unity of the alliance during the execution of the dual track strategy, both in accepting the deployments of the Pershing II's and the cruise missiles, and in the details of the negotiations, was a big political plus for the United States and the alliance, as was the alliance agreement to the INF Treaty as finally negotiated. And I think the Reagan administration deserves considerable credit for the skill with which it handled that end game.

The failure of the Soviet walk out from the INF talks in 1983, and the failure of their attempt to influence western European elections through the INF issue are further examples. How the situation plays out from now on depends on U.S. allied coherence on battlefield nuclear weapons, on conventional forces and related issues, including U.S. Senate ratification of the INF Treaty without reservations or amendments that would require renegotiation or an elaborate round of comparative reinterpretations on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the gamut of allied political military relations, which includes the issues of burden sharing, modernization of nuclear and conventional forces, the reliability of U.S. political commitments, and the quality of the U.S. decision making process, and last but not least the whole range of economic relations and trade, INF has come to play as significant though largely symbolic role.

In terms of the U.S.-Soviet military balance, the INF agreement has relatively little effect. In political terms, it is more significant, being the first arms control agreement negotiated since 1979, and if ratified the first significant one to be ratified since 1972.

It has clearly had a positive effect on making the discussion of other issues between the super powers more feasible, as in turn the ability to reach an INF agreement profited by the easing of U.S.-Soviet relations after their low point in 1982 and 1983.

If the INF Treaty's ratification were to be derailed, despite the modest nature of the agreement and despite its negotiation and support by a president with unimpeachable anti-Soviet credentials, it is hard to see how the Soviets could expect any significant arms control agreement with the United States in the foreseeable future. Some people may think that would be a good outcome. I think it would be a very bad one and a dangerous one.

To conclude on the INF Treaty, the words that come to mind are a modest but useful step. Further alliance military strategy and force structure decisions, nuclear and conventional, need careful political handling. Possible modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons and, if necessary, of permitted, mid-range systems, continuance of U.S. military deployments in Europe, improvement of the capabilities of allied conventional forces, consultations with allies on these matters and on future arms control and arms reduction negotiations will all need to be pursued.

In this context, both the ratification of the INF Treaty and the statements of policy by the administration, by the Congress, and even by outside witnesses who presume to speak with authority as past policy makers or opinion leaders in influencing the future will have considerable importance.

Let me turn now to the issue of the future military balance, specifically conventional force balance in Europe and the corresponding issues of force structure and of arms control and reduction.

To begin with, I recognize that Soviet attacks across the NATO-Warsaw Pact boundaries, especially on the central front, have never really been likely since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. And they are increasingly unlikely, especially in the present political condition of the Soviet Union.

Surely a rational Soviet leadership will consider the potential gain from such an attack and weigh it against the potential loss, which is unlimited. In that sense, the detailed military configuration of the NATO alliance has always been an insurance policy against an unlikely event. But we must always think of future possibilities, likely and unlikely. And there are some. In a tense military-political confrontation, the balance of military forces could matter a great deal. Political cohesion on the Western side could matter at least as much, so we must be careful in structuring alliance military forces and their command arrangements, not to undermine that cohesion.

Even in comparatively relaxed situations such as now prevail, a degree of political intimidation can be and is exercised implicitly or explicitly by a sufficient imbalance in conventional forces. That is noticeable particularly on the flanks. So the alliance needs a balance of military forces, their proper geographical distribution, and expectations of behavior and outcome that would lead the Soviets, their allies and ours, and others all to believe the Soviets could not overrun the central front in a short time, say less than a month.

Such calculation and planning must include the effects of various amounts of warning, delays in Western political decisions, possible mobilization on each side, reinforcement of the allied forces from United States and United Kingdom, French behavior, air power, sea power, and so forth.

With respect to out of area capabilities, what is most important to the United States is political cooperation of its NATO allies in such regions as the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The forces used there would have to be largely American. French and British forces can contribute significantly in military terms, and those of other allies slightly. But the presence of other allies has political importance beyond their military contributions, as is shown by the present situation in the gulf.

Let's come back to Europe. How should the alliance go about improving the balance of conventional forces there? That depends of course on what the Soviets do as well, both unilaterally in their own force structure and dispositions, and in arms control negotiations with the United States and its allies.

Both unilateral and cooperative efforts, cooperative through arms control, can change the balance, perhaps stabilize it and thus reduce the risk of war. The goal should be to give each side assurance that it could not be successfully invaded. That is, to make defensive conventional forces dominant over offensive ones. That is a more feasible task than trying to do the same thing in strategic nuclear terms.

Soviet officials occasionally express concern that under certain circumstances they might be attacked from the west, although that flies completely in the face of the evidence of force structures and disposition of Western forces. I believe that a situation in which neither side had any prospect of successful conventional military action against the other would lessen or remove a present Soviet lever in East-West relations.

Why then should they be willing to see such a change? We do not know that they are, or that they will be. But such a Soviet willingness could arise from what seems to be a present trend in Soviet politics to seek an easing of its international relations for the next few years.

Soviet leaders may have concluded that military capability has carried Soviet power and the Communist party as "the vanguard of the working class" as far as it can, and it is time to turn to other methods. They may wish to concentrate resources on internal development without abandoning political, propaganda, and diplomatic moves abroad. That is one possibility.

Another possibility is that they may plan to anesthetize the West in anticipation of some future Soviet military build-up and confrontation. Or they may hope to make such an arms control agreement part of a larger package that would include economic benefits for the Soviets in the form of availability of Western technology and capital. Or they may be motivated by a combination of these and other factors. The challenge to us is to devise a strategy that is appropriate no matter which the Soviet intentions are.

In unilateral terms, NATO can improve the conventional military balance by several means. And I outline them on page 22. I will not go into detail, I will just mention the categories. You can introduce additional advanced technology into allied forces, you can increase allied reserve or active forces to improve the balance, you can change strategy, and here I will go into a little more detail.

At present, allied strategy (this is something of a caricature, but it is worth saying) is in a strait jacket. You shouldn't, you can't, or you are not supposed to use nuclear weapons early. You are not supposed to have any fixed defenses along the inner German border. Your doctrine is not to retreat from any territory on the allied side of the line, even if so doing would improve the ability to stabilize the line farther forward than would otherwise be the case. And you are not supposed to have plans for ground counter attacks across the border, even after a Western Warsaw Pact attack across that border.

You put all those together and you have a difficult time devising a successful defense strategy. It is like telling the Redskins line that they can't move before the ball is snapped and they can't move forward or backward after the ball has snapped. And you can't dig a hole in the ground to stop the other side from coming across. I think we should relax at least some of those inhibitions.

Finally, you can integrate national forces better than they are and provide a common command-control communications systems. That would make it less rewarding for Warsaw Pact forces to concentrate their attacks at the boundaries between the various Army Corps, where you have an Army Corps of one allied nation on one side of the boundary and of another on the other.

Now it is easy to suggest these improvements. But they all face substantial practical, including political, obstacles. Many Europeans look at the proposal for greater use of technology as a United States attempt to restore its dominance in NATO armaments production.

Both introducing more technology and increasing the force size are inhibited by their implied costs. They probably would require growth over the next 4 years of about 10 percent in present NATO defense budgets. And the growth would have to be devoted to the right uses. Each of those is unlikely.

Force growth is inhibited also by demographic limitations, and changes in strategy by differing views of the Soviet Union and the nature of the Soviet threat. These are accompanied by different views about East-West relations and about relations between the Federal Republic and the DDR. And a better integration of command structure and smoother transition from peace time to war time command arrangements flies in the face of the understandable desire of national governments to command their own forces.

What about conventional arms reduction as a way of improving stability and reducing Soviet ability to attack successfully by rapidly advancing the front through Western Europe? A good many simulations of such a conflict have been carried out involving varying assumptions, which I describe in the prepared text. And as usual, such simulations are probably more reliable in telling us how the results change or changes in these various factors than they are in foretelling the outcome of a particular actual attack.

That outcome would depend on such things as leadership, morale, training, surprise, the fog of war. It is very difficult to evaluate and predict, much less to include in a numerical simulation.

But the studies do suggest the outcome depends on the size of the forces, their armaments, especially tanks and artillery, their location and degree of readiness. And there are some other factors too.

A recent Rand Corporation study based on such simulations concludes that in order to reduce the ability of the Pact forces to penetrate deep into NATO territory quickly, to reduce that probability by arms reductions, the reductions would have to be unequal and rather deep. And they would have to be made in the key fire power elements, tanks and artillery.

The reason is that NATO forces now barely cover the line from the Baltic to the Alps, while the Soviets have large forces in reserves, more than they can funnel at one time through the relatively few corridors that the geography allows for an attack. So unless the Warsaw Pact forces are reduced below the number that they can bring to bear in the first echelon assault through these corridors, reductions on the NATO side merely make the force ratios at the critical points and the outcome worse for NATO.

The reductions should be made in equipment rather than in units or in personnel. And verification of removal or destruction of such equipment, tanks and artillery is probably feasible, but will prove complex.

All of these factors suggest that conventional arms reductions will involve lengthy, complex negotiations, which would affect and be affected by political relations between the West and the Soviets during and after the negotiations.

This raises some of the usual questions. Would strengthening alliance conventional military capabilities or at least convincing the Soviets that the alliance would do so, absent an arms control agreement, act as a positive lever in such negotiations (and how do we do that with shrinking defense budgets), or would such a course make the Soviets less willing to negotiate reductions in their own capabilities?

Or, are Soviet decisions in these matters in fact driven by internal Soviet political, economic and bureaucratic forces and personal ambitions? My own judgment is that they are largely so driven, but that a believable allied intention to strengthen its capabilities unless the Soviets agree to a reasonable and verifiable reduction in conventional forces would be a useful lever.

So I think that conventional arms reduction should be pursued actively, and that we face a Soviet leadership willing to enter such negotiations seriously, but tenacious in safeguarding what they regard as their own security and their own advantages.

We should thus be prepared for protracted and difficult negotiations. In the meantime it is important for the United States and the other allies to bring under common umbrella our military strategy, our own force planning and structure and our proposals for arms control and reduction so that each is consistent with the other, a condition that has seldom prevailed and does not now.

I am going to skip over burden sharing, Mr. Chairman, and go to my conclusions.

I have tried to weave together the state of U.S. alliances, the INF Treaty, future conventional military balance and arms reductions, and the changing world context, political, military, and economic, in which these issues must all be seen.

The United States and its allies have some severe deficiencies and some considerable advantages in the military competition, which in turn is only one, albeit a major, element in our international position and our security.

Our own Nation finds itself in the new position of competing economically, and not always successfully, with our allies and negotiating with a new, articulate, innovative, but by no means assuredly benign, Soviet leadership. I think we can manage a transition to a stabler world situation, but it will take skill, nerve, experience, and innovation.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Brown follows:]

TESTIMONY OF HAROLD BROWN

I. The Context

The U.S.-Soviet Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, future arms control and reduction agreements, for short and long range nuclear forces and for conventional forces as well, force structure planning and burdensharing all need to be seen as part of a wider picture. The relevant context comprises the nature and needs of U.S. security and our alliance relationships both in NATO and elsewhere in the world. These subjects are covered, briefly and I fear sketchily, in my written submission. I will be dealing with only some of them in my oral presentation today.

U.S. objectives in NATO, and in our political and military relationships elsewhere in the world, are not substantially different from what they have been over the past 40 years. That this would be the case is a tribute to the vision of those who, in the aftermath of World War II, displayed the wisdom, political skill -- and in the United States, the required bipartisan will -- to devise an alliance that has faced successfully the challenge of time. Yet, because these objectives must now be sought in a world that is clearly different and significantly more complex than it was 40 years ago, it is appropriate to revisit them. And given such changes and complexities, the methods that we should pursue to achieve those goals need adjustment at the least, and even, conceivably, some revision.

These changes from 40 years ago condition the ways in which the U.S. and its allies should seek to preserve and promote stable international security, democratic political institutions, world economic growth, and access to markets in and to raw materials and product from the rest of the world. Such changes involve both sides of the Atlantic -- and the Pacific -- as well as the Soviet Bloc and the Third World.

The postwar American political objective of promoting European unity as a way to increase the coherence of the alliance members, has met with considerable success over the past 40 years. The further pursuit of that unity is likely to be of great significance during the next 40 years. Today's alphabet of European integration -- ECSC, WEU, EEC, EMS, to cite but a few -- is also an important tribute to the vision of the policymakers of yesteryear. Simultaneously, political change has occurred in Europe. There used to be sharp divisions within many of our European allies, including strong Communist and extreme right-wing parties. Some of them had authoritarian governments. Divisions remain, but there is now a clearer coherence, defined in terms of democratic institutions, market economies (which include various mixtures of government and private sectors, of capitalistic and social-democratic approaches), and a loosely but recognizably shared set of attitudes toward the ordering of the international community and its security.

The United States no longer has the economic dominance or the military predominance we enjoyed after World War II. The U.S. share of industrial production and services that was in the neighborhood of 50 percent then stands now at less than 25 percent. Though U.S. GNP is four times what it was then in real terms, the rest of the world's has increased from its war-destroyed level by a much larger factor. And though the U.S. nuclear capability equals and deters that of the Soviet Union, and U.S. force projection abilities into distant areas exceed that of the U.S.S.R., Soviet conventional military capability gives it a distinct edge on its own periphery, including key areas of Eurasia.

Compared to these developments in the West, what was once thought to be a monolithic Soviet Bloc has lost its most populous member, with China adopting an independent approach in foreign policy, recently very anti-Soviet and even now on better terms with the U.S. than with the Soviet Union. China's revisionist approach to its economic system could threaten to erode the

Communist Party's political control. Such an economic policy, even in milder form, both tempts and frightens Soviet leaders, who have recognized the stagnation of their own economy and the corresponding threat to future Soviet political and even military strength. They are casting about for radical new approaches in economic terms and in political processes, while determined at the same time to preserve full political control by the Communist Party. Eastern Europe has experienced comparable economic failure, and is ruled by communist regimes that with few exceptions lack even as much legitimacy as the Soviet regime has in the eyes of its people. That region, likely to experience both less detailed control by and less economic help from the Soviet Union, is a potential source of significant instability.

Given these changes and complexities, it should not be surprising that, now as before, there are disparities of views and of attitudes on many matters among the various members of the NATO alliance, or between Japan and the U.S., and that individual members of the alliance should differ with the United States about policies within the alliance or in parts of the world far from themselves or their perceived interests.

To be sure, such differences are not new. But the boundaries of cooperation and competition between the U.S. and Europe (as well as Japan) have become over time increasingly blurred. Today for example, the principal economic rivals and partners of the U.S. are at present its industrialized allies in Western Europe and Japan. Moreover, the Third World has become a highly disparate and contentious arena for economic competition and political conflicts. We now experience economic competition from newly industrializing countries either allied with or reasonably friendly to the United States in political and military terms. Political conflicts involve the U.S. and its allies (formerly the Colonial Powers in those regions), the Soviet Bloc, and numerous indigenous and usually nondemocratic regimes and world views including Islamic fundamentalism, left and right wing military dictatorships, both disillusioned and unrepentent Marxism-Leninism, other forms of authoritarianism, and some incipient democracies.

But NATO comprises two of the three industralized democratic regions (North America, Western Europe, and Japan) that together produce 60 percent of the world's product, and lead in technology and in living standard. The combined economic, political, and military weights of its North American and European partners should make feasible the achievement of allied economic, political and military goals, providing those are reasonably defined.

That the allies should often aim for concerted military and diplomatic policies even outside their own immediate region has been shown in recent months in the Persian Gulf. There, the common goals of assuring access to Persian Gulf oil on commercial terms, avoiding domination of the region by an Islamic fundamentalist Iran, and limiting Soviet influence there made it possible for American policy, skillfully applied after a stumbling start, to encourage concerted policies on a behind-the-scene bilateral, or even a unilateral and parallel, basis. We should seek similar approaches in policies toward the Middle East and toward the Third World countries of the southern part of the globe, but should recognize that agreement is likely to be more difficult to achieve there. Specifically, we should not expect others to help us on Central America, although it is not unreasonable to expect them to refrain from opposing U.S. policies.

In military terms the objectives of the U.S. and its allies should continue to be to deter Soviet nuclear attack through appropriate nuclear doctrine and adequate nuclear forces at various levels; the alliance does not need to match Soviet forces precisely at every imaginable level in order to achieve adequate nuclear deterrence. Soviet achievement of nuclear parity in the early 1970s made the threat of the use of U.S. nuclear forces, tactical or strategic, in response to a conventional attack less of a deterrent than it once was. But other factors continue to provide a deterrent to conventional war in Europe. These include the likelihood of nuclear escalation inherent in the political commitment of the United States, the disposition of allied conventional forces including over three hundred thousand U.S. troops in Europe, and the possession and presence of the alliance's nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic. A robust deterrent requires NATO conventional forces that give high confidence of being able to deny the Soviets the quick victory they might hope to gain by rapidly overrunning most of Western Europe in a blitzkrieg launched either without warning or after a rapid mobilization.

In the Third World, allied military capabilities need to take into consideration that advanced military technology has been spread ra[illegible] of advanced m[illegible] developed countries and through the creation of indigenous arms industries with substantial technical capabilities. The U.S. would have to expect to carry the bulk of allied efforts in military actions in Third World areas. As events in the Persian Gulf have shown, however, British and French forces -- especially naval forces -- can also contribute. For either U.S. or other allied forces, their structure, equipment, and especially their ability to be moved in quickly and on short notice will be extremely important, whether the forces they face are indigenous or Soviet in nature.

II. The INF Treaty

I would like to turn now to the INF Treaty itself. I plan to concentrate on three sorts of issues: the effect on the military balance; the impact on and interaction with alliance relations; and U.S.-Soviet relations. These subjects overlap, as do their political and military aspects. Let me begin by saying that I judge the treaty to be in the interest of U.S. security and that

I urge its ratification without actions that would open it to reinterpretation or renegotiation from either side. It is possible unilaterally to write a treaty unilaterally that would be better, if we were beginning from scratch. At some point in the real negotiation, it might actually have been possible to negotiate a better one. I myself would probably have preferred non-zero equal numbers (or at least the right to non-zero equal numbers) on the two sides in both the 500-1000 kilometer and 1000-5500 kilometer ranges. But there are good arguments on the other side; verification is easier at the zero level and is easier also if the agreement covers both range categories. Certain political problems also flow from the agreement: there will be pressures for a rush to denuclearization at the battlefield level; there are European concerns about a perceived decoupling of the U.S. nuclear deterrent from the defense of Europe; and there is also a need to reexamine targeting so that the targets that would have been covered by U.S. INF forces are covered by other systems. But these are manageable. The political disadvantages of not having a treaty or of not ratifying the treaty that has been signed are very much greater. The negotiation and ratification of the treaty and its provisions also produce significant political advantages. The course of events has shown that alliance unity in responding to Soviet military deployments with deployments of our own can encourage, and in this case produced, a fair arms reduction agreement. The elimination of a category of nuclear weapons (land-based ballistic and cruise missiles of range 500-5500 miles), and the evidence that the alliance is prepared to negotiate nuclear arms reductions, encourages public support of allied military efforts, by convincing allied publics that their governments have a believable arms control policy. That in turn helps to legitimize their defense policies and programs.

The December 1979 decision to develop and deploy U.S. INF forces in Europe, made with our NATO partners, was in part a response to the Soviet buildup of intermediate range missiles, especially the SS-20. It also was in part a response to European concerns about the need for additional coupling of the U.S. nuclear capability to the defense of Europe, by strengthening the INF rung of the escalation ladder. These objectives were pushed largely by European allies, but as usual it fell to the U.S. to orchestrate the complex political arrangements that went with the decision, both then and in the 1980s. Those arrangements and the 1979 decision included the dual track approach, combining a program for development and deployment with an intention to negotiate limitations and reductions of the Soviet INF force level and to adjust the level of U.S. deployments correspondingly. The political arrangements included decisions on how many systems were to be deployed in which countries, the timing of the deployments, and the U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

If we look at the outcome of this process, we see that in military terms the Soviet SS-20s, SS-4s, SS-5s, and (undeployed) SSC-X-4s will be eliminated. That means about four times as many deployed Soviet warheads in the INF category will be eliminated as on the U.S. side -- the Pershing IIs and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles. Comparing the situation to that of 1979, when we had zero in this category and the Soviets had a couple of hundred SS-20s, we will be where we were then and they will have removed all of their missiles in that category. With respect to the shorter range INF forces, of 500-1000 kilometer range, the Pershings Is of the Federal Republic of Germany will be removed, along with a substantially larger number of Soviet SRINF systems, the SS-12s and SS-23s. The INF and SRINF elimination will be extended to Asia, an arrangement that affects Soviet but no U.S. systems.

It remains true that the Soviets can still attack all the targets that had been targeted by the eliminated missiles with other forces of their own. The targets that would have been hit by SS-20s can clearly be hit by Soviet ICBMs, for example. Similarly, targets in Eastern Europe or the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union that could have been hit by the Pershing IIs or the Ground Launched Cruise Missiles can now be hit by U.S. ICBMs, SLBMs, SLCMs, or weapons carried in tactical aircraft. The targets of the U.S. systems would be, for example, airfields, conventional forces, and forward military command posts. In each case these could be covered, or threatened in order to deter Soviet actions, or attacked as part of a program of escalation. For us, as for the Soviets, that particular rung of the escalation ladder will not be covered quite as well by other existing delivery systems, though additional substitute systems are possible within the terms of the treaty to meet those concerns, if they should be considered to be a military necessity. What will be missing is the ability to hit those targets in Eastern Europe and the Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union with U.S. ballistic and cruise missiles based on the ground in Western Europe.

In fact U.S. strategic forces have adequate precision, and can arrive almost as fast -- 25 minutes for ICBMs, which is about twice as long as the fastest INF forces would take. One concern sometimes expressed is that a President of the United States would be less likely to use those forces than he would be to use theater forces. That is an arguable issue. It would depend very much on the circumstances under which the crisis had arisen, the detailed military situation that prevailed, and the degree of cohesion between the U.S. and its allies at the time. My personal view is that a President would probably not be much more willing to use land-based theater forces than he would to use either the submarine launched ballistic missiles committed to SACEUR or to use U.S. based ICBMs. But there are arguments for covering those targets from the theater. There are alternatives that would allow this: submarine launched cruise missiles that would take 60 to 90 minutes to get to their targets; submarine launched ballistic missiles assigned to SACEUR -- these can be considered theater based, are less accurate now than the INF systems would have been, but will be replaced by highly accurate D-5s; tactical aircraft which could be equipped with cruise missiles of range under 600 kilometers without coming under the definition of strategic weapons embodied in the SALT II agreement. Thus the concern can be managed, though it may not be possible to provide replacements for the INF forces that would have precisely the same characteristics. Indeed that is why I would have preferred a non-zero solution, but I do not consider this a crucial concern.

Does this INF treaty decouple the U.S. from the defense of Europe? Will it lead to denuclearization, and heighten the danger from what almost everyone agrees to be a significant conventional imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, though there is some disagreement on the degree of imbalance? These questions are political issues, and go to the heart of the alliance relationship. My own answer is that the U.S. is and will remain tightly coupled to the defense of Europe after the ratification of the INF Treaty. It will continue to be coupled in terms of battlefield and other tactical and theater nuclear weapons in Europe. There are 4500 of these including, in addition battlefield nuclear weapons in the form of artillery and Lance missiles, longer range systems in the form of submarine-launched cruise missiles and land-based aircraft whose range and refueled radius, respectively, exceeds 1000 kilometers. It is coupled even more in my judgment by the presence of over 300,000 U.S. troops in Europe; these would be immediately involved in combat by a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack; to think that the American nuclear capability would not be invoked to defend them is to suggest that the U.S. is not coupled to its own military forces. Finally, and not by any means least, the U.S. nuclear and other military capability is coupled to the defense of Europe by its alliance with and commitment to the security of its NATO allies, underlined by the U.S.'s own self interest.

Why, if all this is so, have there been so many expressions of concern about the INF Treaty by pro-American European conservatives, and indications by American opponents of the treaty of private objections by European military and political leaders? The answer, I think, lies in a series of other events. The Reykjavik Summit meeting in October 1986, in which President Reagan enthusiastically agreed to the elimination of all ballistic missiles and perhaps (stories vary) to the elimination of all nuclear weapons, an alteration which would clearly make the shaky (and I think unfavorable) conventional balance the decisive military-political element in the European balance. An event of a completely different kind, but one which must equally have affected European attitudes, was the Stock Market collapse in October of 1987. That strongly suggested chickens coming home to roost after a spree involving hundreds of billions of dollars of consumption, with the money borrowed mostly from outside the United States, and resulting in a potential world-wide financial and economic crisis. When the fundamental basis of both their military security and their economic well-being is called into question by the policies and actions of a U.S. administration, and related events in the U.S., the stage is set for substantial allied concerns about other individual actions by that administration. It is only fair to add that this is not the first U.S. administration to raise such concerns among our allies. But it is also fair to note that the scope of the negotiations at the Reykjavik Summit, as well as the magnitude of the October 19 stock market collapse, were unprecedented. And in any case confidence is further eroded when the very administration whose actions concerns our allies becomes weaker in its domestic political grip, as happened both in 1986 and in 1987: the Iran-Contra Scandal; the 1986 elections;

various legal problems of administration figures; and domestic economic concerns.

Political problems for European leaders result from the INF Treaty through increased pressure to denuclearize Europe entirely, which would be a dangerous mistake militarily and politically. Such pressures are especially visible in the Federal Republic of Germany. Arguments are made by pro-American conservatives to the effect that remaining short range nuclear weapons are useable only against East or West Germany. This ignores the many aircraft-carried weapons, SLCMs, and French and British systems, not to mention U.S. SLBMs committed to SACEUR and U.S. stratetgic systems. Those concerns have nevertheless already led to closer Franco-German cooperation, and thus have not been all bad. The French worry about German resolve, and the loss of value of their own nuclear forces through denuclearization. They also worry about U.S. resolve. But the leaders of European governments, of whatever political stripe, have embraced the INF Treaty. They know that it is popular with their own publics, and indeed an important element in sustaining what consensus remains in favor of a continued strong European military capability. They also have concluded that it is in the best interest of their own countries, and of the alliance, in military and political terms. What European political leaders need to do, and few of them have done it (American political leaders have with some exceptions been rather more realistic in this regard) is to face up to nuclear weapons as a fact of life, and as a necessary part of the deterrence of war even as the alliance works both to stabilize the nuclear balance, by modernization and reduction, and to build up its conventional capability to raise the nuclear threshold. Reykjavik was no help in this regard, nor is SDI. The modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons (of ranges less than 300 miles) would be an effective way of demonstrating an appreciation of this fact of life. Such a move would be politically difficult for some European governments. If, however, it were combined with the reduction in the numbers of battlefield weapons, that would be sensible militarily if the ranges of those battlefield weapons were increased from their present value of a few tens of miles to a couple of hundred miles, it could be done as an alliance initiative and would be an effective move both militarily and politically. It would be one way of preempting a likely Soviet proposal for the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the two Germanies, or in all of continental Europe except France and the Soviet Union.

Where does INF fit in U.S.-Soviet relations? Militarily, it is a side show to the issues of strategic weapons -- START, SDI, and the ABM Treaty. But it is significant in political terms, reintroducing arms control as an accepted element in the relationship, and abolishing a category of weapons. Some of the verification arrangements, including cooperative activities and on-site inspections, could be helpful precedents in START and strategic defense agreements. We should not overestimate this advantage. INF arrangements are a great deal simpler than those for strategic weapons would have to be for equivalent confidence in compliance. We can afford to have them simpler in the case of INF, because there is so little incentive to cheat on INF. The missions of those forces can be carried out by other forces. Because the U.S. has declared the SALT II agreement that limits the number of Soviet ICBMs no longer operative, the Soviets can build as many SS-25s as they wish to carry out the role of the dismantled SS-20s. Why should they instead choose to cheat on INF?

As to political effects, the Soviets do want to encourage differences between the U.S. and its European partners -- in strategy, in political views, and in military planning. They probably see some chances to do these things as a result of the INF agreement. I have already referred to some allied concerns and divisions on these matters. But on the whole, I do not think that the Soviets have so far gained in these terms. The unity of the alliance during the execution of the dual track strategy, both in accepting the deployments of Pershing IIs and Cruise Missiles and in the details of the negotiations, including allied support for the U.S. proposal of the zero option (whether that was the best option or not) was a big political plus. Going ahead with the deployments was another example of alliance unity under U.S. leadership, as was agreeing to the INF Treaty as finally negotiated. The failure of the Soviet walkout from the INF talks in 1983, and the failure of their attempt to influence Western European elections through the INF issue are further examples. How the situation plays out from now on depends on U.S.-allied coherence on battlefield nuclear weapons, on conventional forces, and related issues -- including U.S. Senate ratification of the INF Treaty without reservations or amendments that would require renegotiation or an elaborate round of comparative reinterpretations on the part of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In the gamut of allied political-military relations -- which includes the issues of burdensharing, of the modernization of nuclear and conventional forces, the reliability of U.S. political commitments and the quality of the U.S. decision making process, and last but not least the whole range of economic relations and trade -- INF has come to play a significant, though largely symbolic, role.

In terms of the U.S.-Soviet military balance, the INF agreement has relatively little effect, as I have already described. In political terms, it is more significant, being the first arms control agreement negotiated since 1979, and if ratified the first significant one to be ratified since 1972. It has clearly had a positive effect on making the discussion of other issues between the superpowers more feasible, as in turn the ability to reach an INF agreement profited from the easing of U.S.-Soviet relations after their nadir in 1982-83. If the INF Treaty's ratification were to be derailed, despite the modest nature of the agreement and despite its negotiation and support by a President with unimpeachable anti-Soviet credentials, it is hard to see how the Soviets could expect any significant arms control agreements with the United States in the foreseeable future. Some members of the foreign policy community, and some members of Congress, may think that would be a good outcome. I think it would be a very bad one and a dangerous one.

To conclude on the INF Treaty: I consider it a modest but useful step. Future alliance military strategy and force structure decisions, nuclear and conventional, need careful political handling. A possible modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons and -- if necessary -- of permitted mid-range systems, continuance of U.S. military deployments in Europe, improvement of the capabilities of alliance conventional forces, and consultations with allies on these matters and on future arms control and arms reduction negotiations will all need to be pursued. In this context, both the ratification of the INF Treaty and the statements of policy by the administration, by the Congress, and even by outside witnesses who presume to speak with authority as past policy makers or opinion leaders in influencing the future will have considerable importance.

III. The Future Military Balance

Let me turn now to the issue of the future military balance, specifically the conventional force balance in Europe, and the corresponding issues of force structure and of arms control and reduction.

To begin with, I recognize that Soviet attacks across the NATO-Warsaw Pact boundary, especially on the Central front, have never been likely since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, and that they are increasingly unlikely, especially in the present political condition of the Soviet Union. Surely a rational Soviet leadership will consider the potential gain from such an attack and weigh it against the potential loss, which is unlimited. In that sense the detailed military configuration of the NATO alliance has always been an insurance policy against an unlikely event. But we must always think of future possibilities, likely and unlikely. A failure of reform in the Soviet Union and a continued economic and technological decline might lead to a situation of desperation. One or more East European countries might try to break away from the Soviet Union. Western unity might decay and create tempting targets for individual territorial grabs with the bonus of disintegration of the alliance. In a tense military-political confrontation, the balance of military forces could matter a great deal. Political cohesion on the Western side could matter at least as much, so we must be careful in structuring alliance military forces and their command arrangements not to undermine that political cohesion. Even in comparatively relaxed situations, such as now prevail, a degree of political intimidation can be and is exercised implicitly or explicitly by a sufficient imbalance in conventional forces. This is probably even more true on the NATO flanks where the balance is worse and there may be less sense of assurance that political cohesion would immediately bring the force of the entire alliance to bear. The alliance thus needs a balance of military forces, their proper geographical distribution, and expectations of behavior and of outcome that would lead the Soviets, their allies and ours, and other nations all to believe that the Soviets could not overrun the central front in a short time, say less than a month. Such calculation and planning must include the effects of various amounts of warning, of delays in western political decisions, of possible mobilization on each side, of reinforcement of the allied forces from the U.S. and from the U.K., of French behavior, of air power and sea power, etc.

Allied planners of force structure and of operations must also think about the possibility that the Soviets could outlast the NATO alliance in a long conventional war. The political cohesion of the Warsaw Pact and even of the Soviet Union could, however, come into question in a lengthy stalemated struggle. One must balance the deficiencies of our forces and capabilities for a short as opposed to a long war. But, given my estimate of Soviet thinking and motivation, my own judgment is that incremental capabilities should be put preferentially into assuring the alliance's ability to contain a Warsaw Pact attack during the first month rather than into improving the chances of lasting from the third month into the fourth, for example.

With respect to out of area abilities, what is most important to the U.S. is the political cooperation of its NATO allies in such regions as the Persian Gulf and Middle East. The forces used there would have to be largely American, but French and British forces can contribute significantly in military terms and those of other allies slightly. The presence of other allies has political importance beyond their military contributions, as is shown by the present situation in the Persian Gulf. Some parts of the U.S. force structure need to be configured for distant Third World operations, especially but not only for Southwest Asia. This is true whether the attack being resisted, preempted, or deterred is by Soviet forces or by the forces of regional powers or elements.

How should the alliance go about improving the balance of conventional forces in Europe? The answer depends on what the Soviets do as well, both unilaterally in their own force structure and dispositions and in arms control negotiations with the U.S. and its allies. Both unilateral efforts and cooperative efforts (in arms control) can change the balance, perhaps stabilize it and thus reduce the risk of war. The goal should be to give each side assurance that it could not be successfully invaded, that is to make defensive conventional forces dominant over offensive ones. Soviet officials occasionally express concern that under certain circumstances they might be attacked from the West, against the evidence of the force structure and disposition of Western forces. I believe, to the contrary, that a situation in which neither side had any prospect of successful conventional military action against the other would lessen or remove a present Soviet lever in East-West relations. Why, then, should they be willing to see such a change? We don't know that they are or will be. But such a Soviet willingness could arise from what seems to be a present trend in Soviet politics to seek an easing of its international relations for the next few years. The Soviet leadership may have concluded that military capability has carried Soviet power and the Communist party as the vanguard of progress as far as it can, and it is time to turn to other methods. They may wish to concentrate resources on internal development, without abandoning political, propaganda, and diplomatic moves abroad. Another possibility is that they may plan to anesthetize the West in anticipation of some future military buildup and confrontation. They may hope to make such an arms control agreement part of a larger package that would include economic benefits for the Soviet Union in the form of the availability of Western technology and capital. Or they may be motivated by a combination of these and other factors.

In unilateral terms, NATO options for improving the conventional military balance include the following:

a. Introduction of additional advanced technology into allied forces: precision guided munitions and delivery systems of short and long range; improved target acquisition capabilities including space based and air based sensors of all sorts; tactical intelligence and data fusion; command-control and communications systems; remotely piloted vehicles.

b. Force size. The alliance could increase its reserve or active forces to improve the balance. Estimates suggest that six or eight more divisions would substantially reduce the Warsaw

Pact ability to advance rapidly into Western Europe.

c. Changes in strategy. The limitations of no early use of nuclear weapons, no fixed defenses along the inner German border, a doctrine of not retreating from any territory on the allied side of the line even if doing so would improve the ability to stabilize a line farther forward than would otherwise be the case, and a prohibition of plans for ground counterattacks across the border even after a Warsaw Pact attack across that border combine to make a successful defense considerably more difficult. A relaxation of the last three inhibitions could make a substantial difference.

d. Better integration of national forces and a common command-control and communications system would make it less rewarding for Warsaw Pact forces to concentrate their attacks at the boundaries between Army corps of different nations. The present situation constitutes a significant NATO weakness.

It should be noted that these suggested improvements face substantial practical (including political) obstacles. Many Europeans regard the proposal for greater use of technology as motivated by a U.S. attempt to restore its dominance in NATO armaments production. Both introduction of more technology and increased force size are inhibited by their implied costs; they would probably require a growth of about ten percent in NATO defense budgets over the next four years. Moreover, the growth would have to be devoted to the right uses. Both are unlikely. Force growth is inhibited also by demographic limitations, which are even more severe in Europe than in the United States, and especially so in the Federal Republic of Germany, whose population is actually shrinking. Changes in strategy are inhibited by differing views of the Soviet Union and the nature of the Soviet threat. These are accompanied by different views about East-West relations, and about relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the DDR. A better integration of the command structure and a smoother transition from peacetime to wartime command arrangements flies in the face of the understandable desire of national governments to command their own forces.

What about conventional arms reduction as a way of improving stability, and reducing the ability of the Soviets to attack successfully by rapidly advancing the front through Western Europe? A good many simulations of such a conflict have been carried out, involving varying assumptions about mobilization, political decisions with respect to reinforcement, and capabilities of the forces and equipment on the two sides. As usual, such simulations are probably more reliable in telling us how the results change with changes in these factors than they are in foretelling the outcome of a particular actual attack, which would depend on such things as leadership, morale, training, surprise, and the fog of war -- all of which are difficult to evaluate and predict, much less include in the simulation. However, these studies do suggest that the outcome does depend on the size of the forces, on their armaments, especially tanks and artillery, on their location, and on their degree of readiness. In addition, air power, resupply, intelligence and the technology of sensors and of weapons all matter. A recent RAND Corporation study based on such simulations concludes that in order to reduce the ability of the Warsaw Pact forces to penetrate deep into NATO territory quickly by means of arms reductions, unequal and rather deep reductions would be required in the key firepower elements -- tanks and artillery. This is because the NATO forces can now barely cover the line from the Baltic to the Alps, while the Soviets have large forces and reserves -- more in fact than they can funnel at one time through the relatively few corridors that geography allows for an attack. Therefore, unless the Warsaw Pact forces are reduced below the number that they can bring to bear in a first echelon assault through those corridors, reductions on the NATO side merely make the force ratios at the critical points -- and the outcome -- worse for NATO. The reductions should be made in equipment rather than in units or in personnel. The issue of whether air power should be included is an arguable one; the Soviet position would probably be that it should. They would tend to count only attack aircraft where they are at a disadvantage, while having many more air defense aircraft than the NATO forces. In fact all aircraft are in principle dual-capable. Moreover, aircraft without ground forces can't mount an invasion. Sea power, which is rather less relevant over the first few weeks, would also be a likely Soviet candidate for inclusion. Verification of removal or destruction of tanks and artillery is probably feasible, but will prove complex.

All of these factors suggest that conventional arms reductions would involve complex and lengthy negotiations, which would affect and be affected by political relations between the West and the Soviets during and after the negotiations. This raises some of the usual questions. Would strengthening alliance conventional military capabilities, or at least convincing the Soviets that the alliance will strengthen capabilities absent an arms control agreement, act as a positive lever in such negotiations? (And how do we do that with shrinking defense budgets?) Or would such a course make the Soviets less willing to negotiate reductions in their own capabilities? Or are the Soviet decisions on these matters in fact driven by internal Soviet political, economic, bureaucratic forces and personal ambitions? My own judgment is that they are largely so driven, but that a believable allied intention to strengthen its capabilities unless the Soviets agree to a reasonable and verifiable reduction in conventional forces would be a useful lever. My view, therefore, is that conventional arms reduction should be pursued actively, and that we face a Soviet leadership that is willing to enter such negotiations seriously but will prove to be tenacious in safeguarding what they regard as their own security and their own advantages. We should thus be prepared for protracted and difficult negotiations. In the meantime it is important for the U.S. and the other allies to bring under a common umbrella our military strategy, our own force planning and structure, and our proposals for arms control and reduction so that each is consistent with the other, a condition that has seldom prevailed, and does not now.

IV. Burdensharing

Let me now turn to the issue of burdensharing. To begin with, I would like to note that the alliance is a political arrangement even more than it is a military structure; indeed, different allies participate to different degrees in the military structure. Thus the political cohesion of the alliance, which is in danger of and has already experienced some erosion, needs to be preserved. These fissiparous trends are not surprising. Has the Cold War ended? Did we win it? It is winding down? Whatever the answers to these questions, and whatever form the alliance takes, whether the changes be large or small, it will help the transition if the burdensharing issue is well handled. This in turn raises other questions. How should the burden of each member be measured? What is fair? Who is to decide what is fair? And how should we proceed?

In this connection, it should be noted that the Japanese and European situations are rather different. Japan is a special case. East Asia is more complex in terms of geography, the variety of national entities, and differing states of economic and political development. It is important that Japanese military capability not be such as to frighten other Asians. And the U.S. and Japan, allies though we are, are engaged in an especially severe economic competition with each other. In Europe, the lines are more clearly drawn, there is a long and relatively stable history of sharing of the burden, and that burden -- at least with respect to forces defending Western Europe itself -- is more evenly shared than is the case vis a vis Japan. Europeans do, as they often say, provide over 80 percent of the ground forces (counting the French) and 75 percent of the tactical air forces deployed in peacetime on the Central Front.

The U.S. spends about 6.5 percent of its GNP on defense. The average European contribution is about half that percentage of GNP. The Japanese contribution is just over 1 percent by its own measure, probably more like 1 1/2 percent by standard NATO definitions. The principal competitor in all of these nations for government expenditures both in economic and political terms, is income transfer programs. They are somewhat more difficult to measure. But they probably amount to an average of about 25 percent of GNP among our European allies (with considerable variation among them), 14 percent or so in the United States, and about 10 percent in Japan. The disparity in percentage of GNP devoted to defense is less justified now that the United States has a per capita GNP not much higher than that of its allies. On the other hand, the U.S. is and inevitably will remain the leader of the alliance. As such it has more responsibility than the others. In particular it has more out of area responsibilities than its allies. Those extra responsibilities, as much as its greater size, gives the U.S. extra weight in the political decisions of the alliance. There is no replacement for that weight, or for the U.S. Correspondingly, although if we were starting the world all over again the division in resource contributions between the U.S. and its allies probably would be different from what it now is, I do not think it either realistic or desirable to seek an abrupt and major relative change. Allied leaders will often make other arguments, particularly that the U.S. along with Britain (whose percentage of GNP devoted to defense is not much less than ours) and Canada (whose percentage of GNP is much less) do not have conscription, whereas the European allies on the Central

Front, including France, do. If the difference in cost between conscripts and volunteers is counted in, the disparity in defense percentages of GNP drop. On the other hand, the effectiveness of a conscript force of short termers is somewhat less -- you get what you pay for, and it is questionable to charge yourself for a conscript but credit yourself with a veteran.

In any event, changes in the nature of the U.S. contribution to European defense had already begun in the late 1970s, when we informed our allies that in case of a crisis outside of NATO the reinforcements on which SACEUR had been counting from the United States might go to that other area of conflict rather than to Europe, where NATO planners would otherwise have been expecting them. The swing strategy, of moving U.S. naval forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic in case of a NATO crisis, was altered. Those moves, and their elaborations during the Reagan administration, seem to me a sensible modification of plans. Proposals to remove large numbers of U.S. ground forces in Europe to the United States for possible use elsewhere are in my judgment unrealistic. They would instead be demobilized and thus not useable anywhere. An exception would be a change of that sort made as part of a conventional arms reduction agreement with the Soviets.

We should, instead of relocating large numbers of U.S. troops from Europe, insist on arrangements with our European allies for the freer use of U.S. forces in Western Europe for out of area crises. Europe is closer to many of those areas than the U.S., so this makes military as well as political sense. It would help, however, to make those arrangements with relatively little publicity so as to avoid political complications in Europe. Unfortunately, to counter calls in the U.S. for reduction of American forces in Europe, a high profile for those same arrangements would help. We should also continue the trend toward increased host country support, through supply of indigenous transport, etc. In so doing we can't logically insist that the Federal Republic of Germany buy General Motors rather than Mercedes trucks to support U.S. forces.

Turning to Japan, we should urge Japan to provide the great bulk of the forces necessary for its own self defense against a conventional attack. The Japanese have already been contributing over a billion dollars annually to the support cost for U.S. forces in Japan. The appreciation of the yen and the indication that they will assume more of the costs for Japanese support personnel should boost this to two billion dollars a year. But we should press the Japanese to assume a still larger share. Japan should also be asked to assume a large fraction of the burden of economic assistance for the developing world. Its large trade surplus should be recycled at Japanese risk, not at the risk of U.S. banks.

What is the likelihood of change in the share of the defense burden among the U.S. and its allies? As to reallocation of U.S. and allied shares of a constant total, my judgment is that it will not happen, at least not by agreement. If we can get the total to grow, even very moderately, I think that our allies can probably be persuaded to pick up most of that growth. Europeans are clearly unwilling to shift expenditures from entitlements to defense, or to raise taxes to pay for more defense. It is hard to criticize them for that when the U.S. displayed an identical attitude even while it was increasing the military's share of the GNP. The U.S. borrowed the money, especially from the Europeans and the Japanese, whose savings rate is much higher than our own. Europeans would have a much harder time following the course of borrowing from abroad.

How then should we proceed? My answer is that we need to proceed by political negotiation and compromise, an approach not foreign to this body, nor to the other either, in this kind of difficult situation. I suggest that we begin from where we are and try to improve the military capabilities of the alliance. We shouldn't force burdensharing decisions into a zero sum game. We should adopt the approach that all should do more, and negotiate the ratio of increased contributions. I am not saying that I think the U.S. defense budget can as a practical matter rise in real terms next year or the year after. I am speaking of a program for the next five years. I think that political compromise among allies in those terms is feasible.

To conclude, a few words about defense production as it affects alliance relations. There is no doubt that Europeans, and in a more limited way even the Japanese, want a larger share of defense production of major combat equipment. As a political matter, the two way street and offsets are and will remain a fact of life. Economies of scale and avoidance of duplication of research and development costs argue that the largest producer and purchaser of such equipment within the alliance -- the United States -- can produce the equipment less expensively. This is probably the case, abstractly considered, despite $100 hammers, $600 toilet seats. But again as a practical matter, we need to find some other way to achieve those efficiencies. Such a program was initiated in the late 1970s. The approach was to have only one development in a particular defense area, such as short range air-to-air missiles or long range air-to-air missiles. One industry team from North America and Europe would carry out the research and development on each program, with U.S. firms taking the lead on some and Europeans on others. Production lines would be set up for each system on each side of the Atlantic to provide some competition, at the cost of some efficiency. R&D duplication would be avoided, and some production savings could also result. The program languished during the early 1980s, along with some other alliance issues and multilateral approaches. In recent years, however, it has been revived and I think it ought to continue to be pushed. We should accept the existence of political constraints on achieving the optimally efficient arrangements but that should not prevent us from seeking arrangements that are much more efficient than the present ones.

V. Conclusion

I have tried to weave together the different but overlapping issues of the state of U.S. alliances, the INF Treaty, the future conventional military balance and arms reductions, and the changing world political, military, economic and social context in which these issues must all be seen. The U.S. and its allies have some severe deficiencies, and some considerable advantages, in the military competition. Our own nation finds itself in the new position of competing economically, and not always successfully, with our allies, and negotiating with a new, articulate, innovative, but by no means assuredly benign, Soviet leadership. I think we can manage a transition to a stabler world situation. But it will take skill, nerve, experience, and innovation.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Secretary Brown.

Before we get to questions, we have two nominations and a series of military nominations I would like to bring before the committee. I believe we have a quorum present.

[Recess.]

Chairman NUNN. Dr. Brown, thank you for your excellent statement this morning. You covered it in a very thorough way. You gave us a bit of history and also an analysis of the INF Treaty as you see it, and you also took us into the future.

That is exactly the scope of what our committee is trying to undertake. We are looking at the treaty. We are primarily leaving the first round of inquiry on the details of the treaty to the Foreign Relations Committee, where they have primary jurisdiction.

But we have, of course, a major stake in this committee in the future of the NATO alliance and the strategy of NATO as it is affected by the INF Treaty. Your statement has touched all of those points, in your usual very comprehensive way.

Senator Glenn, we thank you for presiding over those nominations yesterday, and we received word you were in favor of both of them and we have just voted. I hope our word was accurately received.

Senator GLENN. It was accurately reported. We had good hearings, and I have just told the staff to record me in favor of them.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you.

Dr. Brown, in your statement you are critical of NATO's doctrine—and I am quoting from your statement—"the doctrine of not retreating from any territory on the allied side of the line, even if doing so would improve the ability to stabilize a line farther forward than would otherwise be the case."

Are you suggesting that NATO should revise its forward defense doctrine?

Dr. BROWN. I am suggesting, Mr. Chairman, that there ought to be somewhat more flexibility tactically in using natural barriers, in creating artificial barriers, and in allowing a temporary retreat back of some areas if that means that you end up better off.

The forward defense strategy is reasonable, but when applied to mean no movement back from the border at all, I think it allows inadequate flexibility.

Chairman NUNN. I have always understood the forward defense strategy to be a political strategy that is there notwithstanding its severe military disadvantage. Is that a fair expression, or would you categorize it otherwise?

Dr. BROWN. It has its genesis, I think, largely in the great difficulty that any German Government would find in admitting that a Soviet or Warsaw Pact attack would probably occupy some German territory in the early stages of a war.

Chairman NUNN. Is it not true that if you carry forward defense to an illogical conclusion and really are rigid in your response, that in an effort to protect all of the territory you could end up losing all of the territory by being rigid and having breakthroughs and then having lost the capacity to have the mobility to respond to those breakthroughs?

Dr. BROWN. Well, the answer is yes. And of course, the Soviet Union experienced that itself in World War II. Stalin's order not to surrender any territory meant that many hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops were taken prisoner by the Nazis and the German advance went farther and more rapidly, probably, than it otherwise would have.

Chairman NUNN. I note you make what I think is a very significant point. I also note that you make the point of saying that over the long haul we ought to quietly have more flexibility with American forces in Europe.

In other words, rather than withdrawing forces, have those forces more flexible in the sense that we would have quiet political understandings about American forces being able to be used in other parts of the world.

Is that correct?

Dr. BROWN. Yes. It was in the part of my statement that I did not read, but I am glad to see that you did.

I think that rather than pulling forces back to the United States, where they are farther from some of the areas that we might like to use them in, we need to have quiet understandings with the Europeans that in crises some of them might be used elsewhere.

Now, I think that as a practical matter, in an extreme case we could probably do that even now. And to insist on doing it publicly and making a big thing of it might make it harder.

But behind the scenes, at least, discussions of this sort ought to go forward, and obtaining that kind of flexibility, even more than we have now, would be very important to do.

Chairman NUNN. I am inclined to agree with both of those suggestions, and I am trying to put the two suggestions together.

One is more flexible, less rigid forward defense; and number two, more flexible U.S. forces. When you talk about moving U.S. forces to other areas of the world in an extreme crisis situation, does that not also go to the type of forces we should be seeking in Europe? Would those forces not naturally have to be lighter than other forces? Or would we not have to have considerable sealift capability or airlift capability available for that transport?

Dr. **Brown**. Yes. But I think it is a little more complicated than that. Light forces can be defined in two ways—light in that they are easy to carry because they do not have much equipment, but then the problem is that when they get there they cannot move very easily, because most of the weight of the equipment is in the helicopters or in the armored carriers that you need on the other end.

You may have to sacrifice mobility at the other end in order to save weight in carrying them over. And whether you can do that will depend upon what sort of combat you are going to face at the other end.

If you are operating against mobile, heavily armed and armored forces on the other side in relatively open country, the usual light forces, mountain troops or whatever, will not stand a chance. But in other circumstances, if you are operating against less heavily armed forces or in less open country, in the mountains rather than in the desert, then you may be able to use light forces.

We should remember that it is not just the Soviets who have high firepower now and high mobility. They have supplied and in some cases we have supplied third world countries with substantial forces. They are not just a bunch of ragged guerrillas in many cases, and we may need heavy forces.

Nevertheless, I agree with you that we do need a mix of forces and that even for our forces in Europe, probably some of them could well be armed in a less heavy way, that is a way that would allow them to be lifted more easily.

Chairman **Nunn**. What I am wondering, if Senator Warner will yield to me 1 more minute I will take it out of my second round, I am wondering if over the long haul—and I am not speaking of anything quick or radical or precipitous—we could not combine those two so that we have more flexibility with forward defense, more flexibility with American forces, and more of a mobile reserve role for American forces, with a forward defense presence, but some flexibility to move and fill gaps in the weaker sectors of the defense forward battle area, so that we would be able to move American forces more rapidly within the defense sector.

Dr. **Brown**. I think the answer is yes. But if you think strictly of Europe, then it depends on how much the United States is going to do on the central front and how much it is going to do on the flanks.

On the central front, it may well be that you need, and in fact you do need, a mix of heavy forces and lighter forces, but probably it is more sensible for the United States to contribute the heavy forces right there. The Europeans can easily contribute light forces in their reserves.

The Germans, for example, have very extensive reserves, but they are not very heavily equipped.

On the other hand, if the United States is going to play a substantial role on some of the flank nations, the ability to move from

Central Europe to the flanks is of the same order as, and the equipment will be more like, what you would need to move to the Middle East, for example.

So that part of the U.S. European force that is configured for possible movement to the flanks, because we cannot station them on the flanks, given the political situation, could also be useful for out of area situations.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brown, in the testimony by Secretary Carlucci when he was here a few days ago, he expressed a willingness to work with the Congress—this is very unusual—to fashion possible legislation, quite separate from the treaty, that would establish a commitment to support specific actions in the event the Soviets are found to be in significant noncompliance with the INF Treaty.

What is your view on such an extraordinary, and I believe, precedent-setting legislative course?

Dr. **Brown**. In the first place, Senator Warner, I would agree that it is important that it be quite separate from any ratification provisions or understandings. If done at all, it should be done separately.

As to whether it should be done at all, that would depend on the detailed provisions.

Senator **Warner**. Detailed provisions of what?

Dr. **Brown**. Of such legislation.

It is very difficult to prevision or foresee—I am sorry, I am not a word coiner.

Senator **Warner**. I think you just did it.

Dr. **Brown**. It is very difficult to foresee all of the possible violations or arguments about possible violations. And correspondingly, it would be difficult for me to say what such legislation should comprehend.

But I am willing to retain the idea. In other words, I do not reject the idea out of hand, because it is a very difficult and important problem. What do you do if there is a violation, short of abandoning or abolishing or withdrawing from the treaty?

We have not found a good solution to it. It could be that legislation of the kind you mention would be a deterrent to the Soviets to violations of the treaty. You are still going to be faced with the problem of going up to the edge, the Soviets going up to the edge of imprecise provisions, and there are always imprecise provisions.

But there would be a deterrent effect of provisions of that kind in legislation that could make it harder for the Soviets to decide, well, they are going to push us very hard, they are going to violate or almost violate or work right up to the edge, knowing that that would throw us into confusion.

Now, if the legislation were well drafted it could provide a deterrent.

Senator **Warner**. Of course, I am just speaking in terms of generalities. The nature of it, I suppose, would be a commitment between the President of the United States and the Congress at such time as a violation took place, to work together in full partnership to provide the adequate funds necessary to shore up whatever strategic requirements we may have in the face of this violation.

Dr. BROWN. In those general terms, it would be hard to argue against such legislation.

Senator WARNER. That brings me to my second question. The chairman and I along with Mr. Aspin were working on the future modernization of the strategic forces in the aftermath of the INF Treaty. We recognize, of course, that there will be a new President next year and we are trying to preserve as many options as possible, so that the next President has a free hand in charting the course of the strategic modernization program.

Most specifically, we are concerned about the mobile missile and the adequate funding that should be incorporated in the budget now being finalized, as we are talking here this morning, to preserve that option.

It was the view of the chairman and myself and Mr. Aspin in the letter that we transmitted that we feel that such funding should be made available to keep these options open.

Do you concur in that course of action?

Dr. BROWN. Yes, very strongly. I happen to believe that it remains important to have a survivable land-based ICBM. You know, it is not identical with the survival of the United States, but it is a significant element in deterrence.

This is not a new issue. It has been going on for at least 15 years that I have been involved in it, probably more like 20. And it has not been handled very well.

Senator WARNER. As the Soviets move more and more into mobility? They have now, of course, the road and the rail systems in various stages.

Dr. BROWN. Yes.

Senator WARNER. And here we are, still at the starting gate.

Dr. BROWN. Indeed. As I say, it has not been handled very well by the Congress or by successive administrations.

I am not very confident that we are going to be able to manage it. And the Republic will not fall if we do not, but we will look stupid and we will have less of a deterrent than I think we ought to have.

I sympathize with Secretary Carlucci's budgetary problem, and those that will face his successor, whoever that may be. And that makes it very hard to cover all these bases.

I myself think the administration's position, up until now at least, which is that the rail mobile MX is the solution, is not correct; that it does not really manage the bolt out of the blue attack. And so I would like to see the option for a Midgetman, hardened mobile Midgetman, kept open.

The situation in which the Soviets have an ICBM force that could survive an attack with no warning, but we do not, is an asymmetry that bothers me. I think it ought to be redressed.

As to how it is best redressed, I have my own ideas. Everybody has his own ideas. That is part of the problem. But it ought to be left for the next administration to come up with a solution, if they can, and make the choice if they are able to.

Senator WARNER. It seems to me we have that obligation to the next President.

My time is up.

Senator STENNIS [presiding]. Doctor Brown, we appreciate your being here. Your testimony is valuable, of course.

What specific steps could the U.S. Congress take, and specifically the executive branch, what could they do to achieve this desired result you have been talking about? Would you care to go into that?

Dr. BROWN. Specific steps to what end, Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. The desired results that you talked about.

Dr. BROWN. I think that in terms of the INF Treaty, the answer is a simple one. I think ratification is called for. In terms of the subsequent modernization of nuclear forces, I advocate—I know it will not be easy—working with the allies to reduce, but modernize, the battlefield nuclear weapon force, the missiles of below 300 miles range.

I have some doubts as to whether additional steps need to be taken in terms of aircraft, tactical aircraft carrying short-range air to ground missiles, but I think that ought to be looked at.

I think that, on conventional forces, the problem is not very different from what it used to be. The imbalance of conventional military capability persists. There are arguments as to whether it is worse than it was or better than it was.

But it would be desirable to reduce that imbalance. It can be done and should be done in two ways:

First, unilateral steps, and there I give a list of possibilities. I believe more precision-guided munitions, better target acquisition, data fusion, command and control, are the keys.

In purely equipment terms, I believe that command arrangements can be improved on the allied side. In terms of arms reduction, which I think has to be negotiated in parallel, a reduction of the capability to launch a surprise attack or an attack after mobilization ought to be pursued. That will require large reductions and asymmetric reductions in tanks and artillery on the two sides.

It is not too early for the administration to be working on this hard, because I think that conventional arms reduction is next after the summit, presumably next spring in Moscow. I think conventional arms control is going to be a major issue for discussion and negotiation.

Now, those are things for the administration to start. In congressional terms, a big question is what funds are going to be available for this. As I said in my prepared statement, I think the alliance expenditures would have to go up, absent any arms reduction agreements, to do what I say if the Soviets continue along their present lines of military development.

To gain additional confidence in allied ability to resist a Soviet attack and thereby to deter it might require a 10-percent increase over the next 4 years. Now, I am realistic enough to know that that is not going to happen. What would conceivably be possible on the part of the Congress, however, is more stability in funding than we have experienced over the past 10 years, with funds going down, then up very sharply, and now coming down again.

I do not want to make too big a thing out of the 2-year budget process, but I think it would be a help in that direction.

Those are some specifics, Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. My time is up.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brown, let me just ask you about page 22 and your recent response concerning some of the unilateral terms and NATO options that we ought to pursue in improving the conventional military balance.

You talked about in the first item, precision guided munitions and delivery systems of short and longer range. By that, on the delivery systems of short and longer range, are you specifically referring to perhaps the conventional cruise missile, air-launched and sea-launched? What do you have in mind there?

Dr. BROWN. I was thinking in terms of long range, of things up to 1,500 miles. I mean also for example conventional cruise missiles of range up to 600 kilometers, which under existing agreements, even lapsed agreements, you can launch from tactical aircraft.

I am thinking of even submarine-launched cruise missiles of range of 1,000 or 1,500 kilometers. There are limits to what you can do with those because the payload tends to be rather small for a conventional warhead, given that you are only going to have a few hundred of these. But that is what I meant by long range.

I am talking about things that could crater runways, for example, or take out hardened command posts, even with non-nuclear weapons.

Senator QUAYLE. The reason I bring this up is because, as you know, one of the points in the treaty—as a matter of fact, I personally think it was a mistake—is the giving up of the ground-launched conventional cruise missile. They have problems with the verification of it, which is an issue, but there are a lot of other verification problems. I just do not want to see that type of thinking carried over to the air-launched and the sea-launched conventional cruise missile, because I agree with you, particularly if we get this enhanced guidance and accuracy, that there is a lot of things we can use these conventional shorter and longer range delivery systems for.

Dr. BROWN. That is right, Senator Quayle. I think that if you look at the details of what a conventional defense would be like, most of the targets that you are talking about to defend against a massive attack would be within a few hundred, perhaps 600 kilometers.

And you can put a 600 kilometer range air to surface conventional missile on a tactical aircraft and reach almost any of those targets.

Senator QUAYLE. Let me turn to another subject, and I am going to draw upon your expertise not only as a former Defense Secretary, but negotiator, back with SALT I and the ABM Treaty, and ask you to go through a potential problem that I see in this treaty that could be very similar to our Agreed Statement D debate that we have been having.

At all costs, I hope we will avoid any Agreed Statement D issues in relationship to INF in the future. As a matter of fact, if we are going to have arms control agreements that are going to work, we need to reduce confusion and tensions, rather than creating confusion and tensions.

One of the problems I see in this treaty deals with article XIV, the so-called non-circumvention article. It says that basically—and I do not have it in front of me, but it basically says that we will do nothing else that would conflict with the provisions of this treaty. It is a very short and simple article.

It has been designated, and I refer to it as, the non-circumvention article. Now, obviously we have to give meaning to that article, and what its meaning is is of great question.

For example, when we had the Secretary of Defense before us, in response to Senator Warner's question on the Trident program with Great Britain, his response was that is an ongoing program and that would not circumvent the treaty and we could do that.

I then asked a question: What if down the road the British in fact want to deploy a ground-launched cruise missile with a range of, say 3,500 or 2,000 kilometers and they come to us, for help for the guidance system? Would that be interpreted as circumvention of this treaty?

And he said that he would have to get back to us, and I presume that in due time they will.

Another concern that you might think about is that as we get into—and Yasov, the new Defense Minister of the Soviet Union, has talked about—non-nuclear reconnaissance strike complexes. This gets into very much of a grey area of what may be considered an arguable, in this new verification commission, on what is circumventing the treaty.

How would you suggest that we proceed as a Senate, without sending back to the negotiations, but to have a clear understanding of what article XIV means, not just for today but for the debate that it may cause down the road? My personal opinion is that this is a very, very vague provision.

I believe history will show that it came in at the very end, that a number of people in our administration did not want it. But it is in there. We ought to find out what it means.

How, in lieu of the big hassle that we have had on Agreed Statement D, can we proceed in a very logical, reasoned way in getting a good, solid understanding of what article XIV means and how it imposes restrictions or allows us to do certain things and how the Soviets are going to agree to this?

Dr. **Brown**. To begin with, Senator Quayle, I would suggest that these treaties, whether it is the ABM Treaty of the INF Treaty or the SALT I Treaty or the SALT II Treaty, and whether these treaties are of unlimited duration or fixed duration, they cannot be viewed as carved in stone forever, because technology changes and circumstances change.

Even if Agreed Statement D did not exist, we would still be talking about how do you update, or some people would be talking about how do you abrogate, but others would be talking about how do you update the ABM Treaty. And I think that that is going to be true of this treaty as well. Either it has to be updated or it has to become part of a larger framework.

We all understand that, although you are abolishing a category of weapons here, it is a rather narrow category—it is the ground-based cruise missiles and ballistic missiles of ranges 500 to 5,500 kilometers—and that there are other systems that can do the same thing.

There are other systems in our own inventory that can do the same thing. And you are pointing out correctly that our allies might also have systems that would do the same thing.

Now, I was curious to see how the non-circumvention clause would come out in this treaty, and my own conclusion is that this is a very mild non-circumvention clause, to the extent that it is one at all. It says really as little as you could say and still say anything about this.

I would note that we probably maintained a good negotiating position in getting it because, after all, the allies are now allowed to do things that the Soviets and we are prohibited from doing, and this treaty does not change that.

I will not offer a judgment as to whether the specific example that you offered would be allowed or not allowed. I will say that the situation could well change over 5 or 10 years, because in 5 or 10 years from now, if strategic arms reductions actually take place, allied forces are going to be in my judgment brought into that picture in some way, and circumvention by transfer will be only a small part of the problem.

It is understandable to leave the British and French forces out at present levels or even at 50 percent of the present level of strategic forces. But at some point, even the French agree that they would have to be brought in.

I would note that this article is much less restrictive than the corresponding articles in the SALT and ABM Treaties, which say you cannot transfer blueprints or components to others that would do the same thing. And so I actually find this, as I say, relatively not restrictive.

But I would not want to mislead you. I think that it does leave some questions open for down the road, and the answers to those questions may change down the road.

Senator QUAYLE. Unfortunately, my time is up. What we need to do is to figure out a process of how we can answer those questions now for the future.

Dr. BROWN. And I am saying you cannot answer them now. You cannot be confident of answering them now for the indefinite future. What you would like to find, I think is a process that will allow you to keep giving answers as the external conditions change that do not exacerbate the inherent difficulties of arms control agreements with an adversary.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Quayle.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I too want to welcome the Secretary back to the hearing and thank him for a very informative statement. Let me focus on nuclear modernization in Europe. There is obviously broad support for conventional modernization, without judging the importance in terms of nuclear modernization.

You have talked a bit about this in your presentation and your statement is even more expansive on the issue. I think over the course of this past week we have heard some differences regarding modernization of short-range nuclear forces. Maybe it is a difference in concept or maybe we are talking just about nuances.

Earlier in the week, Mr. Schlesinger mentioned that the political situation in Europe, particularly in West Germany, is not hospitable to short-range nuclear modernization. He suggested that there was an overload in the public's fear in Europe on the nuclear questions.

The precise nature of short-range nuclear modernization is not clear. Perhaps we are talking about a Lance missile follow-on or whatever. But could you re-address that issue?

What should we expect if we move ahead with a modernization proposal? What should we be expecting, both with this administration and future administrations, in terms of the modernization of the nuclear force?

What are we going to be faced with if we advocate significant modernization, build right up to the limits of the INF Treaty before the ink is even dry on the agreement?

And how important is the modernization in your evaluation from a defense point of view and in terms of the political reality in Germany specifically?

Dr. Brown. As you say, Senator Kennedy, and as Jim Schlesinger said, political opinion in Germany, including the opinion of conservatives, would make it very difficult in the near future to do any nuclear modernization. We are therefore faced in the near term with the choice of that we are going to manage whatever gaps the INF Treaty leaves with existing longer range forces—aircraft-carried nuclear weapons, for example—or initiating a short-range nuclear force modernization program.

And for the short term, I think probably we are stuck with the first of those. But I do not think we should discard the other automatically or indefinitely.

From a military point of view, it seems to me to make sense to replace Lance missiles, which are short range and I guess they are 75 kilometers or something like that, and artillery, which is maybe 30 kilometers range, with a much smaller number of rather longer range forces, but forces still below the 500 kilometer limit of the INF Treaty, for several reasons.

In the first place, the further back they are, the more time you have before you have to use them or lose them.

In the second place, if their range is longer, even if they are farther back, you do not need as many to cover the same length of front, and so you could respond to the numerical concerns.

Those who say there are far too many nuclear weapons could be answered by saying, we are going to go to half or a third and still have as much military capability.

Unfortunately, those are all logical arguments and political sentiment is not always influenced by that sort of argument. And for that reason, I would not be in any hurry to decide this question.

On the other hand, you have to worry that, if we do not take an initiative, the only proposal on the table will be a Soviet proposal, which will be remove all the weapons on both sides.

And a delicate political judgment has to be made as to whether you are not better off with a prior initiative, trying to work it out with the Germans and saying, we are going to propose going to one-third, but modernizing. Now, I do not know that that would work.

But I am just saying that we should not dismiss that alternative out of hand, because if we do not follow it we may be faced with just one proposal which is going to produce the denuclearization of Europe. I think we can withstand that, but I think we will have a tough time.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me just move quickly into another area, and that is on START and SDI testing. As you pointed out, the military significance of this whole proposal is related to follow-on agreements. We have obvious hurdles to a START agreement in terms of sub-limits, SLCM's, mobile missiles and verification.

Recently Paul Nitze proposed the United States and Soviet Union negotiate a detailed list of acceptable space weapon tests. The Soviets have indicated some interest in the idea. And recently the Washington Post suggests that the JCS supports this proposal.

Do you see the proposal as a possible way to break the impasse over adherence to the ABM Treaty that is the most serious obstacle to progress in the area of START?

Dr. BROWN. I myself would support movement down that line, that is, trying to be rather more specific about what constitutes a weapon or a component of a space-based defense system which is prohibited under the ABM Treaty and what does not.

It is a very complicated matter and would take a lot of discussion and negotiation. There is a fear on the part of SDI advocates that it would ensure an even slower development of the system and might kill any possibility, and it is my impression that the President for that reason is completely unwilling to go down that road.

I think one way or another we are going to be forced to update, as I said, the ABM Treaty, and that is a way that I would proceed to try to do it, either now or next year or the year after.

It is not the only thing that has to be updated, but it is one aspect that I think should be pursued.

Senator KENNEDY. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator STENNIS [presiding]. Senator Thurmond, you are next, sir. I will call on you.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brown, we are glad to have you back with us.

Dr. BROWN. Thank you, sir.

Senator THURMOND. It seems like old times, seeing you here.

In your prepared remarks you indicated you would have preferred non-zero equality of weapons, but you point out that verification is simpler at the zero level. In your opinion, what are the military advantages of a fixed number of these weapons as compared to the enhanced opportunity to cheat that could result in reduced stability?

Dr. BROWN. Senator Thurmond, it is somewhat academic now, but my own judgment in the late seventies and early 1980's was that the additional capability for a rapid, very limited response attacking Soviet or Warsaw Pact air bases, military command centers, choke points, with weapons that could be delivered in 15 minutes (or an hour, half an hour) from the theater, would improve that particular rung of the ladder of deterrence, and so there was a military value, as well as the political value of responding to what was essentially a European concern about coupling.

As I say in my statement, that has to be weighed against the verification value of having no weapons in this category. And although I would have come out probably in the early 1980's on the side of saying there ought to be a few hundred warheads left, I think it is a close call. And the way things have worked out, there is no way to go back to that now.

So I say it is a close call. I would have preferred the other outcome, but this outcome is not significantly worse, and it is irreversible now.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brown, given our technological capability, the United States could deploy conventional systems with the same or better accuracy as that of the ground-launched cruise missile and the Pershing II. There are the obvious range and payload tradeoffs.

But the point is, the precision is accurate. What will be the future impact on our conventional systems by entering into the ban on missiles?

Dr. BROWN. Well, conventional and indeed nuclear forces, aircraft-carried or ship carried, are not banned by this. I think that for all other delivery systems we can still go ahead and get highly accurate delivery. So I do not think that this treaty interferes with that.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brown, we have received testimony concerning the modernization of the remaining nuclear systems in NATO and the need for continued improvements in our conventional forces.

Given the present fiscal constraints and the need to do both, how would you prioritize these needs?

Dr. BROWN. I would place the modernization of the conventional forces at a higher priority, in part because it is politically more feasible. It also costs more money, so that again you are going to wind up with a situation in which you do not have an absolute prioritization, that is you do not do all the conventional forces before you try to do some of the nuclear forces. But I would give the nuclear modernization a low profile and try to do something small, maybe symbolic, while spending most of the effort and most of the money on modernization of conventional forces.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brown, what do you assess to be the probability of increases in NATO defense spending over the next 4 years?

Dr. BROWN. I would assess the probability as low. I think that to some extent it will depend upon what the United States does. I think that the United States can be relatively flat in defense expenditures and still push the Europeans into doing a little bit more. I think if the United States continues to drop at a couple of percent a year, the Europeans will have lots of excuses and significant justification for not increasing theirs at all.

Senator THURMOND. From the statement that you have——

Senator STENNIS. Excuse me just a minute. I must ask you to excuse me. I have an appointment. I will have to go, and Mr. Levin will preside.

Senator THURMOND. Certainly.

From the statement that you have made and from the responses that you have given, I would assume that you strongly support this treaty and feel it is in the best interests of the United States.

Dr. **Brown**. That is correct, Senator Thurmond.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you very much, Dr. Brown.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all.

Senator **Levin** [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

Dr. Brown, welcome indeed. It is good to have you back, as always.

You have testified this morning to the types of things we can do to improve our conventional defenses, many of which we can do unilaterally. You, for instance, have referred to the absence of fixed defenses along the inter-German border. You have talked about the inflexible forward defense doctrine which could indeed make the defense of Germany more difficult, a doctrine which has a political origin, not a military origin. You have talked about the lack of plans for ground counterattacks, again a politically derived doctrine rather than a militarily derived doctrine.

So there are a lot of ways in which we have hampered ourselves in terms of the conventional defense of Europe. Ambassador Abshire was here the other day, and he referred to these or similar actions on our part, or inactions on our part, as self-created vulnerabilities.

A number of these can be done with relatively little expense. Some of them are doctrinal. The barriers, for instance, are a fairly modest cost compared to the couple of days that they might buy us in terms of the defense of Europe.

Why have these things not been done before? What makes you more optimistic that they are doable now than they were in prior years?

Dr. **Brown**. I did not say I was optimistic, Mr. Chairman, but about some of them I think I am a little bit more optimistic.

The reason they have not been done is that the Germans on whose territory much of this would have to be done are in a difficult political condition. Alliance minded Germans, relatively pro-American, have said to me, you have to recognize that Germany is in a peculiar situation. It has the heritage, lives with the consequences of German aggression and crimes in World War II, a divided Germany, on sufferance from its neighbors, under the gun in terms of being faced by 20 Soviet divisions in the group of Soviet forces in Germany stationed in East Germany, a Germany with great economic capability, and a Germany in which the generation that saw its economic revival and political integration into the Western community with American help and American support being replaced by a new generation that feels no responsibility or little responsibility itself for what happened before it was born and has no reason to feel particularly grateful for American or other allied help.

That makes for a difficult situation, and it means that such things as fixed fortifications or defenses would symbolize permanent division of Germany, which they all realize is likely to be very long lived if not permanent, but they do not want to build a 300-mile monument along the western side of the border to go with the Iron Curtain. It makes it difficult for them to do that.

Many Europeans also mistakenly say a conventional war would be just as bad for them as a nuclear war, which shows that they do not really know what nuclear war would be like. So they are disinclined to do anything that they associate with a greater likelihood or a more realistic facing up to the possibility of a conventional war, which we would all admit is very unlikely anyway.

Well, why am I more optimistic? I am a little more optimistic because I think that when it comes to relatively unobtrusive ways of setting up defenses, which I think may be possible, the Germans and the United States have been working on those, I think some of that will happen.

I also think that some of the doctrinal inhibitions can perhaps be fuzzed over. They cannot be reversed, but I think they can be fuzzed over.

Senator LEVIN. Including the forward defense?

Dr. BROWN. That is hard, but I think even that can be fuzzed over. We will have to see, but I have some hopes.

Senator LEVIN. Dr. Brown, in your testimony you have indicated that we should be prepared for protracted and difficult negotiations in conventional arms control. I am wondering whether you would link the conclusion of a START Treaty, not the INF but the START Treaty that is being negotiated, a treaty which we have not seen yet, obviously, but would you link that to an agreement on conventional arms control?

Dr. BROWN. No, I would not because I think you can go down by 30 percent, which is what the alleged 50 percent really is, or you can go down even by 50 percent and not reduce the strategic deterrent to the point where redressal of whatever conventional imbalance there is becomes an immediate necessity.

If a START Treaty of the kind that we have been hearing about takes place with or without an SDI agreement (my own judgment is it probably would have to include some sort of understanding on SDI, but that is irrelevant to this), strategic deterrence would be at least as good as now, and extended deterrence will not be any worse than it is now.

I think that conventional arms control in military terms is important to proceed with, but I do not think that the conventional imbalance becomes more dangerous on the basis of, as a result of the conclusion of a START agreement of the kind that we have heard about.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. My time is up.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.

Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Brown, while Chairman Nunn was out of the room I think I heard an implicit endorsement of the build-down concept as applied to conventional weapons in Europe. Dr. Brown suggested that what we ought to do is submit to the Soviets a proposal that we modernize our short-range nuclear capability at the same time as reducing. In the absence of that, we have only a Soviet proposal, which is total denuclearization of Europe. I think what we have is an endorsement of the build-down concept that you and I submitted on strategic weapons several years ago, and I would hope the administration would perhaps take that into account in proposing it to the Soviets.

Dr. BROWN. We had better talk to our allies before we do it, however.

Senator COHEN. I understand.

Dr. Brown, you indicated that the INF Treaty is a military side show in the sense that the symbolism is more important than the military significance, that the Soviets can achieve through strategic weapons what they could through the intermediate-range.

In any event, let me ask you a question that is hypothetical. Assuming that a majority, or at least 40 Members of the Senate, became convinced for one reason or another that the DIA analysis of the amount of the INF systems that the Soviets have was correct, and that the CIA estimate was wrong, constituting in essence an a priori violation of the treaty. Would you recommend the Senate, under those circumstances, reject the treaty for a violation?

Dr. BROWN. I have not seen the analysis, so I cannot evaluate it.

Senator COHEN. I am not asking you to pass judgment on DIA versus CIA. I am asking you as a hypothetical, if you became satisfied that the DIA's estimate was correct, would you recommend in that case a rejection?

Dr. BROWN. What I would recommend is that the Senate say to the administration, go back and get an explanation and a resolution of this. If the Soviets are in fact in violation by having given false numbers, then as a practical political matter, I think the Senate would find it hard to ratify. But I would not reject. I would go back and say get a resolution of this.

Senator COHEN. With regard to this particular treaty, the administration talks about effective verification. When you were Secretary of Defense we talked about adequate verification. Is there any significant difference between adequate and effective verification?

Dr. BROWN. If it is adequate, it is effective in my judgment.

Senator COHEN. So we use a different word but basically the same standard? We have been told that effective is a much more stringent test than adequate. I have yet to see—maybe the difference is metaphysical, but I have not been able to put a value on it just yet.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Cohen, if I could interrupt without costing you any time, Secretary Carlucci acknowledged the other day that there is no real difference between "adequate" as used by the Carter administration, and "adequate" as being used now, and there is no difference between either one and "effective." While he was saying that, there were some people on the front row with him who were shaking their heads vigorously, but nevertheless——

Senator COHEN. If I could respond to your statement without losing any time, let me point out that we have concurrent hearings going on in the Intelligence Committee right now. As of yesterday's hearing, there was a statement made by a very high level official that there indeed was a distinction between adequate and effective.

Dr. BROWN. The distinction is who is in office. [Laughter.]

Senator COHEN. A point on the special Verification Committee.

Dr. Brown, under the SALT II regime we had an SCC that has been effectively or adequately eliminated, and we now have a special Verification Committee. Among my concerns is the fact that there is no charter for it, there are no regulations, there are no understandings. We have a host of ambiguities in this document, and it seems to me we are asking for future trouble without some definitional guidelines. But that is a statement rather than a question to you.

Let me move on to point No. 5 on my list here, and that is the DOD-Commissioned Study Discriminate Deterrence. You talked about the political instability in Europe right now concerning where are we going and the events in Reykjavik. You, yourself, have endorsed the need to go forward with reductions in conventional as well as chemical weapons. We now have Mr. Genscher who is promoting actively a serious reduction in battlefield and tactical weapons. We have Mr. Strauss, very conservative head of the CSU party, also talking along these lines.

It seems to me that the paper that we have put out called "Discriminate Deterrence" may in fact add fuel to that instability in Europe by its statements, for example, on chemical weapons, something that you and I have worked for during the past year in a study group. The United States has submitted a treaty dealing with chemical weapons, and the administration stated it to be adequately verifiable or effectively verifiable, at least up until last year. Discriminate Deterrence indicates, however, that we cannot achieve the elimination of chemical weapons because we cannot have adequate verification.

Now, if that is the case, it seems to me that the Europeans might see us as backing away from our commitment to seek a chemical ban, and that in turn might add some torque to what is taking place on their denuclearization policy.

Dr. BROWN. I was not a participant in that study, Senator Cohen, but I have read it. I conclude that it was not the intention of its authors either to decouple the United States from Europe or to upset the Europeans. I can understand why some of the statements in that report would raise European concerns, and I think it notable that the administration has not endorsed the report, in part probably for that very reason.

It is not the first time that prestigious people out of office have caused the Europeans to worry about the U.S. commitment, the Kissinger speech in Brussels, the Gang of Four statement about no first use and so forth, and I think we need to reassure them.

Senator COHEN. Usually we do not achieve our prestige until we are out of office, Dr. Brown, as you well know. You receive much kinder treatment now than you did when you were in office, and we look back with a great deal of nostalgia to the time when you were testifying as Secretary of Defense.

You talked about the issue of going forward with upgrades and modernizations, and I think most of us wholeheartedly support that. But right now Mr. Shevardnadze is launching a full court press to persuade the Germans, in particular, not to do this because it violates the "spirit" of the INF agreement.

As I recall, there was a time in 1973 and 1974 when the Soviets took steps that had the potential to help upgrade the SA-5—perhaps I am wrong on that, but as I recall it was the SA-5—and we said, wait a minute, that violates at least the spirit of the ABM Treaty.

Are we now faced with a similar problem where we argue that we need to upgrade the Lance, for example, and they say, that violates the spirit?

Dr. BROWN. It is always, I think, dubious to argue about the spirit of a treaty. It suggests that the negotiators did not do a very good job, and that is often the case, sometimes inherent in the limitations of knowledge, language and the problem of time and technological and other change that I mentioned.

I think we are on better grounds, reasonably good grounds, here because one thing is clear in this treaty, and that is the distances. It is clear that it does not affect things below 500 kilometers, and we should keep pushing that. I would expect the Soviets to keep pushing their line because they have a better integrated military, diplomatic and arms control strategy than we have.

Senator COHEN. No Senate to contend with.

Dr. BROWN. And their allies as yet are not quite so contentious either.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen.

Senator Wirth, I believe you are next.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Secretary, thank you for your very eloquent testimony and excellent answers to questions.

Presumably a primary goal of ours is to deter the possibility that a Soviet surprise attack would be successful, is it not?

Dr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator WIRTH. Secretary Schlesinger said that that was our first goal, and I think that Secretary Carlucci and Ambassador Abshire and others agreed. A broad consensus exists that we should be concerned about the success of a Soviet surprise attack and should be doing everything we can to deter that or make it less possible.

And I think you note the same thing in your deployment.

There are a variety of ways, it seems to me, that one can go about doing that. We have been talking a great deal here about the modernization of nuclear weapons and about the conventional balance. What I wanted to ask you about was the other areas we might call a softer path. I am speaking of, one, confidence building measures, and second, discussions of strategy or doctrine, depending on how that is defined on both sides.

First of all, on confidence building measures, it seems to me that it is logical to assume that the possibility of a successful surprise attack would be limited if we had better information about what the other side is doing, and that we could get better information by building upon the agreements that we have so far negotiated and executed coming out of Stockholm in 1986, the observation groups of various kinds of exercises of the Soviets' and the inspections coming out from various challenges.

What I wanted to do was to ask you if you could comment on, one, the history of confidence building measures, second, how effective you think they have been so far, what we have learned pro and con coming out of the 1986 Stockholm agreements, and third, what your conclusions are as to where we might go from here.

Dr. **Brown**. I think you have raised a very important area for consideration, Senator Wirth. I think that when we talk about arms control and reduction, we ought to talk—and I slighted it in my written testimony, but I feel strongly about it; I am in favor of it—we ought to talk not only about force levels and equipment, but confidence building measures. By those we mean both knowledge of the operational movements of the other side in peacetime and their operational state, where they are, how ready they are and so forth. By knowing about and limiting those measures, those capabilities, it is possible to reduce the ability of both sides, and what we worry about is the Warsaw Pact side, to launch a surprise attack. We reduce their ability and we reduce our worries about it because, providing that the capability is low enough, a confident knowledge that it is low enough reduces the risk of an inadvertent war in which the two sides mobilize and start down a road like that that led, was the occasion of the outbreak of World War I.

I think that has been understood for a long time, and indeed, was first the subject of a negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1958 in Geneva, a conference on surprise attack. I happened to be in Geneva for another arms control negotiation with the Soviets then, so I remember it, and it appalls me to think that I have been at this now for 30 years.

But not much was accomplished at that conference. It was mostly about strategic war, and it was before the era of the ICBM.

The Vienna talks, the MBFR talks, did not pay any attention to this. They were just talking about force levels. The CSCE in Stockholm did lead to discussion of confidence building measures. Some of it came up in Vienna, actually, and did not get anywhere, largely because of Allied reactions rather than Soviet reactions. It turned out that the Germans had big trouble with the idea of overflight by Soviet aircraft to verify some of these troop movements. A lot of the allies and we ourselves had some problem with limitations on out-of-garrison movements of forces and on reinforcement. We need to be able to reinforce because our troops are very far away.

Despite this, some limitations on exercise magnitudes and some provisions for observers did come out of the CSCE. My understanding is that there have now been some exercises in which there have been observers from the other side, and that those have been useful in providing our side with greater understanding of the readiness of Soviet forces, and perhaps some reassurance that we do not have as much to worry about as some of us thought.

I think this is potentially a fruitful area for further negotiation and agreement. And I think that to the extent the Soviets really do worry—and I have no way of knowing how real those worries are—about a situation in which the allies might actually attack (I find it incredible, but I think it is conceivable they do worry about it) we actually have a lever which makes them interested in pursuing such things.

Now, they will want to pursue them anyway even if they have no concern about allied attacks because they will see it as a way to limit allied military capability. But that is always going to be the case in arms control limitations, be they force structure or operational readiness. You are going to try to keep the other side's capabilities down because that is what you worry about.

I think we have a lot to gain by pursuing that option.

Senator Wirth. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

Thank you.

Chairman Nunn. Thank you, Senator Wirth.

Senator Exon.

Senator Exon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Dr. Brown, welcome to you once again.

I listened with great interest to your statement. I agree with you on the INF proposal. Indeed, I from the beginning have supported this proposal. But we have to take a very hard, close look at the details of it, and you helped a great deal this morning in your usual scholarly and yet understandable approach to the problem.

I want to take you first to page 22 of your statement, and I quote, "In unilateral terms, NATO options for improving the conventional military balance include the following: A, introduction of additional advanced technology into the Allied forces."

I learned in a breakfast meeting this morning for the first time that we, our negotiators, now feel and agree that we are prevented under the terms of this treaty from assisting our NATO allies with improvements in their systems that would in any way fill in for the withdrawal of INF missiles.

Does that give you any cause for concern?

Dr. Brown. I have to hear what the opinions are, but I do not think they interfere with our transfer of conventional technology. It seems to me that we can help them with precision guided munitions without violating the terms of this treaty. Those are non-nuclear, and by and large their range will be shorter than the limits.

But I would have to know what specifically we are prohibited from. Certainly, for many of the things that I have in mind here, antitank systems, for example, air-launched cruise missiles of 300 or 400 kilometers, it seems to me that we are not prohibited from doing them, and we are not prohibited from transferring them to our allies or helping our allies to do them. There are other things that we may be prohibited from.

Senator Exon. There is very much of a question on this. We got into a discussion as to whether or not we could lend or give them cruise missiles. That might be allowed, but our assisting the French, for example, or the English in developing a guidance system, if it in any way adversely affected the overall balance would be prohibited.

I do not know how important this is, but it was a new wrinkle that most of us had not heard of before, and I think bears some further explanation. As an expert in this field, I would hope that you would check into that a little bit and give us your advice on it as we move along.

Dr. Brown. There clearly is some effect because, although it was not done explicitly as part of the treaty, the German-operated Pershing I's are coming out, so that there is some overlap there, I agree with you.

Senator Exon. I want to turn to the question that was asked you very early in the question session by Senator Warner regarding our land-based deterrent.

You are generally considered to be the father or the stepfather or the godfather or the grandfather or at least a friendly uncle of the MX missile and I was interested, not surprised but interested in your response to Senator Warner's question with regard to the small ICBM.

Under the Carter administration, you moved aggressively on the MX missile on the grounds that it was a mobile missile, and I believe, if I am not incorrect—I was not in the Congress at that time—but the basic reason for the MX at that juncture was that the Minuteman II and III deterrents were vulnerable because they were "sitting duck" targets of the Soviet Union, and that the MX, since it was mobile, would be more of a deterrent.

Was that a basic reasoning at that time?

Dr. Brown. That is correct, Senator Exon. The basing system, however, is everything. The missile by itself is neither vulnerable nor invulnerable.

Senator Exon. I agree.

Dr. Brown. It depends on where it is, and multiple protective shelters are one way. I think they are relatively invulnerable. Railroad-mounted missiles are invulnerable once they are out of the base or, say, a couple of hours after they are out of the base. Before then they are not.

The size, whether it is Midgetman size with one warhead, Minuteman size with three warheads, or MX size with 10 warheads, is a separate dimension, and it really has to do with what is best from the point of view of cost per warhead, which is generally less for a bigger missile, and what is best from the point of view of arms control.

You would like as few warheads per aimpoint as possible, but if the other side does not know where the aimpoint is, then you do not care as much. We have to remember that a Trident submarine is a single target with 200 warheads, and we put up with that because we are highly confident that it is not a target that can be hit.

Senator Exon. Well, let me just pursue that a little bit further.

You have indicated that the Midgetman would be, and I would agree, an excellent deterrent and protection from a bolt out of the blue scenario.

With your considerable expertise in this area and with the very latest information that we have, do you not agree that the chances of a bolt out of the blue attack have subsided considerably since the late 1970's?

Dr. Brown. Yes, but they were low then. It is largely a change in political situation that leads us to believe that it is still lower. When you acquire weapons systems, you have to think, hard as it is, difficult as it is for any of us, about what the situation will be 15 or 20 years from now, both in political terms and in military, technological terms.

A land-based ICBM that is vulnerable to a surprise attack does not bother you if you have other systems that are invulnerable, relatively invulnerable. If you look ahead 15 years, Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile accuracy will be high enough so that a simultaneous attack on fixed land-based ICBMs and bomber bases will be feasible. That will leave, that by itself would still leave, our submarine-launched ballistic missiles invulnerable, but you worry, not very much, but you do worry some about a Soviet ASW breakthrough.

That is not going to happen, probably ever, and almost certainly not in the next 5 or 10 years, but it might happen later on, and you would like to have another insurance policy.

This is sort of like an umbrella insurance policy that takes care of you above a certain level. Very unlikely, and it may be that Midgetman is too expensive an insurance policy for that coverage, but that is what its purpose would be.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, one last short question, if I might, if you would indulge me, because that was my last question.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Exon, I have to go to a meeting. If you would not mind closing this out, Senator Wirth may also have questions, I will leave you in charge. Secretary Brown we thank you very much for your excellent testimony.

Dr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Tim, may I ask one question?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Assume that you were going to be the Secretary of Defense under a new administration starting next year for 8 long and difficult years. Now, please do not say that I will not answer the question because that is beyond the realm of all possibility because with that you would destroy and not have to answer the question. But assume you were going to be the Secretary of Defense for the next 8 years, my question is where would you get the money out of the defense budget, and what would you sacrifice to provide the $40 billion to build the Midgetman system that you have endorsed here this morning?

Dr. BROWN. Well, the prospect that you describe is probably not as bad as a thermonuclear war, but it is almost as bad. Nevertheless, I will answer the question.

I would take most of the money out of other parts of the strategic program. You see, I do not know what the budget looks like for 3 or 4 or 5 years from now, but I know that the current administration's budget shows a lot of money for SDI, probably an average of $6 billion a year over that period, and I think $3 billion of that could be dispensed with.

Well, that is a fair amount of money. However, it is not enough for $40 billion. And I would look at the rest of the strategic programs as well. I would re-examine the mobile MX—I'm sorry, the train-launched MX, and I would look again at the SLBM program.

Now, the SLBM program is the heart of our deterrent, and I would not want to eviscerate it, but I might change it somewhat. I think we probably have too many missile warheads on Trident submarines, and I would look for a way and hope that it would not be a more expensive per warhead method of going to smaller submarines.

Actually, it probably would be more expensive, but the changeover for a bigger to a smaller submarine would delay the expenses, at any rate, and that might make some room.

Senator EXON. I take it, then, that you, with what you have just said, you place a high degree of necessity for a small ICBM, even to the extent of curtailing somewhat the submarine-launched missile program?

Dr. **Brown**. Of delaying its modernization somewhat, but I said earlier, Mr. Chairman, that this is not a life and death matter, and what I am advocating is leaving it to the next President and the next Secretary of Defense to make that tradeoff, and I would not presume to make it for them, now or then.

What I have tried to do is give you some examples of what they might consider. They might not come to that conclusion. But it is at least an option for them.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you, Dr. Brown. As usual, you have been most helpful, and we have enjoyed your testimony.

Senator Wirth.

Senator **Wirth**. Mr. Secretary, let me, if I might, go back for a few minutes while we have got you here, to talk some more about confidence building measures. I was glad to see you say that it had been an oversight in not including those in your testimony. I find, being a relatively junior member of the committee, I come generally last in the questioning, and I find that this is very productive turf, that most people do leave it out until, and then they say yes, that is a good idea.

I just came back, as my colleagues have heard me say, I just came back from 2 weeks in talking to a lot of our command in Europe, and I learned an enormous amount.

One of the things that I learned was the great respect that they have for the potential of confidence building measures, and I came back with the belief that our military people in this area are way ahead of the civilian political leadership of the country. I shared that observation yesterday with some members of European parliamentarians in the Atlantic Assembly, and they agreed in the same way, that there is somehow a great political reluctance to move on confidence building measures.

Let me give you just some of the thoughts that I got from them. First of all, our commanders said that the Soviets watching our Reforger strike exercise last fall, were very impressed with our capability, and that our commanders thought it was very good, that the Soviets saw the precision with which that operation was done, that it "got their attention" and would have a good effect on future negotiations that we might have.

We had the opportunity to see their troops, and as you suggested, how ready they were, and raised questions in our minds about that. We were able to observe real differences in the way in which various parts of the Warsaw Pact operated in their discussions with each other, and our commanders believed that this was to our advantage. But the Soviets have the capability of watching us a great deal more than we do of watching them. So our having observers there and having inspections there is in fact to our advantage and not disadvantage, as a lot of our political leadership previously had thought.

I heard suggestions that what we ought to be looking at is choke points, for example. There are some transportation points that, if we were able to have observers there, that that could be a very productive way of understanding if the Soviets or if the Warsaw Pact was mobilizing. We would have the opportunity to be at their storage sites. We ought to be pursuing a lot more exchanges between officers, we ought to have the opportunity to look at aircraft, certain aircraft maneuvers that our people felt would be very important, all of these, almost a regime of potential confidence building measures.

I just wanted to put that on the record and see if you had any reaction to either their observations or the potential specific steps that we might take.

Dr. BROWN. I agree, I concur with what you report, Senator Wirth, and I believe that it is an important dimension of reducing the risk of war.

Thinking ahead, I would suggest that at some point, if it has not been done already, some people are going to raise the disinformation issue, because whenever you are supplied information in a cooperative way, or an opportunity is made available, there is in an adversarial relationship the concern that you are somehow being fooled, and that if you rely too much on such information, it can be used as a weapon against you.

My own conclusion is that you need to worry about that, but that on net, there is really just no question that you are better off having these kinds of confidence building measures.

I just want to let you know ahead of time that as we pursue it, this question will come up.

Senator WIRTH. I raised that issue with a number of our intelligence people who were very confident that this should not happen. I think there is always the you-are-being-duped argument made by those who do not like a different way of thinking about this. I understand it, and it is good politics to say you are going to get duped and they are going to try to fool you, but I think on balance we learn at lot more coming in.

Dr. BROWN. We see it right now on the question of how many SS-20s are being hidden from us, and you are going to get some people—I am not saying it is right. I am just saying you always get some people in the intelligence community who say no, you are being fed wrong information.

Senator WIRTH. Let me ask you a final question while you are here.

One other possibility that a number of people were discussing was the potential of our talking strategy with Soviet military leaders. The belief among some was that the Soviets perceive much of what we do, whether this is just rhetoric or real perception, as offensive in nature, just as we perceive much of what they do as offensive in nature, and that perhaps it would be helpful for us to have discussions of strategy with them to see if there might be ways in which we organize ourselves, the way in which we train, the way in which we outline our strategy, you know, could be changed on either side which might lead both sides to some further understanding of the other and some further belief that, in fact, both were defensive in nature.

Dr. BROWN. I would support United States-Soviet discussions on strategy. Again, our information is sufficiently worse than theirs about what the other side has in mind that even partially correct or partially open discussions would be helpful to us.

I said in my testimony that the Soviets sometimes say, often say, that they are concerned about a surprise attack on them, or at least offensive actions against them, and one cannot know how much they believe it. It is hard for us to be objective, but trying to be objective, I really do not see that the disposition of our forces or nature of our forces supports that at all, and I would observe that it is my understanding that Soviet conventional wargames often begin and for the first couple of hours look like a NATO attack on them, but what evolves thereafter is exactly what it would have been if the Soviets had preemptively attacked.

So the disposition of their forces, their training and doctrine is such as to suggest that they do not really believe that they are going to be attacked, they do not organize their forces as if they are going to be attacked, they do not do their wargames, really, as if they are going to be attacked, although ostensibly the wargames sometimes open with that.

Senator **Wirth** [presiding]. Dr. Brown, thank you again on behalf of the committee for your very good testimony and your time with us this morning. We very much appreciate it.

Thank you, sir.

Dr. **Brown**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee recessed.]

NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

FRIDAY, JANUARY 29, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES FOR NATO DEFENSE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Wirth, Warner, Humphrey, Quayle, and Gramm.

Staff present: Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, Sherri Wasserman Goodman, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, and T. Kirk McConnell, professional staff members; Tiffany E. Berger, Barbara B. Brown, Barbara Gallo, Debra A. Rice, and Mickie Jan Wise, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; and Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

This afternoon the committee meets to conduct its sixth hearing on NATO defense and the INF Treaty. Today the committee holds its fourth hearing on the subject of strategy and capabilities for NATO defense, having received testimony earlier this week from Secretary Carlucci, Admiral Crowe, Dr. Schlesinger, and Dr. Brown. The committee has also conducted two hearings on the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance and NATO conventional force improvements and will continue to receive testimony on these subjects next week.

The testimony that the committee has thus far received confirms concerns that have been widely expressed about shortfalls in NATO's defense capabilities. The alliance must develop a common and enduring strategy for managing its continual challenges and opportunities. This hearing is designed to help lay the foundation for that strategy as well as looking at the INF Treaty itself.

We are pleased today to welcome a very distinguished witness, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. Her tenure at the United Nations has demonstrated her devotion to public service and to this country. Ambassador Kirkpatrick is now the Levy University Professor in the Department of Government at Georgetown University as well as a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

We are delighted to have you today, Madam Ambassador, and we look forward to your testimony.

Are there any other opening statements? If not, we will be delighted to get your testimony and then we will have questions.

STATEMENT OF HON. JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn. I would like to begin by thanking you and the committee for inviting me to testify. I welcome the opportunity to share my concerns about the treaty with the committee.

I should like to say that I am less worried about the terms of the treaty than I am about its consequences for the overall balance of forces in Europe and its impact on the alliance and on political trends inside the politics of our principal allies.

My first point is simply the reminder that the terms of a treaty are one thing and its consequences are quite another. Weapon for weapon, I think, the INF Treaty looks like a very good deal indeed. It requires the Soviets to destroy more missiles than we do, because they have more. In the abstract it appears to move Europe's strategic position back to the point at which the SS-20s were deployed against Western European capitals.

But the fact is, of course, that weapons do not exist in the abstract. They exist in very specific contexts and it is the context of the treaty and its overall impact which concern me.

The basic fact about that context is that the Soviet Union enjoys a widely acknowledged, generally understood advantage in conventional and chemical weapons. This Soviet advantage simply cannot be defined away or studied away. It exists and it is understood by all parties to exist. The fact of its existence has an impact on events. Moreover, the Soviets' relationship with its allies in the Warsaw Pact enable it to deploy its weapons in a fashion that magnifies its advantage.

The Soviet advantage is no longer offset by Western technology, and we should not delude ourselves about that. I think that we Americans have seen the Pershings and the cruise missiles principally as offsetting Soviet SS-20s, but while we have seen them that way they have long since taken on a broader significance for most pro-alliance Europeans.

It is widely believed in Europe that the removal of the Pershings and cruise missiles leaves Western Europeans more vulnerable to these Soviet forces. This point was made recently in a letter to the President by a group of Europeans who argued. "The intermediate-range missiles make a general contribution to deterrence through their ability to reach Soviet soil, a capacity not matched by any other land-based missiles in Europe. They link the European pillar of NATO to the U.S. pillar. They provide a crucial element at the level of tactical nuclear weapons, thereby ensuring a continuum of escalation."

European observers, experts, frequently emphasize that no other weapons except the intermediate missiles have the capacity to reach the Soviet Union, no other weapons that can be launched from Europe. For this reason alone, intermediate-range missiles make a crucial and unique contribution, they think, to deterring a Soviet attack.

They worry that the removal of the missiles, therefore, may encourage Soviet military planners to believe a conventional land battle can be successfully fought in Europe without risk of nuclear response.

As the committee knows, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger have made similar points, arguing that the Pershings and cruise missiles closed a gap in deterrence caused by the apocalpytic nature of strategic nuclear war. Thus, the intermediate-range missiles are seen in Europe very widely as a major component in Allied capacity for flexible response and a continuum of deterrence necessary to counter the Soviets' arsenal of diverse weaponry.

A third point made by many Europeans is that no other weapons have the capacity to threaten the Soviet Union without committing the United States to all-out nuclear war. The existence of intermediate-range missiles is thus seen as constituting a more credible deterrent, just because it does not require the United States to take the ultimate step to nuclear war.

Removal of the missiles seems, to many Europeans, to deprive Europe of a credible deterrent because they doubt, frankly, that the United States will, finally, when the chips are down, risk total nuclear war to deter a conventional attack. These doubts are deep and they are taken very seriously in Europe. And, because they are taken seriously in Europe by the political class and strategic publics, they should be taken seriously by us.

The impact of the treaty in Europe is also affected by the widespread belief that the Reagan administration has rushed the process for both personal and political reasons, and whether that is true or not, or fair or not, the wide perception that it is the case affects the understanding of the treaty there.

Europeans have gone from being concerned that Ronald Reagan did not desire an agreement to thinking he wanted it too badly. That must be very exasperating to the President and to the administration. But it is also a fact.

Where intermediate missiles are concerned, Europe is the front line. They are the principal target, the principal victims of any mistakes, and it is simply true that we Americans cannot simultaneously insist on U.S. reliability in the alliance and dismiss the European concerns. The United States has a great deal to lose geostrategically from a neutral Germany or a denuclearized, Finlandized Western Europe.

During the visit of Premier Gorbachev, a Soviet official noted on American television that Finland is not so badly off. It is also not capable of protecting its own independence. It lives off the existence of an alliance of nations who are capable of self defense.

The fallout from the Europeans' doubts and anxieties has already begun to strengthen anti-alliance parties in Western Europe at the expense of pro-alliance parties and to shift the balance of power within the pro-alliance parties from the most pro-Atlantic elements to those of more neutralist tendencies.

On balance, the treaty leaves Europe somewhat more vulnerable and the Soviet Union somewhat less vulnerable, and the alliance somewhat weaker. However, I also think the U.S. Senate should ratify the treaty.

Like many other people who have spent a good deal of time in Europe in recent years, I believe that there is a very widespread, deep and disturbing concern among our principal allies about the divisions in the U.S. Government and the question, "Is America becoming ungovernable?" has become a familiar question.

I think that it would be profoundly disconcerting to our European allies if at this stage of this process the Senate were to reject the treaty. Around the world it would be interpreted as one more important evidence that the United States is in disarray, incapable of pursuing a coherent policy and incapable, therefore, of being a reliable ally.

We would be blamed for the continuing vulnerabilities created by SS-20s in case the treaty were not ratified, and it would be said to prove that we are not interested in disarmament and reducing arms. Therefore, I believe the treaty should be ratified.

But I also think that in ratifying the treaty the Senate should understand that it has not really contributed to our security or that of our allies and has created some new problems that should be promptly and seriously addressed by our Government.

Specifically, especially I think that the administration, understanding European deep concerns and anxieties that have already weakened key links in the alliance, should take great pains to truly consult with the allies in advance of future negotiations and agreements, not merely inform them after the fact of our decisions. There is no doubt that our allies feel that at Reykjavik and in the INF talks the United States presented them with fait accomplis on subjects of profound concern to their security.

This lack of consultation has shaken Allied confidence in the United States. Only advance and continuing consultation will ensure that essential elements of European security are not deemphasized. Such consultation will also ensure that account is taken of conventional forces and of chemical weapons in future negotiations, and it will ensure that we do not confuse the reduction of nuclear arms with the reduction of the risks of war or of conquest.

Second, I think that these developments have illustrated the importance of strengthening the European component in the defense of Europe. The United States should encourage new European efforts, including Franco-German military cooperation, and should view such European arrangements as reinforcing rather than competing with NATO.

Third, obviously, we should be concerned about compliance with the terms of the treaty. We should remember that from Yalta forward through the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, SALTs I and II, and the ABM Treaty compliance has been the principal problem. I believe, frankly, that in agreements with the Soviet Union our treaties should provide for not only monitoring compliance but also for automatic termination of agreements in case of established noncompliance. I would like to see the Senate consider this problem.

I would like to emphasize too that I think that the United States approach to arms reduction—as exemplified in the treaty—reflects the lack of a comprehensive conception of the balance of forces. I should very much hope that in future dealings with the Soviet Union we will proceed from not on a weapon-by-weapon, category-by-category, ad hoc incremental approach, but from an integrated conception of the total balance of forces and the potential risks of war for ourselves and our allies. Specific kinds of weapons are significant only as they contribute to our total strength and vulnerability.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kirkpatrick follows:]

TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK

I thank the committee for its invitation to testify today. I have concerns which I welcome the opportunity to share with the committee. My concerns are of several kinds, but let me say at the outset that I am less worried about the terms of the treaty than I am about its consequences for the overall balance of forces in Europe, its impact on the alliance and on political trends in Western Europe.

My first point is simply the reminder that the terms of a treaty are one thing, and its consequences quite another. Weapon for weapon, the impending treaty looks like a good deal. It requires the Soviets to destroy more intermediate-range missiles than we do -- because they have more. In the abstract, it seems to move Europe's strategic position back to where it was before the Soviet Union targeted SS-20s against Western European capitals, thus stimulating NATO's decision to deploy American Pershings and cruise missiles.

But weapons systems do not exist in the abstract. They exist in particular military, political and cultural circumstances. As Pasteur said once of a disease, "The germ is nothing, the environment is everything."

The military circumstances in which the INF Treaty exist are clear. The Soviet Union enjoys a widely acknowledged, generally understood advantage in conventional and chemical weapons. Unfortunately, this Soviet advantage is not eliminated by hurried redefinitions. It exists. And it is understood by all parties to exist. The potential effects of this advantage are magnified by the forward deployment of essential military components. The advantage is no longer offset by superior Western technology. We should also be clear about that.

While Americans have seen Pershings and cruise missiles principally as offsetting Soviet SS-20s, they have long since taken on broader significance for most pro-alliance Europeans.

It is widely felt in Europe that the removal of the Pershing and cruise missiles leaves Western Europeans more vulnerable to these Soviet forces. The point, made again and again in Europe, was stated clearly by a group of Europeans in a letter to Ronald Reagan. They argued that "intermediate range missiles make a general contribution to deterence through their ability to reach Soviet soil -- a capability not matched by any other land-based missiles in Europe; they link the European pillar of NATO to the U.S. pillar; they provide a crucial element after the level of tactical nuclear weapons, thereby ensuring a continuum of escalation."

Europeans frequently emphasize that no other weapons, except the intermediate missiles that can be launched from Western Europe, have the capacity to reach the Soviet Union. For this reason alone intermediate range missiles make a crucial and unique contribution to deterring a Soviet attack.

They worry that removal of the missiles therefore may encourage Soviet military planners to believe that a conventional land battle can be successfully fought in Europe without risk of a nuclear response.

As you know, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger have made a similar point arguing that the Pershings and cruise missiles "closed a gap in deterrence caused by the apocalyptic nature of strategic nuclear war."

The intermediate range missiles are seen then as a major component in Allied capacity for flexible response and a "continuum of deterence" necessary to counter the Soviets arsenal of diverse weaponry.

A third major point made by many Europeans is that no other weapons have the capacity to threaten the Soviet Union without committing the U.S. to all out nuclear war.

The existence of intermediate range missiles is thus seen as constituting a more credible deterrent, because it does not require the U.S. to take the ultimate step to strategic war. Removal of the missiles seems to many to deprive Europe of a credible nuclear deterrent, because it is doubted the United States will risk total nuclear war to deter a conventional attack.

These doubts are deep enough that their potential impact on the Alliance should be taken very seriously. As Robert Tucker observed in the current National Interest: "Given the apocalyptic nature of nuclear war, the credibility required for allies is very different from the credibility required for adversaries. Adversaries may need only a threat of modest credibility to be deterred. But allies seem to need a form of assurance that approaches certainty."

The total impact of the treaty in Europe is also affected by the widespread belief that the Reagan Administration has rushed the process for personal and political reasons. True or not, fair or not, the perception affects the reception and impact of the Treaty.

A good many Americans find themselves more than a little exasperated by European anxieties in these matters. Ronald Reagan particularly must find it irksome to have gone from being accused of not wanting an agreement to wanting one too badly.

But where intermediate range missiles are concerned, Europe is the front line, and Americans cannot simultaneously insist on U.S. reliability and dismiss European concerns. At some point their concerns become our concerns. The United States has a great deal to lose -- geostrategically -- from a neutral Germany or a denuclearized, Finlandized, Western Europe.

"Finland is not so badly off" a Soviet official noted during the Gorbachev visit. It is also not capable of protecting its own independence, and lives, I fear, off the existence of an alliance of nations, who, collectively, are capable of self defense.

A French official wrote in Politique Etrangere: "Never have the Soviets advertised so openly the objectives the West has always attributed to them: denuclearization of Europe, de-linkage of Europe and the United States, and creation of a new all-European "security system."

This offical believes Gorbachev laid a "remarkable diplomatic trap" into which the United States willingly fell. The French weekly Express saw the "Gorbachev effect" at work on both sides of the Atlantic -- sowing doubts about the reality of the Soviet threat and exacerbating the psychological distance between the United States and Europe, all the while raising hope and intensifying anxieties about the German role in Europe.

Fallout from these doubts and anxieties will in the long run strengthen anti-Alliance parties in Western Europe at the expense of pro-Alliance parties, and shift the balance of power within these latter parties from the most pro-Atlantic elements to the more neutralist tendencies. The process has already begun.

I believe the treaty on balance leaves Europe somewhat more vulnerable, the Soviet Union somewhat less vulnerable and the alliance somewhat weaker.

It does not follow however that the Senate should not ratify the treaty. There is deep concern abroad -- and not only among Allies -- about the divisions in the American government.

"Has the United States become ungovernable?" has become a familiar question. Now, European leaders, parties and governments have made accommodations and public commitments to support the treaty. It would be profoundly disconcerting to them if the Senate were to reject the treaty. Around the world it would be seen as more proof that the United States government is in serious disarray, incapable of pursuing a coherent policy.

Moreover, failure to ratify would permit anti-American forces in Europe to blame the United States for continuing vulnerabilities created by SS-20s and anti-American forces in the world to depict us as uninterested in achieving security at lower levels of risk and expenditures. Neither is true.

I therefore believe the Treaty should be ratified. But the Senate -- and other Americans -- should understand that the Treaty -- though interesting -- has not contributed to our security, or that of our allies, but has created some new problems that should be promptly and seriously addressed by our government.

Specifically, I believe the Administration should take great pains in current and future negotiations affecting Allied security, to truly consult with the Alliance in advance of the negotiation of agreements, and not merely inform them after the fact of our decisions.

The combination of Reykjavik and INF talks shook sober Europeans' confidence in the reliability of the United States as the leader of the Western alliance. They were stunned that basic elements of NATO strategy were put on the table of Reykjavik, regarded as negotiable and nearly negotiated away -- all without consultation of European allies. And all feel that consultation came too late on INF to be very meaningful.

Advance and continuing consultation will ensure that essential elements of European security are neither ignored nor de-emphasized. It will ensure that account is taken of conventional forces and chemical weapons in future negotiations. It will ensure that reducing nuclear arms is not mistaken for reducing the risk of war or of conquest.

Second, these developments and their continuing consequences have illustrated for all the importance of strengthening the European component of the defense of Europe.

I believe the United States should encourage new European efforts including Franco-German military cooperation and should view such all-European arrangements as reinforcing rather than competing with NATO.

Third, like all other weapons agreements, its value depends entirely on mutual compliance with its terms. So far, the great difficulty about U.S.-Soviet arms agreements has not been in negotiating their terms, nor even the terms of verification, but in securing compliance. From Yalta forward through Kennedy-Krushchev, SALTs I and II, the ABM treaty and so forth, compliance has been the problem.

This and all future U.S. agreements with the Soviet Union should provide not only for monitoring compliance but also for automatically terminating the pact in the case of noncompliance. No such provision is included in the current treaty. Perhaps the Senate can take care of this oversight.

Finally, the benefits of the Treaty like the damage are largely political. Its completion constitutes a precedent for cooperation and creates a more constructive climate for U.S.-Soviet relations. This may be useful in the future, especially if we can learn from this experience.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

On that latter point I must say that I agree.

I would ask you my first question by saying if logic prevailed would it not be true NATO would have started with conventional reductions and our emphasis would have been on conventional and our priority would have been on conventional rather than nuclear?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I wholeheartedly agree with that position, Senator Nunn.

Chairman NUNN. I find it very frustrating that here we are, we have got an INF agreement—and there are many good things about it and many positive things. You pointed out some of them. There are some concerns with it, but we do not even have in NATO any conventional arms control proposal that, even if the Soviets accepted and even if there were total compliance, we do not have anything on the table before them that would make an appreciable difference in the balance of power, even if they accepted it and even if they carried it out.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Nunn, I think that is not only true but very important and a very important deficiency in our current approach. And I very much wish that our Government would prepare and propose just such reductions in conventional arms.

Chairman NUNN. I find the NATO alliance, of course, is the bulwark of Western security, but it is so hard to get anything ever agreed on. And the last information I have is that we are not going to have a joint kind of conventional arms control negotiating position ready to go until at least several months from now, possibly as late as the fall of this year, at the earliest.

I find that to be very perplexing, when NATO's primary problem is the conventional disparity in favor of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

Ambassador **Kirkpatrick**. Senator Nunn, I share your dismay and frustration at this. I also believe that perhaps if we worked with the core group of NATO, the Western European Union, our key allies, we might find it possible both to consult adequately and to move ahead with negotiations.

Chairman **Nunn**. I would like to ask a question regarding page 9 of your statement. I think the final point you made was that we should have some provision in the treaty monitoring compliance and automatically terminating the pact in case of noncompliance.

I certainly agree that Western response and U.S. response in terms of responding to even verified violations has always been one of our most difficult decisions. We do not seem to be able to determine what to do if indeed there are violations.

On the other hand, your suggestion that we try to write something like that into the treaty causes me to ask what we should write into the treaty. Do you believe that we ought to, if there is a Soviet violation that we believe has occurred, confront them with the violation and give them an opportunity to correct it?

Ambassador **Kirkpatrick**. Of course, Senator Nunn. I believe in due process, if you will, and great care in identification and verification of significant violations should take place and notification and opportunity to correct, yes.

But, finally, what seems important to me is that our treaties should contain some sort of provision, should be based on an understanding, at least among us, that we assume reciprocal and mutual compliance and that we will not continue indefinitely to feel unilaterally bound in case of noncompliance. But obviously this should occur only after careful investigation, verification, notification and opportunity to rectify.

Chairman **Nunn**. International law calls for proportionate response to violations. In other words, instead of having a proportionate response, do you believe that if there is a violation, if it is significant and if we do not get it corrected—which is sort of the outline you have made here—that we should then abrogate totally?

Ambassador **Kirkpatrick**. I guess I really believe that every treaty, including this one, constitutes our judgment of the minimum terms that we accept as consistent with our security, and that the violation of those minimum terms and the erosion of them fundamentally alters the deal that we have made. The deal, I think, after adequate investigation, verification, notification and opportunity to rectify, should not be regarded as binding any longer.

Otherwise, the terms of a treaty do not really mean anything. If we permit selective noncompliance, then the terms of the treaty are fundamentally meaningless.

Chairman **Nunn**. Would you skip the proportionate response stage and go from determination of significant violation to an opportunity to correct, to abrogation?

Ambassador **Kirkpatrick**. Yes, Senator.

Chairman **Nunn**. When you use the words "significant violation", of course when you write that into law all of a sudden you no longer have—I think you would have to write that in, but you all of a sudden no longer have anything automatic about it. You have made it a subjective judgment and that has to be delegated by practicality to the President, I suppose, unless there was some provision where the Congress came back and made a finding.

So you are back to subjective judgments almost no matter what you write into the law.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think that is true, Senator Nunn, and I do not think there is any way to avoid that. But I do think, nonetheless, that it would be useful to have an understanding ourselves and also with the Soviet Union that when we, after laborious negotiations, arrive at an agreement, that the terms of that agreement are indeed the basis of the agreement, and that significant noncompliance invalidates the agreement.

To be sure, those judgments would be our judgments, but I think that nonetheless those are the judgments we should make.

Chairman NUNN. Consider the following hypothetical. If the Joint Chiefs were to tell you that significant breaches have occurred and we give them a chance and they are not corrected. We agree that there has been a significant violation, but we also believe that if we abrogate the treaty, it will be detrimental to our national security over the next 2 years or 3 years.

Even if the best military advice told you that the abrogation of the treaty would help the Soviet Union and be harmful to our national security, would you place the principle of treaty compliance above that national security risk?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Nunn, I would, and the reason I would under, I would say, normal circumstances—which is another subjective judgment—but under normal circumstances, if our national security were not in dire jeopardy, I would, because otherwise I think we acquiesce in selective compliance and abrogate the very terms of the treaty that we laboriously negotiated.

We should not do that. It renders our negotiations and our agreements almost meaningless if we acquiesce in selective noncompliance.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Madam Ambassador.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. My apologies, Madam Ambassador, for not being here when you arrived. I was at a hearing in the Intelligence Committee on the same subject.

Let me pick up on the chairman's questions on compliance. I am quite interested in exploring another option, one that was touched on by Secretary Carlucci when he was before the committee, namely that we have a piece of legislation totally separate and apart from the treaty. There are constitutional questions whether it can be done, it cannot be binding on a future President or a future Congress, but it could be declaratory certainly of what our intentions here in the Congress and this President were at the time, presuming this treaty went into force.

It would relate to what actions this Nation would take, with some specificity, in the event there were a breach of the treaty. We would put to one side what options we might exercise under the treaty, but we would also have collateral options under this separate piece of legislation.

Do you feel that track has some merit? It would be in the nature of saying should a given action occur, then it would be our expectation that a future Congress and future President would work together in partnership to provide certain sums of money on a fast track, take certain actions to remedy an imbalance in our strategic forces occasioned by this breach.

Ambassador **KIRKPATRICK**. Senator Warner, I guess I think the treaty should only be ratified in the expectation that there will be compliance. I really believe that the only advance preparations, the only cognizance that we should take legally and formally of noncompliance, is the abrogation of the treaty—after careful verification, notification, and opportunity for rectification.

I do not see how we can take steps to do other than abrogate a treaty and have its terms taken seriously. I think, for example, Senator, of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. The Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement is an interesting agreement, some of whose terms were kept secret at the time but for which there was compliance at the time of the negotiations, like the removal of the missiles from Cuba and also of U.S. missiles from Turkey.

Then there were these longer-range commitments such as that the Soviet Union would undertake to ensure that Cuba did not engage in the export of revolution or the destabilization of governments in this hemisphere, and the United States would undertake to ensure that no actions were taken against the Government of Cuba.

Now it is perfectly clear that the Government of Cuba has in fact violated the terms of that treaty, that understanding. It was not a treaty and the Senate was not involved; it was an understanding, but it was an agreement solemnly undertaken by the executive branch, and the terms have been violated for years.

Nobody likes to talk about it. Our policy is made on the basis of the understanding. The fact that there has been noncompliance with key terms of that agreement has had a very large influence on our conduct of affairs.

This incongruity has had a deleterious effect on our conduct of affairs vis-a-vis this hemisphere. It also undermines the seriousness of every agreement which we enter. Every time we acquiesce in noncompliance to a significant aspect of an agreement which has been negotiated, then we undermine the seriousness of the negotiation process and the agreements.

I would not like to see a provision that in case that happens then we will undertake X Y or Z policies beyond abrogation, but simply that we will abrogate and if it is desirable, then, to restore the agreement—for example, concerning destabilization of this hemisphere—we will undertake to negotiate a new agreement whose terms both parties will presumably respect.

Senator **WARNER**. I will try and get in one more question here before my time expires.

Ambassador **KIRKPATRICK**. I am sorry I used your time.

Senator **WARNER**. Madam Ambassador, not only do you have a great knowledge of foreign affairs, but you also have a keen insight into the American political system. The realities are that we are faced with political conventions here early on, followed by a national election, and overlaying this is the very valuable work the President and the negotiators have done in terms of the START agreement.

In the event they are not able to reach a framework that would be tantamount to a treaty, would you think it advisable that they try to conclude under President Reagan's administration some type of an agreement short of a treaty, namely an interim agreement, like the Vladivostok Accords, to put in place and hold for the next presidency the valuable work that presumably will be achieved in the area of START?

Ambassador **Kirkpatrick**. Senator Warner, I do not doubt that that would be done under the circumstances. I do not doubt that that would happen. I think that happens, as it were, automatically under the American system. I believe there is broader bipartisan understanding and consensus on many broad, basic questions of U.S. foreign and security policy than is often understood.

That is the case in important arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. I do not doubt that the work of this administration on a START agreement will be preserved for the next administration in case this administration does not complete it. I am certain this will happen.

Senator **Warner**. As we look at the work that is going on here in the Senate, the chairman and I have been working on a schedule of just our committee and integrating it with the Intelligence Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee and then the floor action of the Senate. This INF agreement is, of course, by comparison less complicated than presumably the START agreement would be.

When I look at the magnitude in proportion to what work START would involve in the Senate, I must say, Mr. Chairman and others, I have some concern.

I thank the witness.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Next is Senator Exon.

Senator **Exon**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick, welcome to you. Thanks for coming to give us your views today.

I had a chance to read your testimony and then I listened to it. The bottom line that I took from reading the statement and listening to it—and correct me if I am wrong—was that this treaty is a mistake but should be ratified since we would otherwise be adversely judged around the world. Is that an unfair conclusion that I have drawn?

Ambassador **Kirkpatrick**. Well, I think it is a reasonable conclusion, but it is not quite the one I intended. What I intended to say, what I think about the treaty, is that it is not really very important in its impact on the balance of forces between the Soviet Union and the United States, that, looked at in the total context of Soviet balance of power, military power, it is probably slightly negative in its impact, and that is the failure to consult adequately in the course of the negotiations with our allies has been very upsetting to them and should be corrected in the future.

But, altogether I think the treaty should be ratified because its non-ratification would be still more upsetting to our allies on matters of direct concern to their security than its ratification. Now that is a slightly complicated position, but it is my position, Senator.

Senator EXON. Well, it is very complicating to me, frankly. I know you are sincere, because you are that type of person—you always have been—but I must say it seems to me that your statement is putting the U.S. Senate in a position that we should ratify the treaty even though we know, in your judgment, that it is not in the national security interest of the United States or our allies.

You do not mean to put the U.S. Senate into that kind of a position, do you?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Well, Senator Exon, not only do I not mean to put the U.S. Senate in that position, I would never recommend to the Senate an action which I thought was not in the interest of United States' security and its allies.

Senator EXON. Well, then you think this treaty is in the national security interest of the United States and its allies?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Exon, I said very clearly that I am in favor of ratification of this treaty by the Senate.

Senator EXON. Yes, but you gave the reason, Ambassador Kirkpatrick, very clearly, I think, in your written statement and in your emphasis when you read it that the primary reason for it was that we would look bad around the world and would lose face if we did not. Maybe I have misinterpreted what you said, and that is why I am giving you the opportunity to explain to me if I read and listened incorrectly.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Exon, I think face is very important in international affairs, and I do think we would lose face, as it were. But, more than that, I believe that the political effects of the treaty have been negative for our principal allies. Now they have made adaptations and accommodations and if at this stage we were not to ratify we would further embarrass them and also ourselves, and the impact would be, I think, negative for everyone.

Senator EXON. Do you feel that the representations that have been made to us both in testimony and privately and publicly that our European allies all strongly favor the ratification of this treaty in their and our overall national security interest is information that is not accurate, or are we putting the wrong context on what we have been told in that area?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Well, Senator Exon, I have said that I think our principal allies have made adjustments and accommodations, and I believe that the simple assertion that they strongly support the treaty may be an oversimplification.

Senator EXON. My time is up. Thank you very much, Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Madam Ambassador.

In your prepared testimony you note that the Soviet Union enjoys a widely acknowledged advantage in conventional and chemical weapons, noting further that that Soviet advantage is no longer offset by superior Western technology, and state further it is widely felt in Europe that the removal of Pershing and cruise missiles leaves Western Europeans more vulnerable to Soviet forces.

Do you have an opinion on that point, that removing the Pershing and cruise missiles leaves Europeans more vulnerable to this

Soviet conventional superiority which you begin your testimony by noting?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Yes, Senator, I believe it does—marginally more vulnerable.

Senator HUMPHREY. You agree with the Europeans on that point?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Not massively more vulnerable, but marginally more vulnerable, yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. And you note, further, that the Europeans worry that the removal of these weapons may therefore encourage Soviet planners to believe that a conventional land battle can be successfully fought in Europe without the risk of escalation to war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. That is the European view.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. It is a very widely-shared European view, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. They are worried that the Soviet planners might think that because it would remove a significant segment of the response. We are, the United States is then left with only battlefield weapons and nothing between there in the nuclear category and strategic weapons, whose use is vastly more provocative than these INF weapons.

What is your view on that point? Do you think that their removal will encourage Soviet military planners to believe a conventional battle can be fought without escalation to strategic?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. My view is that a principal goal of Soviet policy, particularly since the accession of Premier Gorbachev, has been to delink the United States from Western Europe and I do believe that the INF Treaty marginally moves toward delinkage. I do not think the INF Treaty is terribly important, quite, frankly, Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Good. Let's go home. Why are we here?

I am glad you have satisfied yourself on that point. I have not yet, and that, of course, is what each of us is trying to do. You think it makes Europe marginally more vulnerable, but the question is, does it follow, then, that Soviet military planners might be more inclined in some unmeasurable degree, more inclined to think they could get away with conventional war that would not escalate into the strategic level?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think so.

Senator HUMPHREY. You said something in response to another Senator that the treaty should be ratified only in the expectation of compliance. Given the noncompliance in important respects with SALT II, which of course is not a ratified treaty but almost is, practically speaking, and ABM and others, do you think there is a reasonable expectation, against that background, that the Soviets will comply with the terms of INF?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Their record is not very good, but it is also not very bad.

Senator HUMPHREY. How bad is bad enough? You talked a moment ago about the futility and really the foolishness of pursuing arms reduction negotiations if we let the parties get away with cheating.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think we should be very vigilant. I certainly do not think we should assume compliance, and I certainly do not think we should acquiesce in noncompliance.

Senator HUMPHREY. You say the expectation of compliance. We should ratify or assent to the ratification of treaties only in the expectation of compliance.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I believe that.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think that we have reasonable grounds to expect compliance with INF?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think if we are vigilant enough we have reasonable grounds to expect compliance, yes—if we are vigilant enough. I think the Soviet Union is very interested, Senator Humphrey, in the removal of intermediate-range missiles from Western Europe. I really believe this is a goal and they want to do it, and I think they will do what is necessary to achieve this goal. And that is why they have in fact negotiated a treaty with us.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am sure you are right. They do want it or they would not be where they are, and we would not be where we are.

Just one last question. I think my time must be about up. You say that there is a net negative of some degree in our security, that of Europe, some increased measure of likelihood that Soviet planners think they can get away with a conventional invasion without escalation to nuclear, to strategic levels. Yet you urge us to assent to ratification for the sake of appearances, is what seems to be coming through here, so that we will be consistent, even if consistently wrong.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Humphrey, that is not what I mean to do. I think I must not have expressed myself very clearly. You recall there was a time when the United States proposed to develop and deploy a neutron bomb, and our European allies were quite unhappy about it, but they made accommodations and adjustments and suffered some political penalties at the time. And then the United States decided not to do it.

It is a little like enticing someone way out on a limb and then cutting off the limb. I believe that in the case of the INF Treaty the United States, having first worked very hard to persuade our European friends to participate in the deployment of the Pershing and cruise missiles, then, having proposed to withdraw the Pershing and cruise missiles, I think really without adequate consultation, our European allies, now having made adaptations and accommodations to that position, that it would be really, on balance, quite negative for us to change our minds again and cut off the limb onto which we have enticed them.

That is not just appearances. That is real adaptations in policy and positions which parties and governments have made, and it is not appearances on their part. It is not appearances on ours. I think really what I believe is that the damage that was going to be done to the alliance by the INF agreement has already been done, and that nonratification at this stage would do more damage.

That is what I believe.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you. My time has expired.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Humphrey.

I believe Senator Wirth is next.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, thank you very much for being here, for your testimony and for your answers to so many questions.

In the time available to me I would like to ask you a couple of questions, one related to the alliance and the second related to confidence-building measures.

You have stressed in answers to the questions all afternoon your concerns about the constancy of the United States as an ally and the European perception that we are not viewed as being as steady and as committed as we ought to be. I gather from your testimony that that is one of your major concerns, and I would say that also reflects testimony given in the last few days as well.

I recently met with a group of European parliamentarians who were making that same point, and they were pointing to, one, Reykjavik and their deep concerns about the President's statements there on the triple zero and a nuclear-free world, and that that was very unrealistic and frightening to them, particularly in their responsibility to try to encourage a broader financial commitment from their constituencies.

Second, they referred to SDI and the perception that the United States was building a kind of astrodome over this country, leaving them out. And, third, they said opponents of the alliance or people trying to drive a wedge in the alliance might use INF for that purpose.

Are those three arguments about the concerns that our allies might have about our constancy valid?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Well, I think they are accurate descriptions of concerns of our allies. First of all, I think all of those are fairly widely shared. I think that what they fear is the delinkage of U.S. defense from Europe. And I believe that the meaning of the Pershings and cruise missiles for Western Europe came to be different to them than it has been for us, and that while we saw it as simply a weapons system to offset a weapons system, for them it came to symbolize linkage.

And they worry about anything which suggests to them delinkage, and to the extent the SDI suggests to them delinkage, they worry about that.

Senator WIRTH. If you were making recommendations to a new administration, how would you recommend compensating for this perception or how do we repair this? What do we do about SDI, for example?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Wirth, what I would recommend most strongly to this administration or a new administration is that particularly on all matters in which European security is most directly involved that we engage in really thorough-going advance consultation with them, and that we not proceed unilaterally and confront them with a fait accompli.

I do not believe that SDI is an issue which principally concerns Europe. I believe SDI is an issue which principally concerns the United States. By the way, I believe, that START, as compared to INF, concerns our security rather more directly than theirs, whereas INF clearly most directly impacts on European security.

So I think that with each of these issues one has to make a judgment as to whose security is more directly involved. I would always consult in advance, real consultation, and especially on those issues in which European security was most directly engaged.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you. Let me jump quickly to a second question in the brief time available to me.

What is your evaluation of the value of the agreements that we signed onto in the Stockholm Agreement in 1986 focused on confidence-building measures? Have they worked and, if so, what are the next steps that we might take from there? What are the lessons that we have learned if in fact we are concerned about lowering the level of suspicion on both sides and in fact were worried about the possibility of surprise attack?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Wirth, I think confidence-building measures of that sort are useful. I think that they do not have to work quite as well as treaties do to be useful, moreover, because they aim at building confidence, as they state.

And I think we should continue to look for opportunities to engage with the Soviets in reciprocal confidence-building measures.

Senator WIRTH. I will close with this, Mr. Chairman. What has struck me in the testimony so far is that none of our witnesses have really focused on the potential of confidence-building measures. Maybe it is because they are too soft. Maybe it is because they are not a part of the traditional discussions related to U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationships.

I am a little puzzled. And one of the reasons is that, as I have said before, I have spent a good deal of time in the last month talking to a lot of U.S. military people in Europe, and they were very committed to the potential of confidence-building measures and very hopeful that we might take a number of further steps, and they have a lot of specific suggestions.

It would appear to me our military people are far ahead of our civilian leadership here at home—or maybe I am missing something along the way.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Wirth, I would rather suspect that maybe the reason your witnesses have not focused on them is because of the way the invitation is stated, which focused on INF. What I focused on is the impact of INF on our total balance of power, if you will. To a question that focuses on ways of reducing risks of war, for example, I think you would get quite a lot of focus on confidence-building measures.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. I appreciate your being here very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Thank you. Senator Gramm.

Senator GRAMM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Madam Ambassador, let me begin by going back to this whole problem of noncompliance. I think many of us have rejoiced that this treaty has better verification procedures than we have ever had before—certainly not adequate for any kind of START agreement, but certainly a new approach in terms of on-site inspection.

But I think one of the concerns a lot of us have had is what good is it to verify that they are not complying if you do not do anything about it. The other day when Secretary Carlucci was here I read a statement that President Carter had made in arguing for SALT II ratification in which he talked about how extraordinary the offense would be if the Soviets violated the treaty and in fact used the phrase "it could lead to a nuclear confrontation." I read a similar statement by the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

And then I observed that we have two undisputed major violations—encrypting telemetry on missile tests, a clear violation; the deployment of the SS-25, a new type missile, mobile missile, clearly a violation. And yet both Houses of Congress voted last year to force the United States to comply with a treaty that was never ratified and that would have expired, had it been ratified.

So obviously I think there is a problem here. The question is what would be the proper approach? I agree with you that if the Soviets violate the treaty in any significant way the treaty ought to be abrogated and then the burden of proof ought to be on people who want to go back and agree to a lesser deal.

How would you structure that as part of this debate, as part of the treaty? Do you have any ideas as to how you think that should be done?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Gramm, I am not a lawyer. There are many lawyers in this Congress, and doubtless on this committee. As I understand it, the American enthusiasm for arms agreements and for the elimination of war by arms agreements—The Hague Agreement, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and so forth—is based on the model of a contract in civil life, and the notion that by a well-constructed contract we can get agreement on almost anything and solve our problem thereby.

Now I also understand that in contracts in civil affairs there are very frequently clauses which provide for the abrogation of the contract in case of noncompliance and nonperformance. And I find it extremely disturbing that in international affairs we adopt the model of the contract without any provision for noncompliance.

I think it is very serious and I think it really undermines the seriousness of all of our agreements.

Senator Gramm. Well, let me assure you that I am going to give the United States an opportunity to vote on such a provision.

I wanted to ask you an additional question. It seems to me that one thing that is frightening our European allies, perhaps more than anything else, is not just INF and the removal of nuclear missiles, short and intermediate-range, given that we have got 4,500 nuclear weapons left in Europe, a clear superiority in Stealth technology and electronic jamming, but it seems to me that one of the things that has got to be frightening them is all this talk about a nuclear-free Europe and in fact a nuclear-free world.

Do you believe it would be productive if in fact we simply came out with what at least to me is the obvious reality—and that is that as long as we have the threat of the Soviet Union and its political designs in the world, that there is no realistic chance that we will ever eliminate nuclear weapons nor that we will ever be able to withdraw all nuclear forces from Europe?

Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Senator Gramm, may I just add one word to my previous response, please? I never came to the point. My point that I meant to make about the contract was that perhaps we should look to civil contracts for the answer to what sort of provisions we should write on noncompliance. This was the point I really wanted to make.

Senator **Gramm**. It is a good suggestion. Well, it certainly was mentioned earlier that maybe we ought to have something like a sense of the Senate resolution. I see that as totally worthless. I think unless you can get the civil provision in the treaty or actually have a statute that will override the treaty in the event of some triggering mechanism—certification of noncompliance—that you do not have anything.

Ambassador **Kirkpatrick**. I agree with that, Senator Gramm, entirely.

To your second question, I agree absolutely that the most disturbing—the most disturbing thing to our European allies has been the combination of non-consultation and the talk of a nonnuclear world. There is no doubt that they regard preoccupation with a nonnuclear world as a romantic illusion, and that they feel that nuclear weapons have in fact not only guarded their security but their peace for the last 40 years, longer than any period in Europe for two centuries.

And they do not have a negative attitude toward nuclear weapons. Quite the contrary, the anti-nuclear spasms in Europe have passed, I think, quite some time back. Not only do they feel this way, but I think they are right. It is a romantic illusion to image a world from which nuclear weapons have been eliminated, and not just because of the Soviet Union, but also because of the other nuclear powers which have developed or are about to develop.

And that is one of the reasons that I personally feel very deeply concerned about the development of some sort of defense against nuclear weapons by the United States. And may I say, Senator Nunn, I was very pleased to see your recent comments on the development of a nuclear missile defense to protect us against various kinds of nuclear weapons.

I think we should face the fact that we live in a nuclear world. The world is not going to abandon—TNT. We cannot uninvent the firecracker or nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. We should face it.

Senator **Gramm**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn** [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Gramm.

Senator Quayle, I believe you are next.

Senator **Quayle**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Ambassador Kirkpatrick. Let me go back through this whole expectation of compliance issue. I concur with your assessment that one should expect compliance, though I am not so certain that we will get it in the long term.

I think in the short term in looking at this treaty from my point of view there are few incentives for the Soviet Union to violate the treaty. However, if you take this treaty in conjunction with a START agreement, then I believe the incentives will become greater for noncompliance—cheating at the margins, getting in the gray area, trying to move in a direction where they want to go but yet restricting us from perhaps going in that direction.

And when we get down to some of the political responses and the political will, I am very fearful that once these missiles come out—and they are going to come out even if the Senate would not ratify this treaty; they are going to come out—that it would be very, very difficult from a political point of view to ever put them back in, that it would take much more than a significant violation to muster up the political will to start down perhaps another dual track approach.

So, therefore, in our deliberations I think it is very important that we recognize that in the short term, yes, compliance can be expected and anticipated because there would be no reason to do otherwise, but in the long term, unless we really do get a new Soviet Union, that you might anticipate noncompliance, and particularly in the gray area in the margins.

In the long term would you not consider and should we not anticipate some of these areas of potential noncompliance and get down to the heart of the matter to make sure that we have a full understanding of what this treaty allows us to do and not to do? One of the reserving aspects I have with this treaty is the undefined and, I believe, rather overly broad article XIV on the noncircumvention issues. I really see down the road that this is a gray area where the Soviets will push to the margins and perhaps violate. Yet there will be perhaps political constraints placed upon us by the Congress or others that we cannot go into some of the more promising technology.

I just wonder, should we not anticipate some of this noncompliance and therefore, in our deliberations of this treaty, should we not make absolutely certain, with no ifs, and, or buts about it, what the terms of this treaty mean for us today and in the future?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Senator Quayle, I think that is very important. If the Senate does not make clear what the treaty means, then it will never know whether noncompliance has occurred, and so there could not possibly be steps taken to provide against noncompliance. I think that is extremely important.

And I agree with you about article XIV and its ambiguity, and I, too, think that is a worrisome fact.

Senator QUAYLE. Article XIV on noncircumvention, I just think it is a major issue that is going to have to be cleared up by the Senate.

Let me ask you, if you will—not to make you terribly uncomfortable—put on your Soviet hat and put yourself in the Politboro, and look at this treaty. As we have heard a lot of political statements on this side of the ocean that one would be nuts to question this treaty. You have got unequal reductions, that this is a good way to negotiate with the Soviet Union, that for the first time we have on-site inspection and that we should be doing cartwheels because of this treaty.

Well, in the phrase of the President, it takes two to tango, so I wonder if you might share with us some of the reasons that the Soviets would be doing cartwheels that we have in fact signed this treaty. I mean, if it is really that good for the United States of America, the Soviets must think that it is a very, very good deal for the Soviet Union.

And I wonder if you might just enumerate from the Soviet perspective why they are really very, very interested in this treaty and why they think that this is a very, very good deal for the Soviet Union.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Certainly, Senator Quayle—and why they proposed to start with INF in arms agreements. I believe that the Soviet goal in this treaty is a giant step toward delinkage of Western Europe from the United States, which is to say the undermining of the NATO alliance.

And the evidence for this, I think, is fairly clear. Premier Gorbachev, in his last trip before he became First Secretary, he went to Great Britain, you may recall, and had a long and pleasant visit with Mrs. Thatcher in England.

And his first trip he made outside of the Soviet Union after he became First Secretary was to France, where he was received by President Mitterand, and he had long talks with Francois Mitterand about what he hoped for "us" Europeans. He did a lot of talking about "we" Europeans in France. It is said finally that he did so much talking about what "we" Europeans want and what "we" Europeans feel and what "we" Europeans need that Francois Mitterand was finally moved to remind him that he was a European too.

Gorbachev, I think, has worked hard and very skillfully at two things—one, the elimination of the idea of a Soviet threat to Western Europe and, second, at the suggestion that the Soviet Union is a European nation which has a lot in common with the other European nations and that "we" Europeans, as he will say, have a lot more in common with each other than you do with "those" Americans.

In his book, "Perestroika," he takes pains to sympathize with the Europeans about the difficulties of dealing with "those" Americans, who are not Europeans. The removal of the missiles helps eliminate the notion of a Soviet threat, because they, the SS-20s, are the most visible indicator of a Soviet threat since they are targeted directly on Europe's capitals.

The INF Treaty doesn't really eliminate the threat, but it would eliminate the most visible reminder of the threat, and, second, I think it raises a lot of anxieties in Germany and the rest of Europe about delinkage and the reliability of the American deterrent.

The blurring of the boundaries between Eastern and Western Europe has been promoted by Premier Honecker of East Germany in visits both to West Germany and France. He has done a lot of talking about "we" Europeans and "we" Germans, and why we should work together for a neutral, denuclearized Europe.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador.

Chairman NUNN. I have just one other question, but to me it is an important one. The recent opinion polls, Madam Ambassador, indicate that 5 years ago 55 percent of the West Germans considered the Soviet Union to be a serious military threat. Today that number is 24 percent of the West Germans, according to a recent poll. Now that is a very, very big shift, and during that time the military forces of the Soviet Union have continued to steadily increase in capability.

So we have had a very serious diminution of public support by one of our key allies in terms of the seriousness of the military threat, and yet an increase in the military threat itself.

Two questions, really. One, why do you believe that has come about and, second, what should we in the West, including our allies, try to do about it?

Ambassador **Kirkpatrick**. Senator Nunn, I am interested in those figures. There are parallel figures from other polls, too, and I have found in conversations with German and Dutch, particularly German and Dutch officials and social scientists, journalists that the idea of Soviet military threat, to Western Europe is less and less real. It has dramatically declined in credibility for them.

Among the political class and at the level of the masses the notion of a credible Soviet threat has declined. Now one reason for it is generational change, and the fact that we are a long way away from the last Soviet move against a European country. With generational change, those memories dim.

Second, I think the skill in public relations of First Secretary Gorbachev is very important. Gorbachev seems to be a man like everybody else. They say "We will deprive you of the Soviet threat." Georgi Arbatov actually said that during his visit. In "Perestroika" Gorbachev refers repeatedly to the elimination of the idea of a Soviet threat. The Soviet peace offensive, or what the French call the "charm offensive," has had a very high degree of success.

That is the current form of the peace movement. The peace movement is no longer in the streets in the way that it was a decade or two ago, but it is working to promote the notion that there is nothing to fear. The idea that Finlandization is not all that bad is a part of this idea that there is nothing to fear.

What can we do about it? The only thing we can do about it is to be realistic and to keep our eye on not only what is said but also what is done, and to make our decisions not on the basis of what the Soviets seem to say about the use of force but how they are actually using force against their own people, against the Afghan people, in Poland, in Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev's talk about transformation of the Soviet Union's relations with the nations of Eastern Europe is part of the general effort to suggest that the Soviet Union is a nation like others with whom countries can have normal relations. There is nothing to fear.

We need to be very clear about realities of those Soviet relations with Eastern Europe: what they are really based on, how many Soviet troops there are in Poland, how much constraint this puts on the Polish freedom to make decisions.

Chairman **Nunn**. What do we do about Western European opinion in terms of our own relationship with the Western Europeans, both government and public? Is there anything that comes to mind that we can do about that, or is that beyond both our jurisdiction and capability?

Ambassador **Kirkpatrick**. Yes, it is beyond our jurisdiction, except as we talk. But we engage in dialogs at many levels with our Western European friends. It helps if we are well informed and articulate in those dialogs. Beyond that I cannot think of much that we can do.

Chairman **Nunn**. To me, this is what is so inexcusable about NATO not having a conventional arms control position, because I believe one important role of arms control—and we always ought to be serious about our proposals and not simply have public relations in mind—is educational so that our publics can begin to grasp, both here and in Western Europe, what the gaps are.

They see the gaps in the tank forces and artillery forces and the number of divisions, number of maneuverable battalions and on and on and on and where they are located. If we put more emphasis on that, then I think we would have a much stronger foundation from which to pursue both realistic force capabilities and realistic arms control prospects.

But we seem to be so far behind the ball in terms of putting things on the table, and Gorbachev has got all the initiative, as I see it, in the conventional arena. He makes speech after speech about it, and we do not even have a formulated position within NATO.

Ambassador **KIRKPATRICK**. Senator Nunn, I wholly agree with you.

Chairman **NUNN**. Senator Humphrey.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. Madam Ambassador, you argue the case that we ought to ratify, assent to ratification so as not to upset out European friends. In my view, the Europeans ought to be glad the Senate has a role in this process, given the recent addiction of this administration to what I would call a casino style of arms negotiation, as evidenced at Reykjavik and in the process that yielded this treaty.

I want to try to get to the bottom line here. You talked about the negative side of the treaty, that it leaves Europe somewhat more vulnerable, gives Soviet planners somewhat more encouragement they could get away with an invasion without escalation to strategic levels.

What is the benefit of this treaty? That is the negative side. What is the positive side?

Ambassador **KIRKPATRICK**. Well, Senator Humphrey, first, it exists. Like the United Nations, it exists. We start from there, from the fact that it had been negotiated and signed.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. But that does not mean it has positive aspects necessarily.

Ambassador **KIRKPATRICK**. It does mean we must respond to it, that the Senate must respond to it.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. I understand that point, but you have already established your line of thinking on that point. But my question now is what are the positive benefits of this treaty?

Ambassador **KIRKPATRICK**. The benefit of the treaty which I see is that it is evidence of the capacity of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreements on major weapons systems. That, I think, is the benefit of it.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. That is the whole thing?

Ambassador **KIRKPATRICK**. I think that is the whole thing.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. That we can reach agreements?

Ambassador **KIRKPATRICK**. On major weapons systems. That is a big agreement, an agreement to remove a major weapons system and that contributes to a climate in which we can work together, presumably, on other questions.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. We have reached agreements before. I mean, we do not have to have this solely for the purpose of proving we can do it.

Ambassador **KIRKPATRICK**. Senator Humphrey, we have not reached an agreement for quite a while.

Senator HUMPHREY. Agreements for the sake of agreements are good?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I did not say that. I am just saying we have not had an agreement for quite a long time. The best thing I know about the treaty is that it demonstrates that it is possible—at this time—for the United States and the Soviet Union to reach an agreement to remove and eliminate a major weapon. That is the best thing I know about it. There may be better things about it, but I do not know them, Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think certain steps are desirable on the part of NATO in the event of ratification of this treaty to address the imbalance which will no longer offset to some degree by these INF weapons in our arsenal?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Yes, I think so very much. I think that it is very important for the United States to offset the damage by engaging in more fulsome consultation with NATO allies in advance of further agreements.

Second, I think it is very important that NATO develop positions on conventional forces, for example, and strengthen its conventional forces.

Senator HUMPHREY. What do you mean by that? I mean, it is easy to say those things, but we are talking about hard facts and realities. What does that mean? What should we do and what must we do following ratification?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think we should, within the limits of our ability, urge our NATO allies to work toward the strengthening of conventional forces in Europe.

Senator HUMPHREY. Larger force levels?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Not larger force levels for the United States but larger force levels for Western European allies.

Senator HUMPHREY. More divisions and more conventional weapons?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. And more tanks and more weapons of various kinds of appropriate types. And also I believe that we should encourage European initiatives and closer European cooperation. I think that is important.

Senator HUMPHREY. But that would be so even absent this treaty, and I certainly agree with you on that.

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I think the treaty makes it more urgent, though, and more likely that it will occur in Europe.

Senator HUMPHREY. It sure as hell does. I agree with you fully on that.

You said more divisions, more tanks and so on. Do you think that is going to happen?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. It might.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think it will?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. I believe that there will be new frameworks developed for intra-European military cooperation which may very well lead to strengthening intra-European military forces.

Senator HUMPHREY. Sort of a shock treatment?

Ambassador KIRKPATRICK. Sure.

Senator HUMPHREY. A deweaning of Europe, so to speak?

Ambassador **KIRKPATRICK**. Well, I think it is very important for us not to discourage moves toward European independence, greater independence and greater intra-European interdependence. For a period we discouraged such moves. I think it is very important for us to encourage them.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. Okay. Last question, vis-a-vis the conventional imbalance. Do you have any concern about the foregoing of conventionally-armed cruise missiles, which are probably at this point and in the foreseeable future the very best single weapon to counter the Soviet conventional superiority?

Ambassador **KIRKPATRICK**. Senator Humphrey, I have not addressed questions of weapons today because I am not really an expert on weapons. But I will tell you that my greatest concern about weapons in the treaty is the elimination of cruise missiles. It seems to me that this is very questionable both in the specific case and as a principle. The idea of eliminating whole categories of weapons, nonnuclear as well as nuclear applications, is, I think, a very questionable one, with dangerous potential implications.

And, second, I think that the cruise missile, is one of the most useful weapons available to us—the cruise missile, conventionally armed. I regret very much the decision to eliminate it, forego it.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. I do, too. It is too little noticed, I think. Not only are we giving away the only weapons in Europe which can quickly and accurately strike Soviet soil, giving away those two types of missiles, we are also giving away, we should note on every occasion, this incredibly useful conventionally—armed cruise missile.

Who knows? I am sure the Soviets are keenly aware of pocketing that gain as well, but you never see it mentioned.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **NUNN**. Thank you, Senator Humphrey.

Madam Amdassador, we appreciate very much you being here today. You have been very helpful. We would certainly welcome any additional supplemental remarks you would like to make through the record as we go along through these proceedings.

Ambassador **KIRKPATRICK**. Thank you very much, Senator Nunn. Thank you for inviting me.

Chairman **NUNN**. The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1988

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

NATO-WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:08 p.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator J. James Exon, presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Stennis, Exon (presiding), Levin, Kennedy, Glenn, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Humphrey, Quayle, Wilson, Gramm, Symms and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Jeffrey H. Smith, general counsel; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Robert G. Bell, Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dailey, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Judith A. Freedman, Sherri Wasserman Goodman, John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locker III, David S. Lyles, T. Kirk McConnell, Frederick F.Y. Pang, and Mark Robinson, professional staff members; Tiffany E. Berger, Barbara B. Brown, Lucia M. Chavez, Barbara Gallo, Lori M. Jackson, Mary J. Kampo, and Kathleen L. McGuire, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory B. Craig and William J. Lynn, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Milton D. Beach and Donald A. Mitchell, assistants to Senator Glenn; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR J. JAMES EXON, PRESIDING

Senator Exon. The committee will please come to order. Senator Nunn was unavoidably delayed today, so he has asked me to begin the hearing. And I expect that Senator Nunn will be along a little bit later in the afternoon.

The committee meets this afternoon to begin its second week of hearings on the opinions of NATO and other officials regarding the INF Treaty. This current series of hearings continues the review of U.S. National Security strategy that the Armed Services Committee began last year. I have to admit that I almost did not recognize today's witness in his civilian clothes. Nevertheless, where he is, whether he is in uniform or not, Gen. Bernie Rogers will always be welcome to this committee and I want him to know that.

During his more than 40 years of distinguished military service, General Rogers served in several demanding staff and command positions. His last assignment as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe spanned the 8-year period from NATO's dual-track decisions in 1979 to the conclusion of the INF Treaty in 1987. Therefore, General Rogers' views on the implications of the treaty for the defense of NATO will be especially influential and relevant to this committee's review and eventual decision.

Again, let me welcome you back General Rogers, to the Armed Services Committee. Before I ask him to present his opening statement, I would entertain any opening statement from any of my colleagues, which none are present at the moment, but I would like to have Senator McCain's statement inserted in the record. Therefore, the good news is we go right to you, General Rogers, welcome.

[The prepared statement of Senator John McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN McCAIN

Thank you Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow-up on the testimony we have heard by stating some of the reasons we cannot rely on rhetoric about conventional force improvements, low cost or cost free improvements, or revisions in how we assess the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance to deal with the military risks that will still exist if we abolish our INF forces.

The most critical problem NATO faces is not to agree on new force requirements, but rather to correct the past mortgages in terms of problems in total strength, readiness, deployment, sustaining capability, and equipment modernization that have built up over a period of decades. To be blunt, I do not believe that either the American public or the voters of any European nation are willing to pay to correct these mortgages, much less make more force improvements than they are already making.

I think the best that can happen to what is now an unacceptable conventional balance is to fund a few effective force improvements in conventional forces which can be made at something very close to existing resource levels, or in spite of a limited decline in total national defense spending.

As long as one ignores the current trends in the balance, it is possible to point to many individual areas where various efforts to correct NATO's inferiority in conventional forces have produced some important force improvements in the past. I have asked my staff, however, to look at what some of the overall trends in force strength have been since 1965, and the results are anything but reassuring.

If we look at the equipment actually in the unit equipment of the key active combat units and reserve forces in the Central Region—the NATO forces in Belgium, the FRG, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands and the Warsaw Pact forces in Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Poland—work by Phillip Karber of Braddock, Dunn, and McDonald reveals the following trends:

In 1967, NATO and the Warsaw Pact had near parity in active army manpower. Both sides had approximately 800,000 men. In 1987, NATO still had about 780,000 men, but the Warsaw Pact had nearly 1 million.

In 1967, NATO had about 5,500 medium tanks and the Warsaw Pact had about 12,500. In 1977, NATO had about 5,600 medium tanks and the Warsaw Pact had about 16,000. In 1987, NATO had about 6,500 tanks, but the Warsaw Pact had 16,900. The Warsaw Pact has not only increased its lead in tank strength, the U.S.S.R. has converted most of its older tanks to the use of laser ranger finders, and many to the use of active armor. Given the Israeli experience with similarly upgraded Soviet T-62 tanks and the U.S. M-60 series, this gives at least Soviet forces something close to qualitative parity with the average tank deployed in NATO.

The Warsaw Pact has acquired a massive advantage in infantry fighting vehicles. In 1967, NATO had about 11,500 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and the Warsaw Pact had about 13,200. In 1977, NATO had about 12,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles and the Warsaw Pact had about 19,000. In 1987, NATO had about 14,000 armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, but the Warsaw Pact had 22,000. It is important to note that the Warsaw Pact has recently produced heavily armed infantry fighting vehicles more than nine times faster than NATO.

The Warsaw Pact advantage in anti-tank guns has increased steadily. In 1967, NATO had about 1,850 anti-tank guns, and the Warsaw Pact had about 1,450. In 1977, NATO had about 700 anti-tank guns and the Warsaw Pact had about 1,800. In 1987, NATO had about 300 anti-tank guns, but the Warsaw Pact had 1,500.

NATO has lost any meaningful hope of making anti-tank guided missiles into a force multiplier. In 1967, NATO had about 1,100 anti-tank guided missiles, and the Warsaw Pact had about 750. In 1977, NATO had about 3,000 anti-tank guided missiles and the Warsaw Pact had about 4,500. In 1987, NATO had about 7,500 anti-tank guided missiles, but the Warsaw Pact had 11,000.

The Warsaw Pact has massively increased its advantage in regular tube artillery, while converted to modern self-propelled weapons which are generally superior in range and tube life to the weapons in NATO forces. In 1967, NATO had about 1,800 major artillery weapons, and the Warsaw Pact had about 2,400. In 1977, NATO had about 2,200 major artillery weapons and the Warsaw Pact had about 4,800. In 1987, NATO had about 2,100 major artillery weapons, but the Warsaw Pact had 6,800.

NATO's efforts to deploy multiple rocket launchers have been more than offset by increases in Warsaw Pact numbers, and the Warsaw Pact has also rapidly modernized its holdings. In 1967, NATO had no multiple rocket launchers, and the Warsaw Pact had about 700. In 1977, NATO had about 140 multiple rocket launchers and the Warsaw Pact had about 900. In 1987, NATO had about 200 multiple rocket launchers, but the Warsaw Pact had 1,100.

NATO has shifted from superiority to inferiority in short range artillery firepower. In 1967, NATO had 2,000 medium and heavy mortars, and the Warsaw Pact had about 1,800. In 1977, NATO only had about 1,800 medium and heavy mortars and the Warsaw Pact had about 2,000. In 1987, NATO still had 1,800 medium and heavy mortars, but the Warsaw Pact had 2,800.

NATO has cut its air strength at a time the Warsaw Pact has rapidly begun to catch up in deployed combat aircraft technology, and has caught up in overall mission-relevant range-payload capability. In 1967, NATO had 1,800 combat aircraft, and the Warsaw Pact had about 2,900. In 1977, NATO had dropped to about 1,500 combat aircraft and the Warsaw Pact had dropped slightly to about 2,800. In 1987, NATO only had about 1,400 combat aircraft, but the Warsaw Pact still had 2,800.

NATO has lost any hope of using attack helicopters as a force multiplier. In 1967, NATO had 50 attack helicopters, and the Warsaw Pact had about 2,900. In 1977, NATO had about 400 attack helicopters and the Warsaw Pact had about 240. In 1987, NATO had about 550 attack helicopters, but the Warsaw Pact had 800.

In 1967, NATO had 700 air defense guns, and the Warsaw Pact had about 3,800. In 1977, NATO had about 1,200 air defense guns and the Warsaw Pact had about 3,200. In 1987, NATO had about 2,200 air defense guns, and the Warsaw Pact had 3,200.

The previous trends in air defense guns might seem reassuring, but the reality is very different when one considers surface-to-air missiles. In 1967, NATO had 1,100 medium to heavy surface-to-air missile launchers, and the Warsaw Pact only had about 600. In 1977, NATO had about 1,200 medium to heavy surface-to-air missile launchers, but the Warsaw Pact had taken the lead and had about 1,600. In 1987, NATO had about 1,350 medium to heavy surface-to-air missile launchers, but the Warsaw Pact had 2,100.

If one looks at total crew served weapons, it is clear that the Warsaw Pact has taken a massive new lead, while it has also caught up in many areas of quality. In 1967, NATO had 27,400 crew served weapons, and the Warsaw Pact had about 39,900. In 1977, NATO had about 29,740 crew served weapons and the Warsaw Pact had about 56,640. In 1987, NATO had about 2,200 crew served weapons, and the Warsaw Pact had 71,000—more than twice as many.

If one looks at the shifts in total crew served weapons weight by an effectiveness score and combined into armored division equivalents, it is clear that the Warsaw Pact has still taken a massive new lead when weapons quality is fully taken into account. In 1967, NATO had a ratio of 1 armored division equivalents to 1.5 for the Warsaw Pact. In 1977, NATO had a ratio of 1 armored division equivalents to 1.8 for the Warsaw Pact. In 1987, NATO had a ratio of 1 armored division equivalents to 2.2 for the Warsaw Pact.

I agree that Warsaw Pact superiority is not great enough to offer the Warsaw Pact the kind of confidence it would need to attack NATO. Nevertheless, the balance has clearly shifted against NATO in spite of decades of rhetoric about "flexible response", and it will clearly continue to do so unless we face up to the fact that this committee will have to ask for a major supplement to the FY 1989 budget and the current FYDP.

To make this point even more clearly, virtually all of the experts we have heard to date have agreed that the Warsaw Pact is catching up in most areas of deployed conventional technology, and has caught up or surpassed the average level of deployed tactical technology in NATO in a number of key areas. Let's consider what this really means given the trends in total military production of NATO and the Warsaw Pact during 1984-1986.

I am providing these trends in detail in Table One, as a member of my staff has compiled them from recent reporting by the Department of Defense. I should also stress that such figures should not come as a shock to this committee. They have been present in previous testimony to both the Senate and the House.

Nevertheless, these figures show that NATO only produced about 40% of the tanks of the Warsaw Pact, 55% of the other armored fighting vehicles (OAFVs), 20% of the towed artillery, 19% of the self-propelled artillery, and 24% of the AA artillery. NATO also lagged behind in combat aircraft, although far less significantly. The only areas where NATO led were in transport aircraft and naval construction.

I ask the members of this committee to consider these trends in depth before we include any rhetoric about conventional options in our report on the INF Treaty, and ignore the vital importance of improving our remaining theater and strategic nuclear weapons, and encouraging the British and French to do everything possible to modernize their forces. Either we are going to seek a supplement to the current budget and the FDYP on a bipartisan basis, or all the words about improved conventional option will simply mislead the American people. Either our major allies will follow our example, and indeed do far more, or all the improvements made will be cosmetic and the talk about conventional capability will be empty rhetoric.

If this committee is not prepared to begin work on February 18th to revise and expand the conventional programs in our FY 1989 defense budget, and is not prepared during the course of the year to propose specific force improvements to our allies—rather than indulge in another mindless exercise in ally-bashing under the name of "burden sharing", then let's be honest. Anything we say about conventional options will be meaningless, or depend on the sudden willingness of the Warsaw Pact to rush into unilateral disarmament.

Further, I do not really believe that any member of this committee really believes we can or will fund enough additional money for conventional options to reduce our dependence on the need to modernize our remaining theater nuclear and our strategic nuclear systems in ways that will provide us with an effective capability for graduated response, and ensure that our nuclear forces are coupled to those of Britain and France. I think it is already clear that our Committee report must endorse such modernization in the strongest possible terms.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

TABLE ONE

NATO VERSUS WARSAW PACT COMBAT EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION

Category	1984-1986 Total Production		1984-1986 Average Annual Production		NATO as a % of Warsaw Pact
	NATO	Warsaw Pact	NATO	Warsaw Pact	
LAND WEAPONS					
Tanks	4,400	11,050	1,467	3,863	40%
OAFVs	7,600	13,900	2,533	4,633	55%
Towed Field Artillery	1,225	5,800	408	1,933	21%
SP Artillery	775	4,150	258	1,383	19%
MRLs	650	2,375	217	792	27%
SP AA Artillery	75	310	25	103	24%
Towed AA Artillery	25	650	8.3	217	4%
NAVAL WEAPONS					
Submarines	27	25	9	8.3	108%
Major Surface Combatants	46	26	15.3	8.6	177%
Minor Combatants	89	150	30	50	59%
Auxiliaries	21	16	7	5.3	131%
AIR FORCE WEAPONS					
Bombers	27	150	9	50	18%
Fighters	1,650	2,100	550	700	79%
Transports	850	700	28	23	121%
ASW Aircraft	20	15	6.7	5	121%
Military Helicopters	1,595	1,700	532	567	94
NUCLEAR WEAPONS					
ICBMS	10	300	3.3	100	3.3%
LRINF Missiles	380	275	127	92	138%
SRBMs	0	1,350	0	450	NA
SLBMs	170	250	57	83	68%

Source: Adapted from reporting by the Department of Defense, and Soviet Military Power, 1987, p. 122.

STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS, USA (RETIRED), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

General ROGERS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be back to appear before this committee. I have been asked to discuss a number of issues regarding NATO and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. What I would request be done is to have my statement placed in the record.

Senator EXON. That will be done without objection.

General ROGERS. And let me highlight some of the issues as I see them.

I wish to underscore that I appear as a former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, who had the privilege of serving, for 8 years, 16 nations, 14 of which are in the continental Europe or close thereto. So it is against the backdrop of the criterion that I used as the SACEUR to make judgments, recommendations and decisions, which is: what is best for NATO and not what is best for any one nation or any one group of nations that I appear this afternoon.

With respect to the current balance, at the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe, wherever we could place a yardstick against an area to measure, we did, from 1973 to 1986. We found that as we watched from those years up to 1986, the gap has widened, particularly the conventional gap and has reached at least 2 to 1 in nearly all areas to the detriment of NATO. And it is a greater gap in some particular areas.

NATO no longer can depend on its qualitative superiority to overcome quantitative deficiencies. In addition to looking at these conventional areas to which we could put a yardstick, you will recall that before this committee we have always cited factors to which no yardstick is applicable. For example, leadership, morale of the troops on either side, training, readiness, and some others.

These are intangibles which are very important when one looks at the balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. But we must not delude ourselves into a false sense of security by putting too much weight on these intangibles. The threat that NATO faces is real, it is there, it is high, and it continues to grow, and every year the gap between the force capabilities of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact grows wider.

Now a major concern that I have had for over a decade has been that the gap will widen to the point where, even for an alliance whose mission is deterrence—or defense if it fails in its mission of deterrence—the military situation gets beyond restoration, and the Soviets will achieve their objective for Western Europe without having to fire a shot. And that objective that they wish to achieve is to be able to intimidate, coerce, blackmail, and neutralize Western Europe without calling their troops out of the barracks. I believe that the treaty that was signed on December 8 has the potential to accelerate that achievement.

I was asked also about NATO strategy, is it still viable to keep the strategy of flexible response, which we adopted in 1967 when we gave up massive retaliation? I believe that it is still applicable and still appropriate, provided that the means necessary to implement that strategy are furnished and that we also find that the nations have the will to implement it, and that arms control negotiations do not undermine or emasculate that strategy.

The record will show that I am a long time advocate of arms control, because I happen to believe that successful negotiations at such an arms control forum is the only way that we will achieve the future that all of us want. But as SACEUR, one of the cardinal principles with respect to arms control which I had was: accept nothing which will impact adversely upon the credibility of NATO's deterrence in the minds of the Soviets.

Deterrence of aggression and intimidation is the mission of NATO. Not fighting, but deterring, preventing a war. And deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, the Soviet Union. As NATO policies point out, deterrence can only be credible if the Soviet Union perceives that she will suffer greater disadvantages than advantages, greater pain than gain, if she aggresses against the West.

To ensure NATO's deterrent is credible, there are three major instruments provided by NATO strategy and policy. The first tool lies among the three responses of flexible response. The preferred response is direct defense to defeat an attack or to force the burden of escalation onto the shoulders of the aggressor. The second response is deliberate escalation on the part of NATO to include the possible first use of nuclear weapons. Now the Soviets may not believe that NATO would ever resort to the first use, but they can not be certain. And it is this uncertainty, this uncalculability, that has a major role to play in the equation of our deterrence.

The Soviets must always face the ultimate risk that should they and the Warsaw Pact aggress against the West, that it may well cause NATO to resort to the first use of nuclear weapons rather than to capitulate to a conventional attack, and that first use might well escalate to the use of strategic nuclear weapons, the one thing the Soviet Union fears because of the losses she had in World War II. Chernobyl has underscored that fear.

The third response of flexible response is the general nuclear response which in the end guarantees our deterrence. There are two other tools that are necessary for credible deterrence and they are provided in the political guidelines for the employment of nuclear weapons by NATO.

The first one is that NATO must have the ability to strike targets on Soviet soil with certainty, with theater land-based nuclear weapons, and to do so with great accuracy. The Soviet Union must understand, that should she attack, her soil is not a sanctuary, and that the consequences of her aggression will not be suffered solely by the victims of her aggression.

The second tool provided by those political guidelines is that there must be a number of escalatory options between the disadvantaged conventional forces at one end of our force spectrum and the strategic nuclear forces at the other end.

Let me digress to NATO's scenario for handling an attack by the Warsaw Pact should she attack conventionally. Even under optimal conditions, that is, getting the appropriate political decisions on a timely basis to ensure we do all we can so that our forces can defend appropriately, in less than 2 weeks the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe must request the release of theater nuclear weapons. And why is that so? Because of the guidance given to him by his political authorities which says that you, SACEUR, before you lose the cohesiveness of your defense, you will request the release of nuclear weapons, and because of an inability to sustain ourselves in Allied Command Europe longer than a period which is less than 2 weeks.

There are insufficient replacements for battlefield casualties, insufficient replacements for losses of materiel on the battlefield, as well as not sufficient ammunition stocks. You will note that I point out in my statement the United States is much better off in the area of sustainability than most other nations, and it should be, because of the long line of communications over which those sustainability items must travel.

SACEUR's request for the initial request of theater nuclear weapons would be of such a nature as he would ask for relatively few. He would want to strike militarily significant targets on both Soviet soil and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact soil. The purpose is to cause the Warsaw Pact and Soviets to cease and desist in their attack.

Two messages would be sent through political/diplomatic channels just at the time those nuclear weapons were on target. One to the Soviets to tell them look, you are going to be subject to further strikes on your soil, which might escalate to the strategic nuclear exchange unless you withdraw your forces. The other to the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations to tell them that you will find that we are striking Soviet targets on your soil, and we will continue to do so unless you stop supporting the Soviet Union in the attack against the West.

The Soviets then will decide whether or not to stop or run the risk of escalation to the strategic nuclear forces.

Now, to get to that point that I have just described in the scenario, NATO must have what the political authorities have recognized for years, escalatory options other than capitulation to a conventional attack or the resort to strategic nuclear weapons.

Having only the option at each extreme would return us again almost back to the position of massive retaliation, which we discarded in 1967 as no longer appropriate. The purpose of the 1979 two track decision was to provide NATO with those escalatory options, with the capability of striking targets on NATO, Warsaw Pact nation soil.

We had two means by which to reach Soviet soil in 1979. One was the Vulcan aircraft of the United Kingdom, and it was going out of their structure. The other was the F-111. And with the massive air defense forces of the Warsaw Pact it was decided by 1979 that the F-111 was not adequate, and that we had to do something else.

To get a consensus (unanimity) on the deployment track of the ground launched cruise missiles and Pershing II's, some nations had to have a negotiating track. The deployment track was the pacing track, it was to fill a gap that had developed in our spectrum of deterrence. Although it was "sold" to the publics of NATO as a means to capture the SS-20s. But that is not so. The deployment of the SS-20s at the end of the 1970's just made it more urgent that NATO get on with the decision to deploy its weapons and fill that gap in our spectrum of deterrence.

Getting from the two track decision to the double zero agreement, we found along the way the demonstrations in Western Europe, the 1981 suggestion that we have a zero level LRINF agreement, that is, we would not deploy in NATO those long range INF weapons if the Soviet Union would destroy her SS-4s and her SS-20s.

The President offered such a proposal. Nobody that I ever talked to on either side of the Atlantic believed at the time that the Soviets would ever agree. As I point out in my statement, Mr. Wöerner, the Minister of Defense for the Federal Republic of Germany said then that he would crawl the 240 miles from his home to Bonn if it were ever agreed to by the Soviets.

At the time, 1981, I was asked publicly what I thought of the zero level proposal. I said I thought it was a magnificent political ploy, but it gave me military gas pains because it returned us to where we were in 1979 which we had found to be unsatisfactory.

NATO followed through with its deployment of these weapon systems in December 1983, despite everything the Soviets could do to keep us from doing it. The next thing was the late 1986 Reykjavik summit. There were major concerns on the part of the Europeans when they found out what had occurred or nearly occurred at that summit, that the very foundation of NATO's deterrence—the nuclear weapon—had almost been given up. And they were unnerved that the superpowers negotiated the fate of Western Europe over their heads without consultation with them.

The West Europeans discovered after the summit that Gorbachev might well accept the zero level proposal. At that time, a number of senior personnel pointed out the folly of their having ever fostered the zero level proposal. But they also pointed out to us in uniform that there was no way they, the political authorities, could walk that cat back, because if they went to the public and said the proposal they had been promoting for some 6 years now makes no sense, they would lose their political credibility. It was at that juncture that political credibility took a higher priority than the credibility of NATO's deterrence.

In February, 1987, Mr. Gorbachev agreed to the zero level LRINF proposal. NATO cried out that as long as he had shorter range INF, SS-22s and SS-23s, that could hit the same targets as the SS-20s, NATO could not agree. So Mr. Gorbachev threw them in in April 1987. He was the only one that had any, because the United States had withdrawn its shorter range INF when it deployed the Pershing IIs. And on December 8, 1987, we saw the signing of the double zero agreement.

Turning now to the INF Treaty, Mr. Chairman, I come here today to talk about that treaty only to give you the view of a commander who bore some responsibility for the security of the West in Europe, and how I view this agreement.

There are some good aspects. It proves that if NATO negotiates from strength, unity and resolve, it can bring the Soviets to the negotiating table and get them to negotiate seriously. On-site verification is a breakthrough. Asymmetrical reductions is another breakthrough. All of these favorable aspects of this treaty may well serve us in good stead in the future as we negotiate further.

My concerns, again as a former SACEUR evaluating the treaty against the criterion of what is best for NATO, are as follows.

I am concerned that we are giving up the Pershing II, the one weapon system that the Soviets really fear that are land-based in theater. They fear them because they can strike Soviet soil in 13 minutes, penetrate the Pact air defenses with ease and are very accurate when they get over the target.

The Soviets found the P–II put them in the same posture they had had the West Europeans for many years, that is vulnerable to being struck by theater land-based nuclear weapons from the soil of Western Europe just as they had threatend Western Europe for so many years.

I am concerned because we are giving up the escalatory options. We are returning to 1979 and the F–3. What has changed in the meantime? The air defenses of the Warsaw Pact have become more sophisticated and they have been strengthened in other ways.

I am concerned because this treaty puts Western Europe on the slippery slope of denuclearization, something the Soviets have wanted ever since we started deploying nuclear weapons in Western Europe. It makes Europe safe for conventional war.

We have gone from 1,500 miles for the cruise missiles down to 1,100 miles with the Pershing IIs, and now down to 300 miles. And the weapons systems that we have left that are nuclear capable will be able to strike primarily Germans on the soil of either East Germany or of West Germany. That causes German concerns and you already have noted the pressure from senior German personnel, supported by the Soviets and by the Warsaw Pact countries—particularly Eastern Germany—for going to a third zero level, that is further denuclearization.

I am concerned about Soviet compliance with this treaty. I attended many briefings of ministers in NATO by U.S. teams pointing out how the Soviet Union continued to violate the ABM Treaty and the SALT agreement. I do not know why we should be more confident now that they will in fact comply.

And what recourse do we have if the Soviets violate this treaty? Do we redeploy these weapons systems? No chance, completely infeasible. The West European will not again, in my opinion, go through the trauma of having such weapons systems placed on their soul.

I am concerned about the rationales that are presented as to why this is a good treaty. Such as "We will have 4,000 warheads left in Western Europe after the treaty is implemented. Isn't that surely enough?"

I remind you again of NATO's mission of deterrence, not fighting the war, and the necessity to conjure up the perception of pain, disadvantage in the minds of the Soviets if we are going to have a credible deterrence. And what is the composition of that 4,000 residual stockpile? A few maritime depth charges with a range of zero. Hundreds of artillery fired atomic projectiles with a range of 9 miles. And when you set the artillery back from the forward line of troops so they are less vulnerable to incoming artillery, their rounds will land on our soil. About 80 Lance with a range of 66 miles. They must be set back as well. Perhaps they can reach just across the inner German border. There are the 72 Pershing I–As of

Germany, that could at least strike military significant Soviet targets or non-Soviet Warsaw Pact soil and conjure up this perception of pain. But they will be withdrawn by the Germans when this treaty is implemented. That leaves bombs for dual capable aircraft with a range of about 180 to 200 miles, providing they can penetrate the air defenses.

I do not believe that that residual stockpile and our inability to reach out to strike military significant Soviet targets will cause any perception of pain in the minds of the Soviets and therefore the credibility of our deterrence is reduced. It is not a question of numbers. The question is, after this treaty is implemented, will NATO have the weapons platforms that can propel nuclear warheads onto militarily significant targets and conjure up this Soviet perception of disadvantage? I think the answer to that will not be 3 years from now.

I am concerned about the rationale: "They are giving up four to every one that we are giving up, and surely that is a good deal for us." And corollary justification: "It reduces the number of weapons that the Soviets have to strike the rear areas of NATO." Numbers are important only when you have to fight a war. That is not the mission of NATO. The name of the game in NATO is deterrence. Further, it is only 3 percent of their warheads that the Soviet Union is giving up, and almost all of the 97 percent remaining can strike West European targets, the same targets that the SS-20s and SS-4s can strike. So it keeps the risk on the backs of the West Europeans. And what is it that we give up? The one weapon system that the Soviet Union fears, the Pershing II, which, when coupled with the U.S. strategic nuclear forces, keeps the credibility of NATO's deterrence high.

There are those who now say "We can use strategic weapons to 'compensate' for this INF Treaty". To use strategic weapons puts us back where we were in 1967, when we had the massive retaliation strategy and we decided that it was no longer appropriate.

There are those who have a corollary to this use of strategic weapons. That is to use the 400-plus nuclear warheads committed to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe which are located on submarine-launched ballistic missiles as a compensatory measure for this INF Treaty.

Well, we looked at that in the debate from 1977 to 1979 and decided that it did not make any sense to use strategic weapons that way. But as I point out in my statement, that is not what worries me.

SLBMs are strategic weapons, always have been, are at the negotiating table, are used by the SACEUR in conjunction with the strategic laydown by the U.S. strategic forces. The Soviets can discriminate between the launching of a land-based ballistic missile and a submarine-based ballistic missile, but they cannot tell, when they see missiles breaking the surface of the ocean heading in their direction, whether they include the 400 plus warheads that are assigned to the SACEUR, or whether they are witnessing the initial strategic laydown by the West.

With the Soviets having a policy to launch under attack—that is, to release particularly their ICBM fleet when they see strategic nuclear weapons approaching their soil—I do not understand why people would advise the United States and the United Kingdom putting themselves in such a vulnerable position just because we are rash enough to use strategic warheads for theater purposes.

There are others who say: "We can compensate with sea-launched cruise missiles in the aftermath of the implementation of this treaty." There is no difference between a sea-launched cruise missile and an air-launched cruise missile, other than the manner by which they are launched. And if political credibility has the priority that was assigned to it in the aftermath of the Reykjavik summit, I do not see how it can be politically credible to be observed removing weapons with one hand and replacing them with identical weapons with the other hand.

I am concerned that, pursuing an urgent U.S. timetable, we are sacrificing the long-term credibility of NATO's deterrence for political expediency, all because of a 1981 proposal we did not expect the Soviets to accept.

But as Henry Kissinger has pointed out, "we should not blame Gorbachev for accepting proposals that should never have been made."

We have to deal with the real world, Mr. Chairman, and I am a realist. The agreement has been signed. Chances are high, I think, that it will be ratified, from what I read in the press. So what do we do now?

The first thing that has to be done is NATO needs to develop a strategy for arms control and determine where it fits with its overall strategy. Where does NATO draw the line on this denuclearization? What do we do if Gorbachev offers up dual capable aircraft (and he has twice as many as we have in the West), or if he proposes a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe? We need to predetermine the answers to those questions.

We also need to keep the credibility of our deterrent just as high as possible after this is implemented, recognizing the fact that it will never be as high as with the Pershing II deployed. And that means a number of things. We must enhance our conventional forces. We have always needed to enhance our conventional forces. This just spotlights the fact and makes it urgent, it does not change the need. Every SACEUR since Eisenhower has been pleading for enhanced conventional forces.

There are priorities that could be set for conventional force improvements, such as, we need to do better with the conventional forces already assigned to NATO to bring them up to the standards that have been set by Allied Command Europe. We need to continue to modernize our forces and as we do take advantage of our technology to exploit weaknesses on their side and strength on our side. And there are other things that we need to do, such as collaboration and cooperation to a greater extent on the research, development and procurement of weapons systems.

I think we need to strive for a satisfactory agreement on the reduction of conventional forces to a reduced and verifiable level. I have included in my statement some of the things I think we should keep in mind as we negotiate that agreement.

We need to protect our dual capable aircraft so that they can survive at the bases where they are located, can penetrate better, and can have a longer range.

We need to implement the second half of the Montebello decision. The first half, the 4,600 ceiling on nuclear warheads in Western Europe, was accomplished last year. We need to follow through on the Montebello commitment to develop and deploy a follow-on to the Lance missile (with a range of at least 150 miles) and an air to surface standoff missile with a range of about 250 miles; to modernize our artillery-fired atomic projectiles as long as we are going to keep them (we are doing that with the 8 inch); and to ensure that the Trident programs come to fruition in both the United States and the United Kingdom.

I believe we should seek a satisfactory agreement on the 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear forces. In the SHAPE study that we made, we found no adverse impact on that cardinal principle, i.e., on the credibility of NATO's deterrence. But I happen to believe that the United States should look at certain things with respect to such an agreement: not sacrifice its research on SDI in trying to reach this agreement; hopefully tie such an agreement to a satisfactory agreement on conventional forces (otherwise we lose our leverage on the Soviets to negotiate seriously a conventional reduction). It was suggested that we establish such linkage with the INF Treaty but that suggestion was discarded. Now there is another chance to get some leverage on the Soviets, with the disparity all in their favor in conventional forces by tieing the START agreement—which they want—to a satisfactory agreement on conventional forces. Since it is warheads that are counted in a START agreement, we should provide a sufficient number of targets with low vulnerability should the Soviets initiate the first strike. Thus, the advantage of the single warhead versus the multiple warhead missiles and the mobility of the missile systems come to the fore. And it points toward the advantages of the Midgetman missile. It also raises the issue of whether or not the United States should consider reorganizing its submarine forces to have a greater number of submarines with a lesser number of missiles on board per submarine, so that those forces cannot be so quickly destroyed.

Mr. Chairman, I have discussed the NATO balance, the deterrent mission, the viability of the flexible response, laid out the path NATO took from double track to double zero, and have listed the positive aspects of the INF Treaty and my concerns with it, and I have set forth some actions which I believe the United States and NATO should take should the INF Treaty be implemented.

These actions will require resources and they are expensive, and they will require the collective will of the NATO nations to undertake them. Unhappily, I must say that my last 8 years experience causes me to project that we can expect a fairly high level of will to do these kinds of things, manifested by the appropriate rhetoric, but with few, if any, additional resources being made available for strengthening the collective security of the alliance.

I thank you for permitting me to appear and to place a statement in the record. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Rogers follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. BERNARD W. ROGERS (Retired)

You have asked me to discuss a number of current and prospective issues relating to NATO, especially the impact of the INF Treaty upon NATO's strategy. I am pleased to have this opportunity to present my views as the former SACEUR who for the past eight years bore some direct, personal responsibility for the security of the West in Europe. Serving 16 nations, 14 of which are in or near continental Europe, I evaluated proposals, exercised judgement and made recommendations and decisions against the criterion of what is best for NATO as a whole, not what is best for the United States or any other nation or group of nations. That is the perspective which I bring to this chamber today.

THE CURRENT BALANCE OF FORCES

You have asked about the current balance between the forces of NATO and those of the Warsaw Pact (WP). In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when the Soviets declared that never again would they be "faced down" militarily by the West, we at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) have measured the gap between NATO's force capabilities and those of the WP. Between 1973 and 1986 we found that, in every area to which we could put a yardstick, the gap between NATO's conventional force capabilities and those of the WP was widening to the detriment of NATO. Where the Pact had been ahead of NATO in 1973 -- which was in most areas -- the gap has widened. Where NATO was ahead in 1973 -- such as with armed helicopters -- the WP has either now surpassed NATO or has narrowed the gap. In almost all areas the WP surpasses NATO by a ratio of 2:1, and in some areas the ratio is considerably greater. Further, NATO can no longer depend upon qualitative superiority to compensate for the quantitative disparity of its forces vis-a-vis the Pact.

I realize that there are some persons who would wish to redefine the Pact threat to NATO by citing certain intangible factors that appear to favor the Alliance. They point to the fidelity of the NATO nations to the cause of the democratic West as contrasted with the potential lack of such faithfulness on the part of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) nations to the Soviet cause. Such observers of the threat also argue that the morale of the Pact troops is low, the quality of Pact military leadership is poor, the level of Pact training is inadequate and the state of readiness of Pact forces is low. I admit that these and other intangible factors for both the Pact and NATO are important in trying to weigh the balance between the two, but I also believe that we must be very careful not to use such intangibles to delude ourselves into a false sense of security. The threat is there, it is real, it is high and it continues to grow. Every year that passes the gap between the force capabilities of NATO and those of the WP gets wider, to NATO's detriment.

My major concern for the past decade has been — and continues to be — that even for an alliance whose mission is deterrence of war, this gap might widen to the point where the military situation for NATO would get beyond restoration and the Soviets would accomplish their objective in Western Europe: against the backdrop of massive conventional forces, which can threaten to seize and hold territory, to achieve the capability to intimidate, coerce and eventually neutralize the West European nations without having to fire a shot. I also believe that the INF treaty has the potential to accelerate the Soviets' achievement of that objective. But more about that later.

NATO'S STRATEGY

You have asked if NATO's deterrent strategy of Flexible Response (MC14/3) that replaced the bankrupt policy of "massive retaliation" (MC14/2) in 1967 remains viable. I believe that it does and will continue to be an appropriate and adequate strategy provided:

- The means needed to implement it properly are furnished.
- The nations demonstrate the will to implement the strategy.

° The strategy is not emasculated by the arms negotiating process.

I hasten to add that the record will show I am a long-time advocate of arms control negotiations because I believe that only they can provide the kind of a future all of us want. However, for me as SACEUR, I contend that a cardinal principle applicable to negotiating such agreements is to accept none which impacts adversely on the credibility of NATO's deterrence in the mind of the Soviets.

Deterrence of aggression and intimidation/coercion resulting from the threat of aggression is NATO's mission. If NATO should ever need to fight to secure its territory and nations' freedom, then it would have failed in its mission. But deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, in this instance the Soviet Union. As NATO policy documents set out: if NATO's deterrent is to be credible, the Soviet Union must perceive that, if she and the Warsaw Pact were to aggress against the Alliance, she would suffer greater disadvantages than advantages. In short, suffer greater pain than gain.

To ensure NATO's deterrent is credible, there are three major instruments provided by NATO's strategy and its policies. The first tool is to be found among the three responses envisioned by Flexible Response. The first and preferred response is direct defense to defeat an attack or to force the burden of escalation onto the shoulders of the aggressor. The second response and one of the 3 key tools to credible deterrence, is deliberate escalation by NATO to include the possible first use of theater nuclear weapons. The Soviets may doubt that NATO would ever resort to such first use when failing in a conventional defense — even though NATO's alternative would be capitulation -- but they cannot be certain. This uncertainty, this incalculability, is an important factor in NATO's equation of deterrence. The Soviets must always face the ultimate risk that Pact aggression would lead to NATO's initial use of theater nuclear weapons which might well escalate to the strategic nuclear exchange, which is the one thing I believe the Soviets fear. The loss of twenty million citizens in WWII still preys on the minds of older Russians. The Soviets realize their losses from the West's strategic nuclear strikes would be much higher; the Chernobyl accident undergirds that realization.

The third response is the General Nuclear Response, the ultimate guarantor of NATO's deterrence.

The other two major tools for keeping the credibility of NATO's deterrent high are set forth in the "Political Guidelines for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons" by NATO. They are:

- The ability to strike militarily significant targets on Soviet homeland with land-based theater nuclear weapons. (The Soviets must understand that their country would not be a sanctuary should they aggress, that the consequences of Pact aggression would not be borne solely by the victims of that agression.)
- The possession by NATO of credible escalatory options between its disadvantaged conventional forces at one end of its force spectrum and its strategic nuclear forces at the other.

NATO'S SCENARIO FOR PACT ATTACK

Let me digress at this point to remind you of the scenario which NATO would most probably follow — and which it exercises — should the Soviets/Warsaw Pact attack conventionally. Even under optimal conditions -- especially appropriate and timely political decisions to get our forces best prepared to defend -- SACEUR would be required to request the release of nuclear weapons in less than two weeks after the Pact attacked. This would not be the result of our troops not performing well -- they would. The reasons are two:

- A lack of sustainment by the forces of Allied Command Europe: insufficient trained replacements for casualties, inadequate stocks of ammunition, and not enough prepositioned war reserve stocks to replace materiel losses on the battlefield. (The US ability to sustain its forces is better than most of its allies — it should be in view of the length of its lines of communications. Still, it has some deficiencies.)

- The political directives to SACEUR that before he loses the cohesiveness of his conventional defense (i.e., subject to penetrations by Pact forces on a fairly broad scale) he will — not may — request the release of theater nuclear weapons.

When he requests the initial release of nuclear weapons, SACEUR would seek the use of a relatively small number in order to strike militarily - significant Soviet targets on both Soviet and non-Soviet Pact soil (certainly not on NATO soil). The purpose of this first use of theater nuclear weapons is to cause the Soviets/Pact nations to cease and desist in their conventional attack. Simultaneously with the nuclear strike there would be messages sent through political channels to:

- The Soviets advising them that they and their Pact allies would continue to suffer additional nuclear strikes if they did not withdraw their conventional forces; and

- The other Pact nations advising them that NATO is striking — and will continue to strike -- Soviet military targets on their soil because of their having joined the Soviets in aggressing against NATO; thus, they should cease their attack.

The Soviets/Pact nations must then decide if they wish to "cease and desist" or to continue their conventional attack — with or without nuclear weapons — and thereby run the risk of the situation escalating to the strategic nuclear level of which they are fearful. To get the Soviets/Pact nations to that juncture, NATO must possess theater nuclear escalatory options so that it does not face the choice of either capitulating to the conventional attack or resorting to strategic nuclear forces. (Shades of NATO's former, and long since bankrupt, strategy of "massive retaliation".)

FROM TWO-TRACK TO DOUBLE ZERO

It was to provide such escalatory options with theater land-based nuclear weapons that could hold Soviet military targets at risk on both Soviet and non-Soviet WP soil that NATO decided in December 1979 to deploy the ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II (PII) ballistic missiles in Western Europe. A gap in our spectrum of deterrence had developed which needed to be filled. The only weapon platform NATO then possessed which could meet the political guidelines was the US F111 aircraft based in the UK and the British Vulcan aircraft. The latter was about to be withdrawn from service leaving only the F111 which had any chance of penetrating the extensive Pact air defenses. NATO concluded that the F111 by itself was insufficient for credible deterrence, thus the deployment track of the two-track decision of December 1979. The second track was a negotiating track, but the pacing one was the need to deploy the longer range intermediate nuclear force weapons. However, without the negotiating track there would have been no NATO consensus (unanimity) on the deployment track. Despite the concern about the negotiating track expressed by some at the time, it was agreed that two tracks were better than none; thus, the two-track decision.

The deployment decision was "sold" to the Alliance publics as having the purpose of capturing the Soviet SS20 ballistic missiles. But that was not the case. The decision had been taken in order that the gap in NATO's deterrent would be filled. The fact that the SS20s were starting to be deployed at the end of the 1970's only made it more urgent that NATO get on with deciding to deploy its LRINF weapons.

By 1981 there were a number of demonstrations being staged in West European nations against deploying the LRINF on their soil commencing in

December 1983. To assist in dampening down these demonstrations it was suggested that, if the Soviets would destroy their SS20s and SS4s, NATO would not deploy its new class of LRINF weapons. President Reagan publicly offered such a zero level proposal later that year. No one, on either side of the Atlantic, believed that the Soviets would ever accept it. (In fact, it has been reported that the Minister of Defense of West Germany even promised to crawl the 240 miles from Bonn to his hometown if the Soviets ever agreed.)

In response to queries at the time, I stated publicly that the zero level LRINF proposal was "a magnificent political ploy, but militarily it gave me 'gas pains' because it would return NATO to its unsatisfactory posture of 1979."

The Soviet leadership did not then accept the proposal, even though its advantages all were on the side of the Soviets. However, the proposal did have a quieting effect on the demonstrations.

In December 1983 NATO commenced deploying the US LRINF. The Soviets left and then returned to the LRINF negotiating table. A number of proposals for LRINF reductions were tabled. In late 1986 a hurriedly assembled summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev was held in Reykjavik.

Serving in Western Europe at the time, I observed that when the West Europeans learned what had occurred at Reykjavik they were astounded. They could not believe that the very foundation upon which NATO's deterrence rests -- the nuclear weapon -- was almost negotiated away. They were equally unnerved by the fact that the two superpowers had been negotiating the fate of Western Europe over their heads without their being consulted by the US.

After the summit, the West Europeans realized that Gorbachev might be prepared to accept the zero-level proposal for LRINF. A number of senior members of NATO and of Western European governments then decried the folly of their having fostered such a proposal. But they pointed out that they would have to accept Gorbachev's agreeing to it. To go to their people after trying to convince them since 1981 that zero-level was the desired solution and tell them that they, the governments, had misled them for all that time would result in a major blow to the credibility of the politicians. It was at that point that political credibility and expediency took priority over the credibility of NATO's deterrence.

When Gorbachev agreed in February 1987 to zero-level for LRINF, and then threw in the Soviet shorter range INF as well two months later, NATO found itself hoist with its own petard.

THE INF TREATY

There are a number of positive aspects of the INF Treaty. It has demonstrated that NATO unity, resolve and strength will cause the Soviets to get to the negotiating table and to negotiate seriously. For the first time, the Soviets have agreed to on-site inspections and to asymmetrical reductions. All of these aspects of the treaty may prove very useful in the negotiation of future reductions of other forces.

However, the INF treaty concerns me for a number of reasons. (I remind you again that as SACEUR I evaluate such agreements against the backdrop of what is best for NATO as a whole.)

- I am concerned that NATO is giving up the PII ballistic missile, a weapon which can penetrate the Pact air defenses with certainty, can reach targets on Soviet soil within thirteen minutes and is very accurate. This is the weapon the Soviets fear most and were out to capture -- irrespective of the cost — because it puts the Soviets in the same posture in which they have had the West European nations for years: vulnerable to nuclear attacks by theater land-based weapons platforms. That posture made them extremely uncomfortable. Further, the PII, coupled to the US strategic nuclear forces, keeps the credibility of NATO's deterrence very high in the Soviet mind.

- I am concerned that NATO will be eliminating both of the credible LRINF escalatory options between its conventional forces and the strategic nuclear forces, returning NATO to its posture of 1979. And what has occurred in the meantime to change that posture? Only that the Pact air defenses have grown more extensive and have become more sophisticated, making them even more apt to prevent NATO aircraft from penetrating.

- I am concerned that the treaty puts NATO on the slippery slope of denuclearization of Western Europe, a long-time stated objective of the Soviet Union. Its denuclearization would make Western Europe safe for conventional war, or more likely, subject to intimidation, coercion and eventual neutralization from the threat of aggression by Pact conventional forces. This treaty reduces the range of NATO's nuclear weapon systems from 1500 miles (GLCMs)/ 1100 miles (PIIs) to less than 300 miles, thereby making NATO's deterrent less credible to the Soviets. The ranges of NATO's residual weapons will mainly cause them to strike German targets — either in East or West Germany. It is for this reason that we have noted some West German officials — with Soviet and East German support --pressing for a third zero-level agreement to eliminate the remaining short range nuclear forces (SNF) and further denuclearize Western Europe.

- I am concerned about Soviet compliance with the treaty's provisions. It would be a first for them. I recall the numerous occasions on which I listened to this administration's briefing teams trying to convince its allies that the Soviets had been and are violating the ABM Treaty and the SALT agreement. Why should we have greater confidence that the Soviets will now comply with this treaty, even though it provides for more stringent verification procedures? And what would be our recourse should the Soviets not comply? Return the LRINF weapons to West European soil? Such recourse would not be feasible.

° I am concerned about the rationales being presented to justify this treaty which I believe tend to mislead the people of NATO on both sides of the Atlantic.

°° One rationale is: "There will remain 4000 nuclear warheads in Western Europe which surely will be sufficient for deterrence." (Keep in mind that for NATO's deterrent to be credible it must conjure up in the Soviet mind a perception of greater pain than gain from Pact aggression.) Examining the composition of the residual 4000 nuclear warheads one finds:

°°° A small number of nuclear maritime depth charges. Range: 0.

°°° Hundreds of artillery-fired atomic projectiles (AFAPs). Range: 9 miles. The artillery must be set back some distance from the forward line of troops to reduce its vulnerability to incoming enemy conventional artillery/missiles/aircraft. Where will our nuclear AFAPs strike? On NATO soil.

°°° About 80 obsolescent LANCE ballistic missiles. Range: 66 miles. They, too, must be located even farther to the rear of the forward line of troops. How far east can the LANCE then strike? Perhaps along the western edge of East Germany/Czechoslavakia.

°°° The 72 PlA ballistic missiles of the FRG. Range: 420 miles. Although they cannot reach Soviet soil, these missiles can at least strike militarily significant Soviet targets in all of East Germany, much of Czechoslavakia and in Western Poland. However, the FRG has declared it will eliminate its PlAs once the INF treaty has been fully implemented.

°°° The remainder of the 4000 warheads will consist of hundreds of nuclear bombs for NATO's dual capable aircraft (DCA). Range: 180-200 miles, providing the aircraft can penetrate Pact air defenses which become stronger each year.

°° In view of the scenario I previously described for NATO's first use of nuclear weapons, is it logical to think that these residual 4000 nuclear weapons will cause a Soviet perception of sufficient disadvantage/pain should the Pact aggress to keep NATO's deterrence credible? I don't think so. It is not a question of numbers of warheads that will remain post-INF treaty. The real question is: "After the treaty is implemented, will NATO possess the appropriate weapons platforms which can propel nuclear warheads onto sufficient militarily-significant Soviet targets and do the Soviets know that NATO can do so? " After the treaty is implemented, the answer will be: "No."

°° Another rationale: "Since the Soviets are giving up many more nuclear systems than NATO, the treaty has to be a good deal for the Alliance." Not so, from the standpoint of the threat to Western Europe. (However, as I have indicated, the precedent asymmetrical reductions by the Soviets might prove very useful in future negotiations.) Proponents of the treaty point out that it reduces the number of Soviet missiles with which they can strike installations in NATO's rear areas. That is so, but such numbers only count if NATO has to fight. For NATO, the name of the game is to deter, to prevent having to fight. Further, what the Soviets are eliminating comprises only about three per cent of their stockpile of nuclear warheads. Nearly all of the remaining 97% can be targetted onto those same installations in NATO's rear area, thereby keeping the risk high and on the backs of the West European people. And what does NATO give up? The very weapon system that the Soviets fear most -- the PII -- which puts the Soviet homeland and people in a similar posture of vulnerability and keeps high the credibility of NATO's deterrent.

°° A third rationale: "We can use strategic nuclear weapons to 'compensate' for the effects of the INF treaty and thereby keep NATO's deterrent credible." To do so would have NATO, for all intents and purposes, revert to its former strategy of "massive retaliation." Why should that strategy be anymore credible now than it was in 1967, when it was discarded and replaced by "Flexible Response", in view of the Soviets having developed the capability for a retaliatory strategic strike? In fact the Soviet ability to retaliate following a US strategic first strike has grown in the intervening years. Others have suggested as a "compensatory" measure for the treaty that NATO use the 400+ nuclear warheads which are committed to SACEUR and which are located on submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Such use is possible, but does it make sense? This issue was argued in the debate leading up to the LRINF deployment decision in 1979, but was discarded as being an inappropriate use of strategic warheads. My objections to this proposal are:

°°° SLBMs are strategic weapons, always have been, and are so considered in arms control negotiations. Those SLBM warheads committed to SACEUR are tethered to the release of the rest of the US strategic forces and SACEUR coordinates fully his targets therewith.

°°° Although Soviet surveillance platforms could discriminate between the launching of land based ballistic missiles and submarine based ballistic missiles, they could not tell whether the SLBMs they observe breaking the surface of the ocean and heading towards the USSR contain some of SACEUR's 400+ strategic warheads being used for theater purposes, or represent the initiation of the US/UK strategic strike. If the Soviets have a policy of attacking under launch --i.e., releasing their strategic forces when they observe US/UK strategic weapons heading towards Soviet soil -- why should the US and UK bear the risk of being struck by the Soviet strategic nuclear forces because NATO was rash enough to use strategic weapons for theater purposes? Further, I don't believe the Soviets would view such use as being credible in the first place.

°° A final rationale: "NATO can 'compensate' for the INF treaty by using sea launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) to hold at risk the former INF targets." This is feasible, but is it credible? A SLCM and a GLCM are identical, small, unmanned aircraft whose difference lies in he platform from which they are launched. The question is: Would it be politically credible for NATO to be seen taking away cruise missiles with one hand while with the other it replaces them with identical cruise missiles on a different launch platform? I wouldn't think so, not if political credibility in this INF treaty business has the high priority I described was given to it post-Reykjavik.

(Incidentally, when one hears such language in NATO as: "compensate" for the treaty, or take "compensatory" measures, the thought must surely cross his mind that if NATO needs to compensate for this treaty, maybe it should not have been agreed in the first place.)

° Finally, I am concerned that, under the aegis of the US, the long-term credibility of NATO's deterrent is being sacrificed by this treaty on the altar of short-term political expediency. The treaty may be considered by the US as being in its short-term political interests, but it is not in those of its West European allies nor the long-term interests of both.. But, as Dr. Kissinger has pointed out, we certainly "should not blame Gorbachev for accepting proposals that should never have been made."

POST-INF: WHAT TO DO?

If the INF treaty is implemented, there are a number of actions which I believe should be taken. Among them are:

° NATO must develop a strategy for arms control that, *inter alia*:

°° Determines how such a strategy fits into NATO's overall, broad strategy.

°° Determines where to draw the line on the slope of denuclearization.

°° Predetermines the responses to potential Gorbachev initiatives, e.g., eliminating dual capable aircraft or establishing a nuclear free zone through Central Europe.

°° Develops some NATO initiatives for arms control.

° NATO must strive to keep the credibility of its deterrent as high as possible in the mind of the Soviets, realizing that it will never again be as high as with the PIIs deployed. This means that:

°° NATO's conventional forces must be improved. The treaty spotlights the adverse imbalance between its forces and those of the Warsaw Pact; however, with or without the treaty, NATO has needed to enhance its conventional strength, as every SACEUR has pleaded beginning with the first, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

°°° NATO's priorities for conventional improvement should be: first, do better with national forces already assigned to Allied Command Europe (ACE) by bringing them up to ACE standards for manning/equipping/training/maintaining/sustaining (especially); second, continue modernizing nations' forces and take advantage of the West's technological lead to exploit the Pact's weaknesses and NATO's strengths (a case in point is FOFA, follow on forces attack); and third, create additional force structure.

- NATO must pursue vigorously a satisfactory reduction of conventional forces to a balanced and verifiable level. Some principles for conventional negotiations are:
    - Do not include tactical nuclear weapons as the Soviets want.
    - Reduce by divisions which, with a chain of command and a support structure, are fighting units.
    - The Soviets must make an asymmetrical reduction, withdrawing sufficient Soviet divisions far enough East so that their movement westward would be picked up readily by western intelligence. (Even better would be for the Soviets to eliminate from their structure the forces they withdraw.)
    - The heavy arms and equipment of US divisions withdrawn to be stored in Western Europe.
- NATO must implement the second half of the Montebello decision of October 1983. The first half was agreement to reduce by end-1988 the theater nuclear stockpile in Western Europe to no more than 4600 warheads, an objective achieved in 1986. The second half was a commitment by nations to:
    - develop and deploy a follow-on to the LANCE ballistic missile which will have greater range (at least 150 miles) and accuracy.
    - develop and deploy an air-to-surface standoff missile for tactical aircraft. (range: at least 250 miles.)
    - modernize NATO's artillery-fired atomic projectiles. (This is underway for the 8-inch howitzer round.)

  - ensure that the US and UK plans for their TRIDENT forces are implemented. (To date they are.)

Implementing the second half of the Montebello decision should be credible politically since it was made long before an INF agreement appeared possible and needed to be done regardless of such an agreement.

- NATO must take the necessary action with respect to its dual capable aircraft to:
  - improve their survivability at their bases.
  - enhance their ability to penetrate the Pact air defense.
  - increase their range.
- NATO should continue to seek a satisfactory agreement in the START talks that would reduce strategic nuclear forces of the US and USSR by 50%. Our evaluation of this proposal at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) revealed that it would not impact adversely on the credibility of NATO's deterrence. However, the US should:
  - not sacrifice its research on SDI to achieve such an agreement.
  - retain leverage on the Soviets by linking any START agreement to a satisfactory agreement on conventional forces. (With the imbalance in the conventional field favoring the Soviets, what other leverage does NATO have for the Soviets to negotiate seriously?)
  - consider the possible reorganization of its strategic nuclear forces to provide a greater number of targets which a Soviet preemptive first strike must hit by:

°°° deploying the less vulnerable, mobile Midgetman with its single warhead.

°°° increasing the number of submarines with a lesser number of SLBMs on each than currently is the case.

SUMMARY

I have discussed the current NATO-WP balance in general terms; have reviewed NATO's deterrent mission and potential viability of NATO's strategy of Flexible Response; have laid out the path NATO took from double-track to double-zero; have listed the positive aspects of and my concerns with the INF treaty as it has been constructed; and, have set forth what action I believe NATO/US must take should the INF treaty be implemented.

These actions require resources and the collective will of the NATO nations to undertake them. My last eight years' experience causes me to project that we can expect a fairly high level of will, manifested by the appropriate rhetoric, but with few, if any, additional resources being made available for strengthening the collective security of the Alliance.

Thank you for permitting me to make this statement a part of your record.

Senator EXON. General Rogers, thank you very much. That was an excellent statement and I listened to it very, very carefully and had a chance to review briefly the prepared text that you gave us, which has been accepted as part of the record.

I have said that I support the INF Treaty and pointed out, I think on the first speech on the subject on the Senate floor, that I felt that in the short term the conventional imbalance in favor of the Soviets would be strengthened because of the INF Treaty. I therefore suggested that certainly before we go into any formal signing of a so-called START agreement, that I did not feel that I could in good conscience, from what I know now, support a START Treaty unless there was a significant beginning at least to address the conventional imbalance that you have articulated very well here this afternoon.

I further called on the administration that this would be a good time for a "summit." I only used that term because it is popular today, but some kind of a meeting of the NATO allies to get specific agreements on what they are going to do individually and collectively about the continuing imbalance of conventional forces is needed.

I assume from your statement today that you would feel that we would be somewhat remiss in our national security responsibilities unless we were the leaders in beginning to bring about better imbalance of those conventional forces by getting the NATO leaders together, since it is obvious that we are the ones that took the leadership in bringing about the INF Treaty.

What would be your view of that suggestion?

General ROGERS. I think this Nation must continue to lead in the alliance. It was very helpful the first 2 years of the current administration when one could point to this Nation as a nation that had fiscal problems, just as other nations did, and yet it found a way to increase considerably its defense budget by taking resources from other programs.

That lasted for 2 years and now it has lapsed. The problem we face, Mr. Chairman, is that the people of Western Europe have not yet been convinced that there is a threat to their freedom down the road. When you have coalition or minority governments in almost every nation other than, say, in the United Kingdom, it is very difficult for national leaders to tell their people about that threat to their freedom.

The people can have their peace, but lose their freedom, as I have described, if the Soviets achieve their objective in Western Europe.

There are a number of things working against us. There is a complacency. NATO has been successful as the greatest peace movement on Earth for 39 years almost, and why can it not continue for the next 39, losing sight of the fact that there has been a major shift in the force balance since 1949 when NATO was founded.

There is a new generation plus that is growing up in Western Europe who have never known war. Many of them think that freedom is a God-given right and therefore they do not have to sacrifice for it.

But I think impacting most upon the inability for any of us--and I spent 8 years on the stump on this one—for any of us to convince the Western Europeans that there is a threat to their freedom is the ubiquitous, aggressive, clever, and very successful propaganda and disinformation programs of the Soviet Union. The Soviets are winning the information battle in Western Europe.

When you couple that today with a man such as Gorbachev, who is clever, charismatic, and charming, and who appears to many in the West as having the best interests of the West high on his priority list, it just makes it that much more difficult to convince them that there is a threat to their freedom.

Until they are convinced and they are then ready to go to their parliamentarians and say, we the people are prepared—and this is on both sides of the Atlantic—to give up some things in other programs, primarily social and public, for the benefit of improving our security measures, until that happens the parliamentarians are not going to make a change in the allocation of resources, with more going to security and less to other programs, certainly not in Western Europe.

Senator EXON. General Rogers, I just returned from a trip to the South Pacific, and I found, with the exception of Australia, the same general attitudes in that part of the world as you expressed for Europe. I was shocked to find the near-universal acceptance, except in Australia, our rock-hard and realistic military ally, of this nuclear-free zone concept. Indeed it is now embedded in the new constitution of the people of the Philippines, that was ratified at the same time they elected President Aquino.

There does indeed seem to be a problem in the world today recognizing the Soviet threat that still exists. And I think that you have brought up a very, very serious matter here, and I appreciate the fact that you have enunciated that in your usual prompt and most efficient fashion.

I would like to call upon the chairman of the committee at this time, who has arrived, for any comments that he has to make, and then Senator Warner.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Chairman Exon.

We are delighted to have General Rogers. I just returned from General Rogers' city of Atlanta. We are delighted to have him and his meaningful testimony before this committee. It always has been. He has been one of our most valued military leaders.

And Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you presiding in my absence. I am going to have to be in and out today, so I would ask you to continue in that role, in which you are performing so well. And I will wait my place in line.

Senator EXON. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Rogers, let me also congratulate you on really an excellent statement. I really was quite intrigued about the history of the so-called double zero, and for you to add a point that really has not been made, because everybody thinks that the double zero and dual track was just to negotiate and then deploy.

Senator EXON. Senator Quayle, a member of the committee has asked if you would identify which page you are referring to in the Rogers' statement? Did you just make some mention of a particular phrase?

Senator QUAYLE. No, I just congratulated him on the entire statement. But I was particularly intrigued by the history, and I do not have the page.

Well, let me look here. From page 7.

I was just listening to his testimony and I thought it was very interesting, the historical background that the General gave us on this two-track decision to double zero, because it is basically understood that the dual track was, one, to negotiate, and if the negotiations failed then to deploy.

But what General Rogers is pointing out is that there is another reason that we were going to deploy, and that is to make up for some military problems and a military imbalance that we seek to rectify. And that is a very important point as we decide whether this treaty is really in our best national interests or not.

That second point that General Rogers pointed out—and I believe that is the first time that any witness thus far, and I have been here for all of them, has brought that historical fact up on this treaty. And it is a very, very important point, coming from a very important person that knows and knew a lot about why we were pushing the position that we were pushing.

General Rogers, my questions go to this conventional gap which I believe in your statement you have said has grown, as a matter of fact. The reference point that Admiral Crowe recently turned back to was to 1967, on the MC14/3 when we got away from massive retaliation and went to the doctrine of flexible response.

He stated that he thought that perhaps the imbalance since that time had actually gotten a little bit worse, the imbalance of conventional forces. I gather from your statement that you would concur with Admiral Crowe from the reference point of 1967, which I think is a very important point, when we adopted the new strategy of flexible response.

I also think it is a very key point that we are coming up with on the ratification or approval of ratification of the INF Treaty.

Do you concur with what Admiral Crowe told this committee, that even though we have done a lot ourselves in that time period, the imbalance of forces on a conventional basis has actually gotten worse, rather than better?

General ROGERS. Yes, I do concur with that, Senator. We have gotten stronger in Allied Command Europe every year because of commitments that have been met by nations in fulfilling the force goals.

But the Warsaw Pact has gotten stronger also. It has gotten stronger at a greater rate and has reached a higher level.

I do not wish to burden you with a series of charts, but these show that we have projected from 1973 to 1986, as I said, those items to which we could put a measure. And it does show that widening gap.

In areas such as helicopters, where they had none in 1973 which was the date we picked at SHAPE they now have twice as many attack helicopters as we have.

So I agree with that, that gap has widened. And these charts show it. It does not take into account the intangibles, as I mentioned in my statement, to which we cannot put a yardstick. And those intangibles are important when considering the balance.

But the short answer is yes, sir, I concur.

Senator QUAYLE. In 1967, when we moved to the strategy of flexible response, we said we are going to do more and needed to do more in conventional forces. In your statement I believe you said that every SACEUR going back to Eisenhower said we ought to do more in conventional forces. Yet the gap has gotten wider.

It has gotten worse. Today we are now saying, and we hear, that we need to do more on conventional forces. We have either got to go ahead and modernize or we have got to have conventional arms control or whatever the case may be, to do something more to get parity in conventional forces.

Why should we today be optimistic, given the past history, that we in fact will do more in the area of conventional forces, where if you look at history we simply have not done what we said needed to be done?

General ROGERS. Well, first, I do not think you should be optimistic. NATO has been satisfied over the years to mortgage its defense to the nuclear response, and therefore has not done what was necessary to enhance its conventional forces and to raise the nuclear threshold to a point where it made sense.

With the INF Treaty, Western Europe faces the fact that we have given away most of that nuclear response. We cannot strike militarily significant Soviet targets on either non-Soviet Warsaw Pact soil or Soviet soil without resorting to strategic weapons or SLCMs as a compensatory measure.

So now Western Europe faces the problem: Well, if we have given up our nuclear deterrent, or a large part of it, are we going to enhance our conventional forces? I think the chances are between slim and none that there will be greater resources made available unless the Soviets do something as in late 1980 when we were concerned whether or not they were going to go into Poland. Such actions run the antennae up in Western Europe and causes some kind of shock.

If the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet Union provides a shock to Western Europe, we might get a reduction in social and public programs, and with that reduction carried over into an increase in conventional force improvement.

The shock of withdrawing U.S. forces will not cause our West European allies to do more. In fact, it would cause them to do less, for a couple of reasons. But I will not take the time now to expound on that.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Next is Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rogers, assuming that the treaty is ratified, and it looks that way although it is not a done deed yet, and I certainly have reservations about it, but if it is ratified and then it is violated, knowing the history of the Soviet Union regarding treaties, what steps should be taken if the Soviet Union violates the treaty? Should some language be put in the treaty, in the ratification language, or where?

I would like to hear your comments on it.

General ROGERS. Well, if they violate the treaty, it is justification for the United States to withdraw from the treaty. But the violation would come, I would expect, after the 3 years had expired and the weapons have all been withdrawn and destroyed. So to even consider that it is feasible to go back and put those weapons systems on West European soils, as I mentioned earlier, does not make sense.

I do not know what language should be put in, Mr. Shelby. But I do believe that it would be helpful if there is some kind of language that is associated with this treaty (which would not be a killer amendment) but which would at least give the sense of the Senate that you are fed up with the Soviets violating the agreements that we have made with them, and that if they do it this time, we are going to do so and so and so and so. I would have to leave that to the skilled craftsmen to draft such language. And I am not sure what it is that would make the difference. But they ought to be put on notice that at least we are fed up with noncompliance and we do not intend to tolerate it anymore.

Senator SHELBY. General Rogers, assuming that this treaty is ratified, assuming it is 4 years hence or 5 years hence or whatever it is, and that the scenario that you painted a minute ago, at least the way I discerned it, that there are not a lot of resources reallocated in Europe or perhaps over here for conventional weapons build up by NATO, where are we then in your judgment, 5 years hence?

General ROGERS. Well, this is what concerns me, Senator, that we will be just where the Soviets want us to be in Western Europe. The West Europeans will be accommodating to the East. You will find a neutral Germany, at least a neutral Germany, and you will find that in the end this treaty will have been not in the long term interests of this country, because the last thing we want, I would think, is a Western Europe that is looking to the East.

I was worried for 8 years, as SACEUR and 3 years as Chief of Staff about the achievement by the Soviets of their objective in Western Europe to intimidate and coerce and so on without having to fire a shot because of the gap that was growing in conventional forces every year. But now I am even more concerned because we have given up most of our nuclear deterrent. It will cause Western Europe to be safer for conventional war, and because it is conventional forces that can seize and hold territory, the threat of conventional pressure by the Soviets may cause us to find a Western Europe that is accommodating to the East.

Senator SHELBY. General, what are the prospects in Vienna regarding conventional weapons reductions?

General ROGERS. I think personally that the chances of getting a satisfactory agreement on conventional forces are as good as they are in our expecting to find additional resources being provided by nations to enhance their conventional forces. We must continue to strive vigorously to get such an agreement, providing we keep in mind certain principles as we negotiate.

Senator SHELBY. General Rogers, were there ever any linkage talks between conventional weapons reductions and the INF Treaty, to your knowledge?

General ROGERS. Well, there was. Some who view this treaty in the same manner that I do along with me had suggested that we try to get this kind of linkage with the INF Treaty. We were told by our negotiators that would be too tough to negotiate, that the Soviets probably would not agree to it, and therefore they (our negotiators) would not try to get it.

I refer to that as applying the principle of preemptive concession. I think we should have at least tried. That is why I suggest we ought to at least do it with the START talks, to keep that leverage so we can get a satisfactory conventional agreement.

Senator **SHELBY**. Do you think it is possible to link conventional reductions with START talks? Do you think it should be?

General **ROGERS**. Yes, I do, and I so stated.

Senator **SHELBY**. You think it is in our national security interests in a big way, do you not?

General **ROGERS**. Well, I do, sir. I do not know what other leverage we are going to have because what is it that will cause the Soviets to want to reduce in an asymmetrical manner their forces when the disparity is all in their favor? And if they want the START agreement as much as I think some of us have been led to believe they do, with such leverage maybe we can get an agreement much quicker with those now in power in the Soviet Union than we were able in the past.

Senator **SHELBY**. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Thank you.

Senator **EXON**. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Humphrey.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, General.

Following up on the discussion about the possibility of the likelihood of reductions in conventional forces, I would certainly urge my colleagues to examine this Rand report if they have not done so yet, just released on conventional arms control, and one of the important conclusions is "To have some effect, proposed reductions should be substantially asymmetrical, probably at least at a Pact/NATO ratio of 5 to 1 in combat capability. This would require division reduction ratios that are even higher." Higher than 5 to 1. Get this, "Smaller asymmetries are likely to leave the balance more precarious from NATO's standpoint." So anything less than 5 to 1 will work against us, put us in a more precarious position, according to this Rand report.

If we hope for anything really constructive in the way of stability and the maintenance of national security and that of our allies to come out of conventional arms reductions, we have to hope for and strive for a balance, indeed, insist upon a balance of better than 5 to 1 reductions.

It seems highly unlikely the Soviets would agree to that, and if they do, then we will know for sure that a new day has come.

But in the meantime, first things first, I guess.

General Rogers, in your statement on page 8, you discuss the history of the zero option and say as follows: "In response to queries at the time, I stated publicly that the zero level LRINF proposal was 'a magnificent political ploy, but militarily it gave me gas pains because it would return NATO to its unsatisfactory posture of 1979.' "

In the ensuing 6 or 7 years, how have your gas pains been doing?

General **ROGERS**. They have been getting more severe.

Senator **HUMPHREY**. I beg your pardon?

General ROGERS. They have been getting more severe.

Senator HUMPHREY. Your gas pains are more severe.

General ROGERS. Senator, yes, sir. I have found nothing to relieve them because, in fact, we are returning ourselves to the unsatisfactory posture of 1979 when we said we had to do something about filling that gap in our spectrum of deterrence.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, if we have a gap in our spectrum of deterrence, do we still then have flexible response?

General ROGERS. We came closer to massive retaliation than we did to flexible response, and that was recognized at that time.

Just to add one point, Senator Quayle mentioned that this might well be the first time that he had learned that it was to fill that gap in our spectrum of deterrent and not to capture the SS-20s that NATO had made its decision to deploy.

Many of the witnesses that you have had were not there at the time. They were not participating in the system at the time. You have some who will have, but those in this administration certainly were not participating in what was going on at the end of the 1970's.

Senator HUMPHREY. Switching now, on the same subject, but to page 3, you say that you believe that the policy of the strategy of flexible response remains viable. You say, I believe, that it does and will continue to be an appropriate and adequate strategy, provided the means to implement it are properly furnished.

Will the means needed be furnished if we relinquish the ability to strike Soviet soil quickly, accurately and reliably with less than strategic weapons?

General ROGERS. I do not think so, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. You think not.

General ROGERS. Because it has been pointed out since we brought nuclear weapons onto the soil of Western Europe that we had to make the Soviets understand that they would suffer greater disadvantages than advantages should they aggress. And as I mentioned, there are three key instruments to provide that, to keep our deterrent credible, and we are removing two of them, still keeping the first use option as a part of our strategy, which I think is important.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, how can we exercise the doctrine of strategy of flexible response at levels lower than strategic weaponry absent the INF weapons?

General ROGERS. It will be very difficult, in my opinion, to do so. But you see, I do not think the means needed to implement it properly will be furnished.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are there any means in our hands now absent the INF weapons?

General ROGERS. Not now, other than the F-111. Only if we are able, as we bring in the F-15E into the U.S. inventory and as we bring in additional aircraft into NATO's other inventories, to put the proper equipment on board for penetration purposes and increase their range, we may develop some. But there is the very difficult problem of refueling in a benign environment over Western Europe in time of war in order to have sufficient range to penetrate and get back; and second, trying to penetrate the massive air defenses that they have.

Senator HUMPHREY. My 6 minutes are up.

I have many more questions. I hope you are going to be able to remain with us.

I think this might well be the most important hearing of the whole series.

Senator EXON. Senator, thank you very much.

Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Senator, I will pass for the time being, please.

Senator EXON. Next on the list I believe is Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I too, want to join in welcoming General Rogers. He has had a very distinguished career in the service of our country and I think has made an important presentation here.

It is obviously difficult to challenge any of the military representations that you have made, General, but I find it somewhat difficult to believe that as our military situation both in NATO and Western Europe has moved to the kind of situation you describe with only the withdrawal of 400 missiles. I do not minimize the fact that they are of a specialized nature and description but to move from flexible response closer to massive retaliation because of the INF agreement I find it difficult to understand. It deserves, at least from my point of view, a good deal more explanation because it seems that you have drawn very clear and precise lines in terms of our own presentation here today, arguing the case that NATO is moving in a very dramatic and significant way from the flexible response to massive retaliation. This is obviously a matter of enormous importance and consequence.

There are others that have had experience who have not reached that conclusion. But certainly it is one that does deserve a good deal of attention.

Second, I was interested in your presentation about how the Soviet Union is quite capable of moving their missiles to targets in the rear echelons. Therefore, the points that have been raised by those that support the treaty that those various supports, prepositioned materials, and other bases which were thought to be more secure with an INF Treaty, are actually just as vulnerable as before because the Soviet Union may retarget their heavier weapons. I think logic suggests that if the Soviet Union is going to move into that kind of a stance, the United States would also move into that kind of stance. It is difficult to follow the opposite logic that the removal of INF missiles constitutes very little progress because the Soviet Union is going to pick up the slack with their larger ICBM strategics, but the United States is caught in this position where it is going to have some reluctance to use its ICBMs because that would or otherwise is going to move us into a dramatic, different phase of a conflict. I do not know whether you want to make a comment on that.

The third point that I want to make deals with the description that you give of the conventional balance and also the importance of the will of the Europeans. I think it is a message that ought to be heard and attended to by the committees. I for one find it absolutely extraordinary that after the last 8 years of unprecedented expenditures, some $2 trillion in military equipment and personnel, that we continue to have problems with conventional forces.

After we have had Secretary Weinberger talking about all these needs, 8 years later find that those here who have had this responsibility come up and talk about how difficult a situation we are in in terms of this conventional balance.

I think it is reasonable for the taxpayers to ask what in the world we have been doing with the money after all of this period of time, to find ourselves in that kind of position. I find that is of concern to me as well.

Well, those are three different points. As you know, we have a limited period of time, and so we try to ask about eight questions, have them answered on others' time.

But I would appreciate perhaps your addressing these questions. The final point that I would make is whether you are really urging us to reject this because of your own perception and understanding of the attitude of Western Europeans. Because of their hesitancy to commit the kind of resources which would be necessary for a conventional capability, you see a continued deterioration in their will and that therefore you feel that unless we are going to stiffen the spine of those countries with the weapons that would be removed, that we are advancing the day when there is going to be a serious change in the whole political atmosphere in Western Europe.

If that is one of the principal reasons for your wanting to retain INF missiles, I think we are on a slippery slope. If we followed the logic of your argument, retaining INF missiles may delay this deterioration 1 year, 2 years, but the inevitability of the outcome as you have described it is certainly not very hopeful.

We have to ask ourselves whether the modernization of conventional forces, which I support, and even the recognition of the attachment of the nuclear capability to U.S. conventional capability, which I support as well, will be enough to have much of an impact in terms of maintaining our current status as a NATO partner.

General ROGERS. With respect to other opinions, of course, I recognize that there are other opinions concerning those things that I have covered in my statement.

I just go back to the fact that I am here solely for the purpose of presenting the view of a man who bore the responsibility on the military side, to a certain extent, for Allied Command, Europe, and particularly for the security of the West in Europe for 8 years. I see the fact that we have been unsuccessful in the past to get additional resources for conventional purposes to the extent that is necessary resulting from NATO being satisfied with our deterrent being dependent upon the nuclear response. With our reduction in that nuclear response, I see us more and more moving to the point where the West Europeans are going to have to be satisfied with the good will of Gorbachev as far as their future is concerned.

Talking about using strategic weapons by the Soviets and retargeting those strategic weapons onto the same targets into NATO's rear area and all that, it really does not change what the Soviets have done for these many years. They have been able to retarget, to strike targets in Western Europe. The point I wished to make or tried to make was that that still keeps the risk and the threat on the backs of the West Europeans. That is unchanged as a consequence of this treaty in my opinion. It is only when you have to fight a war that it makes a difference as to those numbers that we are talking about.

But among those weapons we are giving up are the very ones that are the basis of our deterrence being credible because the P-II can hold the Soviet Union at risk from Western Europe without having to resort to strategic weapons, should we fail to defeat a conventional attack.

I think that is much more credible in the minds of the Soviet Union as far as deterrence is concerned than thinking that the United States will turn right to strategic nuclear weapons if we fail conventionally. There has been sufficient doubt even in the minds of our West European allies, as you know, as to whether the United States would be prepared to resort to strategic weapons, and that is why we put those two escalatory options in between.

With respect to the balance and where all the money went, I am speaking in terms, Senator Kennedy, of Allied Command, Europe as a whole and the commitments that nations have made to the Allied Command, Europe, and the fulfillment of those commitments. And as I mentioned in the statement, the United States is much better off in almost all areas, but it only has two corps out of the eight corps that are in the central region, and relatively few forces in either of the other northern or southern regions.

So it really is not just the United States, but it is all of those forces committed by nations to Allied Command, Europe.

And a change in the atmosphere of Western Europe, that is my concern, Senator, is that down the road the Soviets will achieve the objective that she has set for herself, which I have mentioned, without firing a shot, to be able to intimidate and coerce and neutralize. And you see that trend today.

One of the reasons the French have tried to bring greater vigor into the Franco-German axis is the fact that the French are concerned that West Germany is tending toward neutralism. You see that today, particularly with the Social Democratic Party which, when it went out of power, moved to the left to pick up the Greens, finds it cannot get back to the center, and now is trying to work out an arrangement with Eastern Germany.

That exists in Western Europe today. But my concern is down the road that there will be accommodation on the part of all of the West European nations.

So yes, I think there will be a change in the atmosphere.

Senator KENNEDY. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Senator.

Under the early bird rule I have been attempting to follow all day, I am now pleased to recognize Senator Warner, who came to the meeting at the same time that I did.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

How nice it is to see you, General.

General ROGERS. Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER. It is always a pleasure.

General ROGERS. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Just to phrase a question very simply, and I expect that you have answered this, but it would be interesting to have a simple question and hopefully a simple answer.

Do you believe that NATO would be stronger if this treaty were rejected?

General ROGERS. I am concerned about the results of this treaty, Senator Warner, but you had to look at the other side of the coin.

The other side of the coin is if the Senate failed to ratify this treaty, what would be the impact upon Western Europe, specifically our West European allies? I recall so well how for 4 years, in the aftermath of the decision on the neutron bomb, I was beleaguered in Western Europe about the decision that the President had made at the time when he had just gotten to the point where this country had convinced the West Europeans to put the enhanced radiation, reduced blast weapon on their soil. Then the President decided that he would not deploy it. That had a major impact on Western Europe.

Failing to ratify would have a similar impact because this country has brought along its West European allies with it. However, the political authorities in Western Europe had no option, once Gorbachev said he would accept it, but to go along with it for political credibility purposes, as I mentioned earlier. With a zero level for the shorter range, there was nothing they could do because how could they say to their people, well, we cannot accept something in which the Soviets give up everything and we give up nothing. So I think they had no option but to accept the double zero.

But there is another point that Senators must take into consideration, I think, which is also on the opposite side of the coin from my statement. That is, even if the treaty is not ratified, will these weapons systems remain deployed in Western Europe once the United States has declared that they are not necessary for the security of Western Europe? I do not know of any government in Western Europe, except perhaps the United Kingdom, that could ever keep those weapons systems on their soil once the treaty was signed. And I am not sure that even Mrs. Thatcher could cash in so much political capital to try to keep them on her soil.

So those are considerations that you have to take into account as you look at this treaty.

Senator WARNER. So often when those of us who are active in public life are given a question like that we must simply answer yes or no, and what would be the yes or no answer?

General ROGERS. But I am not a Senator, Senator.

Senator WARNER. I understand that.

General ROGERS. And I do not have to answer yes or no.

Senator WARNER. But you are here in an advisory capacity to the Senators, and I am just asking is there a yes or a no. Is NATO stronger if this treaty is rejected, yes or no?

General ROGERS. NATO will be weaker from the standpoint of the credibility of its deterrent as I have pointed out earlier.

Senator WARNER. So I would interpret that that it would be stronger if we reject it.

General ROGERS. It would be stronger if it were not ratified, that is correct.

Now, you cannot walk away from the other side of the coin.

Senator WARNER. Right.

General ROGERS. I can, but you cannot, and the other side is will it in fact be disastrous to NATO if we do not ratify the treaty, and the weapons are going to come out of Western Europe anyway.

So we have been caught up, I think—not I, but I think you and others—have been caught up in a situation in which the United States made a proposal that we should not have made, and it was agreed, and now how can we turn it down? It will have a major impact on Western Europe.

Senator WARNER. Well, where we are, and it is now the Senate's constitutional role—we were not in the negotiations, nor should we be in negotiations, but advice and consent is now our function.

The other question that will be asked of many of us, it has already been asked of me, would the U.S. leadership role in the NATO alliance be strengthened by the rejection of this treaty, yes or no?

General ROGERS. I think it would have an adverse impact on the credibility of its leadership within the alliance.

Senator WARNER. If we were to reject the treaty?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. The United States influence in NATO would be weakened?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir, because as I said, for 4 years we lived in the aftermath of that other decision.

Senator WARNER. Now, in your testimony you endorsed the triad which we have all followed for these years, and I think quite successfully—that is conventional forces, tactical nuclear forces, and strategic nuclear forces.

What order of priority do you attach to modernization within that triad? We could add the chemical dimension within the context of the conventional.

General ROGERS. I would put at this juncture, assuming ratification, that the priority should go to fulfilling the commitments of the Montebello decision, keep the credibility of our deterrent just as high as we can, and that is the modernization of the nuclear side. At the same time we should attempt to get nations to fulfill the commitment they made under the Conventional Defense Improvement Initiative of the Secretary General which spotlights the critical deficiencies on the conventional side.

Both of them have to be done, out at this juncture, since we are walking away from the nuclear deterrent to such an extent, I would put the modernization, follow-on to Lance, air-to-surface missiles, those other things.

Senator WARNER. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. Did the questions by the Senator from Arizona get inserted in the record?

The Senator from Arizona had to depart the hearing early and asked that his questions be put in. I do not know the policy that you and Chairman Nunn have. It is purely voluntary, so to speak.

Senator EXON. I would think that these are the questions that were to be submitted by Senator McCain?

Senator WARNER. Senator Nunn has spoken on this, and I think Senator Nunn should address that.

Chairman NUNN. Well, the rule is, for people who are not on the Government payroll who are kind enough to give their time to come up and testify, that we are going to impose no huge number of questions for the record, but if they voluntarily take the questions and are willing to answer them, we welcome that.

So it would be up to General Rogers.

Senator EXON. We will submit these to General Rogers, and he under the rules would have the option to answer them if he wishes to.

Chairman NUNN. Knowing of his usual cooperative attitude, I am sure he will answer them. But we do not want to have a whole lot of questions for the record for witnesses. It is just not fair to witnesses to give them 30 or 40 questions to take out after they have spent their time testifying. That is the point.

General ROGERS. My typing is pretty lousy, Mr. Chairman. I might find some interesting ones I will write out in longhand.

Life has changed.

Senator WARNER. I hope for the better.

Chairman NUNN. I notice you have a better suntan.

General ROGERS. I just came back from a 2 week vacation. It is a very interesting life out there which I had never experienced before, and I wonder why I hung around in uniform for so long.

Senator EXON. Senator Nunn, under the early bird rule, you would be next.

I would be glad to recognize you.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Rogers, the other day we went into some detail with former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger on some of the same questions you have addressed. Of course, you have stated very forcefully here today that the elimination of the INF missiles in Europe will diminish the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified to the committee last week, quoting him, that "it is a form of parochialism in Europe to suggest that the Soviets have basically been deterred by a relative handful of warheads in Europe, none of which were deployed before 1983." He went on to argue that "it is the overall strength of America's strategic forces that have been the principal element in Europe's nuclear deterrent in the past and will remain so in the future."

So he is basically saying there is a whole lot more to this nuclear deterrence than simply what SACEUR has, that you have to look at the whole array of weapons that we have in our arsenal.

How would you respond to that?

General ROGERS. Well, as I have pointed out, the third response in our NATO strategy of flexible response is the general nuclear response, and I added that it is the guarantor of our deterrent because that is the one thing the Soviets fear.

But at the end of the 1970s, we did not have the ground-launched cruise missiles and the Pershing IIs in Europe and NATO recognized it as a deficiency because, as I pointed out, the only thing we were going to have left with any chance of penetrating into Soviet space to keep our deterrent credible was the F-111.

So we made the decision that we did not have sufficient in 1979, and that is why we put the new systems in Europe starting in 1983. And it has made a difference. The Soviets do fear the P–II.

Now, what is it that they are going to fear that will escalate to the strategic nuclear exchange with what we have in the residual stockpile in NATO?

Chairman NUNN. What about air-launched standoff weapons?

General ROGERS. We should have an air-to-surface missile. We knew that in 1983 at the Montebello decision, and nations committed themselves to just that kind of a weapon system. We should have that, and it should have a range of at least 250 miles.

But under this treaty, it cannot exceed 300.

Chairman NUNN. The air-launched weapon, under this treaty?

General ROGERS. Theater-based tactical air-launched cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, I do not believe you will find can exceed 300 miles.

Chairman NUNN. I do not think this treaty touches air-launched missiles.

General ROGERS. Air-to-surface missile. I am not talking about the ALCMs.

Chairman NUNN. I do not think it does. I mean, that is what a lot of us are thinking we are going to have to make sure we use as "compensating factors."

General ROGERS. Well, in Montebello we have asked for at least a 400 kilometer stand-off missile.

Chairman NUNN. This treaty affects only ground-launched. It does not touch air-launched.

Does that make a difference to you?

General ROGERS. No, because we do not need to reach much farther than about 250 to 300 miles, both on the conventional side with conventional warheads on air-to-surface missiles, and nuclear warheads on air-to-surface missiles in order to accomplish the mission that we have been assigned.

Chairman NUNN. Why would air-launched missiles, standoff air-launched cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, not compensate if NATO chose to take that route for these missiles that are being taken out?

General ROGERS. Well, that has been suggested, that the ALCMs that are on the B–52s with a range of about 2,500 kilometers, might well be used to compensate, and the question is do we forward deploy them or do we not? I think it would be very difficult to forward deploy them and have them viewed as theater weapons.

Chairman NUNN. Could NATO deploy air-launched cruise missiles on its own forward-based systems?

General ROGERS. On tactical aircraft?

Chairman NUNN. Or F–111s or any of them.

General ROGERS. The Air Force advises that the weight of the air-launched cruise missile is so great that you have to have a large platform such as the B–52 or the B–1 from which to launch it. What we need is an air-to-surface standoff missile that can be carried by tactical aircraft. The question that the Air Force had when we suggested the 400 kilometers was whether or not we can accommodate that on a tactical aircraft because of the weight of the missile in order to get the flight range out to 400 kilometers.

Chairman NUNN. But you would certainly encourage the development, if this treaty passes, whether it does or not, of a standoff delivery system for NATO's planes, some form of standoff-missile, would you not?

General ROGERS. I have been for that, Senator, since the early 1980s.

Chairman NUNN. You mentioned here in your written statement that submarine-launched ballistic missiles cannot compensate for INF systems because they are "tethered to the release of the rest of the U.S. strategic forces," and because the Soviets will be unable to discriminate that NATO was using strategic weapons for theater purposes.

I understand the rationale for that to some extent, but does that not really argue that these submarine-launched missiles assigned to SACEUR really have no meaning?

General ROGERS. No. They do have a meaning, particularly when the U.K. Trident comes into being, because we will be able to reach with the U.K. Trident missile warheads that are committed to SACEUR, targets that we cannot reach now with weapons systems within theater.

So when I say they are tethered, they could be broken loose, but SHAPE does in fact today work very closely with the Joint Strategic Targeting Planners at Omaha to ensure that the targets for SACEUR's SLBM warheads are not duplicated by them, and vice versa.

Chairman NUNN. But if the Soviets really are going to interpret, as you have, the submarine-launched ballistic missiles attached to NATO, if they are ever used, as a strategic U.S. attack, then basically you are saying that when SACEUR makes the decision on those or the President releases, that basically we have, in all perceptions, launched a strategic counterattack.

General ROGERS. They are tied, and I think they should remain to be tied since they are strategic weapons, to the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the United Kingdom, just as they are today. They are strategic weapons and should be used strategically.

My concern, as I pointed out, is that the SACEUR has to request the release of those nuclear weapons from one or both nations, and one or the other would have to release those warheads to him.

My problem is that the Soviet Union, when they see SLBMs breaking the surface of the ocean, they do not know if those missiles have warheads on them that belong to SACEUR or are they part of the initial strategic laydown by the U.S./U.K., because those boats out there have warheads on them that are committed to SACEUR on a daily basis and ones that are not committed to SACEUR. If in fact the Soviets have the policy to launch their strategic weapons under strategic attack, I cannot believe that it makes much sense in the minds of the Soviets as being credible, or should it in ours, to expose ourselves to that vulnerability.

That is my problem.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, General Rogers.

Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Symms.

General ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, before Senator Nunn leaves, I just want to be sure that we understand each other. There are boats out there, submarines out there that have both warheads committed to SACEUR and warheads not committed to SACEUR on the same boat.

Chairman NUNN. I understand, and that does raise the question again in my mind about the value of having those assigned to SACEUR. I do not know that I see that value under your rationale. I think you have made a pretty powerful case that it is effectively a strategic launch.

General ROGERS. The value is that SACEUR can ensure that some targets that he cannot hit with weapons systems in theater that he feels he must strike can be struck when the strategic nuclear forces are released.

Chairman NUNN. That assumes an all-out military war.

General ROGERS. That assumes that we have had the release of the strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and United States, which would lead to that, yes.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I want to welcome you to the committee and say that your testimony has been needed to give us the proper balance and perspective on this. Most of the witnesses have paraded in here and been in favor of the treaty, and in Washington, DC, I think that, you know, balance is like the chef that had the horse-rabbit stew. He put in one horse and one rabbit and called it horse-rabbit stew.

I am glad to have you here, and like Senator Humphrey, I think your testimony is probably about as important as any that we will have. I guess you're really the first witness that has pointed out that if you were a Senator, you don't really know how you would vote, but I think you made it clear that you are less than enthusiastic about this whole arrangement for the defense of NATO and for the preservation of freedom. And I agree with you, I read what you said in U.S. News and World Report, and your comment about that your biggest concern after retiring from a career in the Army was that your country might preserve the peace but lose its freedom, which you deem the two as inseparable, and I share your view.

There is a general feeling in this town both stated and unstated by many people that the INF Treaty will ultimately mean that the United States will be withdrawing troops from Western Europe and from the NATO alliance. This will cause the Europeans to have to put up a little more money to provide for their own defense. I had a Congressman friend of mine tell me that this morning. He also said, don't feel so discouraged about the treaty because, ultimately it will mean we will bring back some of our troops and the Europeans can pay for their own defense.

You made a comment earlier that you didn't go into, but I would like to have you discuss in a little bit detail why you think the withdrawal of U.S. troops or forces from Europe will cause the Europeans to do less and not more?

General ROGERS. Well, I think the West European allies would view it as resulting from one of two reasons, the first one being that the United States believed that the threat had decreased, and therefore they would do less, when in fact the threat would not have decreased. Or they would interpret it as the United States giving up its commitment to the security of Western Europe at a time when we need more and not less forward deployed conventional forces in Allied Command Europe. Therefore, I think that would lead our European allies to seek an accommodation with the East because they would view the United States giving up on its commitment.

And under either of those circumstances they would be doing less. And it is a myth in my opinion, and we witnessed it with some previous congressional amendments, to believe that the West Europeans are going to do more by our lessening our commitment in Western Europe. They are not going to do that in my opinion. It will work the other way.

Senator SYMMS. Well, General, Ambassador Abshire pointed out before this committee last week that one of the greatest shortcomings of NATO was the Northern Army Group and the shortcomings of the maldeployment of forces in that group as opposed to the Pact forces.

What is your view of the situation of the Northern Army Group?

General ROGERS. Well, that is the area of greatest concern that we have in the Central Region because the Northern Army Group defends against the most likely avenue of approach from the East in Central Europe.

The Dutch forces, its corps has its left flank on the Elbe River and it only has one brigade forward deployed. It has to bring nine more brigades forward. It has to mobilize four of those nine and that is going to take time.

Senator SYMMS. What do you advise that we do about that?

General ROGERS. Well, we have done something about it. The United States has forward deployed a U.S. brigade of an armored division up into that area which is to act as the reception brigade for the Third U.S. Corps that will be deployed there.

What we need to do about it is to continue to improve our sea and airlift so we can get our reinforcements over there more quickly than we can today. Every year that goes by, the amount of time that it takes to meet our commitment of 10 divisions in the European theater by mobilization plus 10 days—which we equate to D-day in NATO—gets shorter.

But it is now going to take about 30 days to meet that D plus 10 commitment. We cannot get them there in 10 days. That is one thing we need to do.

There is a suggestion that we have a dedicated covering force for that area. That bone has been gnawed by a number of people. But if we could do it under the procedures that Ambassador Abshire has suggested, it would be very helpful That is, to do the same thing with that covering force that we did with the airborne early warning aircraft, the AWACS aircraft, and with mutual funding of other resources that we needed. That is what he is proposing. Somebody has to buy the equipment. There are a lot of reserves over there in these nations that have forces in the Northern Army Group area, but somebody has to buy the equipment for those forces. Otherwise they are of no utility.

If we can get that mutually supported, that is, common funded, it would be helpful.

Senator SYMMS. General, my time is up, but I would like to ask for you to just comment briefly on congressional restrictions on the nuclear warhead for army tactical missile systems, and also on nuclear artillery projectiles. Do you think those should be lifted?

General ROGERS. Yes, because SACEUR's Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study, 1985, which we took 5 years to develop so we would do it right, starting with a clean sheet of paper, shows us that 925 nuclear warheads for the U.S. Army worldwide is not sufficient to fulfill the needs of Western Europe.

So I would hope that that ceiling of 925 could be lifted. And the other one that needs to be lifted is the use of dual capable weapons systems. There is a proscription by the Congress that weapons platforms, that are designed to attack the WP follow-on forces can only have conventional warheads on them.

We cannot afford single purpose weapons systems, in my opinion. We need to have the capability to use both conventional and nuclear warheads on those systems. I am talking specifically about the Army's Tactical Missile System and the follow-on Joint Tactical Missile System which have that proscription on them. We need to utilize them for nuclear weapons as well as conventional.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Rogers, thank you very much for being with us. In the short time available, let me see if I can go back to Senator Warner's very good question: "Would NATO be stronger if the treaty were rejected?"

And I gather your response to that is you certainly would not have negotiated INF in the order in which it was negotiated. You would have done other things first. But given the fact that we have a de facto INF, which is what we do have, that we then have to consider what steps we take from here in other areas.

Is that a fair summary of your position?

General ROGERS. Well, NATO will be weaker militarily. If you consider deterrence political and not military, it will also be weaker politically by this treaty. But what I cannot answer is would it be even more weak as a consequence of failing to ratify this treaty on the political side. And I think that is a very important consideration that the Senators have to keep in mind.

Senator WIRTH. That is one of the balance points that we have had. And we have heard over and over and over again from the previous witnesses before today that it would be a political disaster for us not to ratify the INF Treaty, and that, while some of the witnesses might not have put INF in the order in which it has appeared, they would not have done this first, we have to go ahead and ratify INF, I think has been the consensus, and then focus on some of the other issues that you raised in the last three pages of your testimony.

General ROGERS. I think that Senators—I am not one, as I pointed out—would want to be very wary of future negotiations in which we get caught up in this thing and you have no option but to ratify.

Senator WIRTH. I think we have to be careful in our optimism, but we also have to be sure that we are not letting a kind of pessimism carry us away. And there is a balance in all of this. There is moderation in everything, and including moderation is probably a good idea.

General ROGERS. That is a little bit of gratuitous advice, for which I apologize.

Senator WIRTH. Let me turn if I might briefly to the measures that came out of the Stockholm agreement in 1986 and what we have learned from them. One, do you think that what we have learned or could learn from the inspections, the observations allowed under Stockholm and the inspections allowed under Stockholm have been valuable?

And if so, should we be making an effort perhaps to augment the current regimes that we have in cooperation with the Warsaw Pact countries to expand upon Stockholm and to move into an augmented group of confidence building measures?

General ROGERS. I cannot speak from personal experience on the value of the confidence building measures. But I will say that those who have participated in those inspections or in those visits—not inspections, but to the training—yes, they tell me that they have been very valuable.

Yes, I do think that we need to continue to expand our confidence building measures. There is a place for dialog in our business.

Senator WIRTH. Would it have been valuable for you as a commander in chief in Europe to have been able to meet with your counterpart in the Warsaw Pact forces?

General ROGERS. I thought so, Senator, and I used to say as much when asked that question after speeches, sort of throwing out the line to see if I would get any nibbles. I finally did from Marshall Kulikov, my counterpart.

He wrote me a long letter asking to meet with me. I have forgotten the timing of it. It was in the last year of my tenure as SACEUR, but I was unable to do so because the political authorities did not wish that to happen.

Senator WIRTH. Were those NATO political authorities or U.S. political authorities?

General ROGERS. Well, the United States has its own constraints today from the Defense Department on its people in the aftermath of the Major Nicholson murder. But this restraint was the consensus of the political authorities of NATO at the highest level, that is at the ministerial level, that I should not do that.

Senator WIRTH. Would it have been valuable or would it be valuable for our commanders to be talking with their counterparts about what we call strategy and they call doctrine?

It seems to me that both sides say that we are defensive in nature, but both sides are perceived by the other or at least say that we are perceived as being offensive in nature. And there must be a breakdown in our definition in our definition of strategy or doctrine if in fact there is such a grave misunderstanding.

General ROGERS. I believe it would be helpful, because dialog has a very important part to play in this whole business as far as I am concerned.

I found when I was Chief of Staff, whether it was visiting the Chief of Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia or of Indonesia or wherever it might be, that it was very helpful to spend time with them, take the measure of each other, find out what their concerns were, present mine.

You do not change ideology with those kinds of meetings, but they are helpful.

Senator WIRTH. General Galvin said, I would like to know what worries the other guy and I would like to tell him what worries me. It seems to me that is an important kind of discussion to have.

Let me ask you finally, can you tell me on the basis of your experience as Chief of Staff and then as SACEUR how you think the threat and likelihood of confrontation with the Soviet Union has changed, if it has, in the last dozen years in which you have held these very responsible positions? One, how has the threat of confrontation changed, and where would such a confrontation—and has the location of that confrontation changed?

General ROGERS. I think the most likely confrontation between the superpowers would be somewhere other than Western Europe. And any confrontation in Europe would come as a spillover from the confrontation someplace else, such as the Persian Gulf area.

Senator WIRTH. Has that changed?

General ROGERS. I think that is a change.

Senator WIRTH. There was more likelihood a dozen years ago that there would be confrontation in Europe, and that is less likely now than it was then?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir, that is what I think.

Senator WIRTH. General Rogers, again and like all my other colleagues, we have enormous respect and appreciation for the wonderful job that you have done for all of us and for the country, and we thank you very much for being here today.

General ROGERS. Thank you, sir.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you.

Senator EXON. Senator Wilson will be right back in. He has been waiting very patiently and he will be here in just a second, if we might pause for just a second.

General ROGERS. I do not want to fill every void with conversation, but if I might just add to my discussion with Senator Wirth.

What Kulikov was interested in was: You keep saying as SACEUR that we are much superior on the conventional side than you are in NATO. He said: I just do not believe that; now let us, you and I get together and let us tote these things up and come to some kind of a conclusion.

And I think it might have been helpful to have done that, frankly. I was very disappointed when that opportunity was not—I was not permitted to take advantage of it.

Senator WIRTH. When that does occur, we will get Senator Levin as the recorder of that discussion and we can have "Beyond the Bean Count II."

Senator LEVIN. That was an interesting comment you just made about Kulikov.

Senator WIRTH. I was just saying, that fits right into the discussion that you had.

Senator LEVIN. He was not allowed to meet with Kulikov, that last comment.

Senator EXON. I am sure we will get into that in some detail with the next questioner. I would like to recognize Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, you know of my admiration for you and I am pleased to see you back here. I am pleased to see that in this presentation you have lost none of your clarity and concisiveness.

Let me, because we have only 6 minutes, ask you two questions, and I will ask the second first. I would like you to take maybe the last couple of minutes to respond to how you would prioritize the various steps you have urged upon us today as the things that we need to do in consequence of the prospect of the elimination of this whole class of intermediate range nuclear weapons, because you have urged us to do many things.

And I cannot argue with the wisdom of a single recommendation, but they all cost a lot of money. And I see a terrific crunch coming, so I think we need to have them prioritized.

The question I would like to have you answer first is one that responds to the cautionary note, to put it mildly, that was given by your colleague, Lord Carrington, last week when he spoke to reporters in Copenhagen and urged those among us in whom he detects impatience to understand clearly that conventional arms control will be far more time-consuming than was the INF or very likely reduction in strategic arms.

My question, prompted by that observation then, is this: Is it possible for us to, in contemplation of the START agreement and its negotiations, devise a schedule of conventional arms reduction that could be coordinated with what we would undertake by way of strategic arms reductions, so that if there is a Soviet violation on the conventional side we would have in place a mechanism that could give real meaning to threats that heretofore we have made and not made good on?

General ROGERS. Yes, sir, I personally believe that such a linkage or synchronization—or whatever one wishes to call it—is possible. And I really think, that among the things we must explore to keep our leverage on the Soviets with respect to conventional reductions tied to the START agreement, that what you suggest might well be a channel which we should pursue.

I guess you would call that the synchronization of reductions, and I think that could work. Failure to do what was supposed to be done on the conventional side would cause us then to cease what we had agreed to do on the START side, which is of greater attraction to the Soviets.

To prioritize those things that I have listed, I mentioned that I believe that implementing the second half of the Montebello decision which modernizes those nuclear weapons that we will have left in theater—the follow-on to Lance and the air to surface, standoff missile and others—I think to me that has high priority.

The second priority, frankly, as we continue to try to reach a satisfactory agreement on conventional forces at a reduced, balanced, verifiable level, would be to improve our dual capable aircraft. Dual capable aircraft I believe will end up being the best means that we will have to keep the credibility of our deterrent as high as possible—not as high as with the Pershing II—but to [illegible] ey survive, to see that they can penetrate, to find a mea [illegible] uel them in time of war, so they can have sufficient range, [illegible] crease the basic range of those aircraft.

So those are the first two priorities. That is going to cos [illegible] The United States has already taken steps, as I reviewed [illegible] ding on this, with the ATACMS, the Army tactical missile s [illegible] to have it perhaps as a follow-on to Lance. The Air Force ha [illegible] proved—I have forgotten what the jargon is in the Air Forc [illegible] mission need requirement for the air-to-surface standoff missile [illegible] tactical aircraft.

So my first priority would be fulfillment of the Montebello commitment; my second priority, dual capable aircraft; then continue to work on the CDI, conventional defense initiative, to have nation's fulfill their commitments to it, and vigorously pursue a satisfactory conventional agreement linked to START.

Now, that is what I would like to see. The decision that has been made in NATO, if I understand it right, is to have the START agreement, number one, and then go down pretty much, I think, the same priority as I have listed to you.

Senator WILSON. Could you tell—and you might have done this before, so just say so. But could you state for the record what contact was made with you, what consultation occurred, either by the Joint Chiefs, the State Department, the Pentagon, or the White House, prior to their taking a decision with respect to INF?

General ROGERS. I was not consulted as the SACEUR. The way I learned about what this country was going to propose at the negotiating table from 1979—I am speaking only on the INF—from 1979 until I retired was through two sources: One, when the negotiating team would come to NATO headquarters to brief the Ambassadors or, in other instances, some higher level national representatives about the proposal the United States was going to table at the negotiating table, I had a representative present. He was permitted to attend those meetings, and he would report to me what it was that occurred.

The second source I had was in my U.S. role as Commander in Chief of the European Command I was privileged to be on the distribution list of a number of State Department cables, both from the State Department and to the State Department, which gave me an opportunity to judge what the thinking was of this country.

But the consultation that was made with the SACEUR and SHAPE was on the MBFR side, and since many of the NATO nations were involved in that, we would be asked by the political authorities to give our opinion of various proposals that were about to be negotiated or laid on the table by the West at the MBFR.

Senator WILSON. Thank you.

My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. However, I would like to make a suggestion to you. Knowing of the interest and leadership that you have brought to this whole subject of strategic weaponry and because of the focus that that will find in the prospect of the upcoming START negotiations, that is that we perhaps invite General Rogers back if it is convenient for him, to pursue the points that we discussed in connection with the linkage to START of some kind of conventional arms reduction.

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Senator **Exon**. I think that is a good suggestion and we will try to work that out, with the cooperation of our friend and good counselor, General Rogers.

Senator Levin.

Senator **Wilson**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Levin**. General, welcome again. It is always great to see you even if you do have a tan which makes us all jealous.

General, I listened with great interest as you were answering questions about what the bottom line is on your advice this afternoon. Senator Warner asked some questions, Senator Wirth and others. And I think I understand that you are saying that on the military side you view this as a negative, on the political side there is both a negative and a positive, and you are not sure whether the positive on the political side outweighs the negative, but you acknowledge that it is something we have to consider.

Is that basically it? And if so, let me just try to put the bottom line question my way, because it is important how your testimony is perceived here, because of the high regard in which all of us hold you as well as people who are not in this room hold you—all of our colleagues.

Is the thrust of your testimony today that you are urging us to reject this treaty or is the thrust of this testimony that you are urging us to look at some of the military negatives that you see in this treaty and to throw those into the hopper with some political negatives and some political positives?

General **Rogers**. What I would hope you would do would be to take the thrust of my statement as another factor that you have to put into your equation to determine whether or not you vote up or down for ratification.

Because I think that it is important for you to know the view of a commander who had 8 years in which to observe this alliance at fairly close range, and what it is that NATO needs to accomplish its mission of deterrence. That is just one factor.

Senator **Levin**. But to put it as bluntly as I can, because this is the way the reporters have to analyze your testimony, and that is the way the world is in terms of us advising our colleagues as to what you recommend.

Are you recommending flat out that we reject this treaty?

General **Rogers**. No, sir. I am not recommending flat out that you pass it either.

Senator **Levin**. I got that drift pretty clearly.

General **Rogers**. I do not want to overemphasize that latter. If I can have this without it being on your time, because it is applicable to questions that other people have asked, other Senators have asked.

None of us can lose sight of the fact that failing to ratify, when we get to where we are, will have a major political impact in NATO. And I do not think that any of us can predict just how serious that will be.

Senator **Levin**. You mean a negative impact there?

General **Rogers**. Yes, sir. An adverse impact. And the missiles are going to come out, in my opinion, whether it is ratified or not. Because they have been declared expendable by this country.

Senator LEVIN. You indicated, General, that you were not consulted on the INF Treaty, you were not asked for your opinion on it; that you found out what was in the treaty in two ways and you outlined both of those ways.

I will not repeat them, but basically you were made aware indirectly about what was in it without being directly asked for your advice.

Maybe that is not quite accurate. You were made aware of what was in the treaty by one way or another. But your advice was not solicited on it. I think that is a better way to phrase my conclusion of your testimony.

My question is this, after you found out one way or another what was in this proposed treaty—either because the person representing you at the Ambassadors' meeting informed you or because you were on the distribution list—after you found out what was in this treaty, did you initiate, or volunteer your comments or thoughts to either the President or the Secretary of Defense?

General ROGERS. To neither one of them, but I did to the political authorities of NATO, for whom I served directly as the SACEUR. I am only serving directly to the President and the Secretary of Defense as the CINCEUR.

But I did make the political authorities of NATO aware. However, I was asked, Senator, to come back in the spring of 1987 to meet with the President to discuss with him my views of the treaty and why it was that I opposed it.

So I did. I cancelled a trip, came back, but never got to meet with the President. I did meet with some of the people in the White House. So I really never had an opportunity to discuss it directly with him.

But I would also say that neither did I actively seek a direct enface with him.

Senator LEVIN. Why did you not initiate those conversations, if your feelings were so deep about it?

General ROGERS. Because I initiated them with the people for whom I served as the SACEUR directly.

Senator LEVIN. To whom in the White House did you make your feelings known, other than the President?

General ROGERS. Mr. Carlucci and General Colin Powell.

Senator LEVIN. At least they were aware. And you testified also, I believe, at least in front of the House of Representatives in December 1986, relative to INF. Is that correct?

General ROGERS. About that time.

Senator LEVIN. That is the indication, that there was some testimony late in 1986.

And that is one of the things I wanted to ask you about also, if I have any time left. It has to do with one of the things you said then, and I would like to know if that is consistent with what you are saying today.

You said then that you do not believe that the zero level option necessarily leads to decoupling, as long as we have 326,000 U.S. forces stationed in Western Europe, because the United States intends to protect them.

And I am wondering whether you believe that is also true today? And if so, is that, in general, consistent with your testimony?

General ROGERS. Yes. Those who argue that there will be decoupling go back to the premise that one of the reasons we had to have the decision to deploy the weapons initially was to tighten the coupling between the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and those theater forces. It did do that.

But then when they argued that giving up those forces would lead to decoupling, I do not believe that is so. Because the United States is not going to—I always assumed at least, in both my SACEUR and my CINCEUR role, that the United States would not have 326,000 U.S. forces in European command, most of them on the European continent itself, unless it intended to protect them; that the United States was not going to sacrifice them. And that is a very tight coupling, I think, as a consequence.

Senator LEVIN [presiding]. My time is up. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. General, in your testimony, you reviewed the history of the INF deployment, noting that weapons were deployed both to address the gap existing in our arsenal of weapons and also the need to address the SS-20 deployment.

My question is, To what extent did that INF deployment improve the security of Europe? Was that a major improvement? Minor? How would you characterize it?

General ROGERS. Well, for the first time, we had the means to carry out the general political guidelines with certainty, when those weapons were deployed.

Prior to that, we did not have the means with certainty to do that.

Senator HUMPHREY. I understand that. But what did that represent? How significant an improvement was that in the security of Europe?

General ROGERS. Well, I thought it was a major improvement, because it raised the level of the credibility of our deterrent in the minds of the Soviets much higher than it had ever been before.

And as one of the negotiators made very clear to me, the Soviet Union intended to capture the P-II because of what it could do irrespective of the cost.

Senator HUMPHREY. And you felt it was a major improvement in Europe's security.

To what extent will Europe's security be degraded by the removal of these weapons, assuming, which is more than a reasonable assumption, that we will be lucky to keep the status quo with respect to funding for European forces, both ours and our allies?

Lucky, assuming there will not be any increase, and that we will be lucky to maintain the status quo. And assuming the Soviets are not going to agree to conventional force reductions on a ratio of 5-1 in our favor, which this report says is the bare minimum necessary to maintain our position.

Assuming those things, which seem reasonable to me, to what extent will Europe's security be degraded by this removal?

General ROGERS. Its future freedom will be degraded, and therefore its security will be degraded.

Senator HUMPHREY. To what extent? You said it was a major improvement at the time we put them in. Can you characterize the degradation in this?

General ROGERS. To me, it will be a major degradation in the credibility of our deterrent. Particularly the deterrence of intimidation through the threat of conventional aggression.

Senator HUMPHREY. One populace that does not seem to get mentioned in all of this, we talk about the security of our European allies, and that is very important.

But what is perhaps a degree more important is the security of the lives of our 325,000 young men and women and their families who are there. How would you characterize your concern, or can you comment in some way about how this affects the security of our troops in Europe, this withdrawal?

General ROGERS. I do not believe that it will impact in a major way upon the security of U.S. forces in those two corps areas.

The major impact down the road will be to the freedom of the West European nations and not upon a short notice attack, a short warning attack by the Soviets, in my opinion.

Senator HUMPHREY. You have said in a number of places, including in your article in Global Affairs, that the denuclearization of Western Europe would make that region safe for Soviet conventional aggression. Does that not put our troops in greater danger?

General ROGERS. Did I not say, just as a follow-on say, but more likely would be the achievement of the Soviet objective of neutralization without firing a shot?

I really believe that that is the more likely case coming from this treaty. And if that happened, the security of our forces, I do not think, would be impacted. But the question would be, what good are they anymore if Western Europe is accommodating to the East, as a consequence of a threat of conventional attack?

And I think that that would be something this Nation would consider down the road, and maybe reach in and decide to remove them.

Senator HUMPHREY. Going back to the dilemma which confronts us, namely that we have negotiated a treaty which is to the detriment of our own security and that of our allies on the one hand, on the other hand there would be a political uproar if we failed to ratify it.

Which in your view is the greater evil? Which is the greater threat to our national security?

General ROGERS. Well, Senator, I am going to have to leave that to you, and your colleagues.

Senator HUMPHREY. But look, you have spent a lifetime in serving our country in the military branch. You have spent how many years as NATO commander.

General ROGERS. I spent 8 years as NATO commander. And this treaty is wrong. We should not have this treaty, in my opinion. But we have it.

And now I have presented to you my concern as far as the military view of it. Seventy percent of what I did as SACEUR was political. So obviously, it has political overtones. But the fact is, you have to make that determination and not I, as to which is the greater threat.

Senator HUMPHREY. And it is a weighty decision, is it not? This is a real roll of the dice and I resent it more than I can say, that the administration got us into this fix.

This is casino negotiations for arms control. We saw it at Reykjavik, we saw it in this, and look what it has brought us to. A very bad situation, and I resent that.

General ROGERS. Well, I am not being very helpful to you, Senator.

Senator HUMPHREY. I am asking your professional advice. You literally know more about it than at least this Senator, by virtue of your career and the time you spent amongst the Europeans. Which is the greater evil?

General ROGERS. I believe the greater evil—let me qualify this.

Because it is tough, but I am looking at it from the standpoint of the future of NATO as a viable organization in which this Nation can continue to exercise the leadership which it must do if it is to remain viable.

Failing to ratify, I think, might well be disastrous to NATO as a viable organization. And for the opportunity for this country to continue to lead.

I do not like it either, Senator, that we have gotten up to this point where we have really virtually no option but to go ahead and to ratify something which is counter to our interests and counter primarily to the interests of our allies in Western Europe.

Senator HUMPHREY. I thought I had seen the limits of insanity before. But this situation is more insane than I have ever seen in this city.

For the sake of form, we are going to ratify substance which is against our national interests. I would like to pursue that a little more if I had time, but my time has expired.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Thank you, Senator. General Rogers, you have been extremely patient, and very, very helpful, and as responsive as I think you can and should have been to the questions that have been asked of you.

I always marvel at your ability to state your position very clearly, but not try and intrude on the obligations that others have in this particular area.

I remain very much concerned, though, about what you are telling us about the European perception of the threat to them. I am worried, as I indicated to you, at what I see as the perception of the threat to our traditional allies and friends in the Pacific region, save Australia.

I guess I am coming down to the conclusion here that maybe the Americans and the Australians are the only ones that have their heads screwed on right with regard to the threat. That is a pretty deplorable situation, if that is true.

Let me ask you this question. I am not sure you handled it in the questions. As far as the people of the various countries in Europe and as far as the elected political leadership in the various countries of Europe—I am talking about NATO now—I have gotten the clear impression that they, the public, are strongly for ratification of INF, and that they, the elected political leadership of NATO, are strongly in favor of ratification of the INF agreement. Is that correct?

General ROGERS. I think the first is correct, that the people feel good, because they feel that the fewer nuclear weapons you have the more secure they are. And therefore, if you went to zero, you would be completely secure. That is false, obviously.

On the other hand, I think you will find the political leadership feels otherwise, although they might have changed since I talked to most of them last.

Senator Exon. When was that, General?

General Rogers. That really was, well, I retired the end of June 1987, augmented somewhat in a visit in October of last year.

But they would say to me, Senator, as an international officer, even though wearing a U.S. uniform, things that they would not say to you. Or to members of the administration. They had accepted the fact that they were in a corner.

They had to accept the first zero level, because they had fostered it since 1981, thinking it would not be accepted by the Soviets. They had to accept the second zero level because the other side were the only ones that had any.

Their people were in favor of this double zero; so the political authorities accepted it. But there is concern on the part of many political authorities in Europe about this treaty. Unless, as I say, they have changed since I last discussed it with a number of them.

But those who have been in Western Europe, some fairly recently, and who have not been members of the administration or officials in the Government, in any branch of the Government, have come back with indications that there is great concern.

When you have coalition and minority governments, as you know, Senator, the wind testing is what is important for the senior leaders in an administration in Western Europe. They test the wind.

Rather than lead the people and convince them what it is that they need to do as a people, they will test the wind. I have had prime ministers say to me, "General, I know what I should be saying to my people about security measures, but if I do, not only will my government fall but my party will lose in the next election. And I do not want that to happen. And I can understand that, I think.

Senator Exon. I understand that, if you do not.

General Rogers. So there is concern in Western Europe.

The citizens who have followed this whole thing intimately over the years have written a number of articles counter to the INF Treaty. But most of the people feel better about it.

But the fact is NATO is where it is today because the United States put NATO where it is, and we have to start from that point. And the point is, what do we do after this treaty has been fully implemented?

Senator Exon. I have listened with great interest to you today. And you know my fondness for you over the years.

I do not happen to share the full concerns that you have expressed in many areas here today, and I will not go into them. But I am very much concerned to hear what I hear from my visits and your visits around the world.

Sometimes I wonder what the Europeans think, if there is not a threat of major proportions, why the United States of America has over 300,000 troops and their families in Europe? What are we doing there after 40 years?

I guess it is a failure of the political leadership. And maybe the story as we tell it. I told you about our rock-hard ally in Australia.

I had heard about the antinuclear sentiment but until you go there and see it and talk to the people and hear how they feel you don't really understand it. It is typical of any politician in that area, save in Australia, to put his finger up into the wind and discover that the masses are so strongly for a nuclear-free zone concept. It is almost unbelievable and just is not in touch with the times.

But even in Australia, the question that was asked most of me by the political leaders of both and all parties was whether we will have any difficulty in ratifying the INF Treaty.

I would certainly say to all of us who are wrestling with this that regardless of how we got here and whose fault it is that we are in the position that we are in right now. If the U.S. Senate would fail to ratify the INF Treaty, and I believe that there are sufficient numbers in the U.S. Senate that do have the political courage to stand up and say no, if they thought this treaty was as bad as you think it is, I think we would be allowing the Soviet Union the greatest political coup that they have had in a long, long time.

The world at large is for this treaty. And if it should not be ratified, I think there would be devastation to pay on the part of the interests of the United States around the world because the people are hopeful that this will be at least a door-opener, a tiny step, if you will, toward future understanding with the Soviets.

Now, having said that, General, I do have grave concerns about START, unless many of the things that you have mentioned here are addressed. But I think it would be a critical error on our part, given the situation that we are in, to have any killer amendments attached to this treaty.

I happen to feel that everything is a risk and there is nothing risk-free. I think this Nation is at a crossroads on the INF Treaty where we had better approve it, and then move on to correct some of the imbalances at a later date.

While we are doing, we should tell people of the United States and the world that this treaty does not solve most, if any, of the major differences between the two superpowers.

It would be wrong and terribly wrong. That is a worry that I have. They think this is going to foster that idea in Europe. See, everything is getting along just fine now, and we do not need all of this.

So that is a little editorial comment. I know you will not take this personally, because you are not that type of an individual.

But since we have had so much wringing of the hands around this table today, I just wanted you to know that there are some of us who are wringing our hands also that are not as inclined to make, or try to make major changes in this treaty that I suspect that will be made, and I hope unsuccessfully, on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

My time is up. I recognize Senator Symms.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I might just add a little bit of my editorial comment.

In my view, the devastation that will be done by the treaty has started this so-called love-in that the President has participated in with Mr. Gorbachev, the dictator of our adversaries, has already created political devastation.

Because the people that General Rogers spoke of in Europe did have the courage to stand up to help us deploy the cruise missiles and the GLCMs got the rug jerked out from under them.

So the devastation is already done. I fall in the camp with Senator Humphrey. I greatly resent what has happened and I think your testimony, General, solidifies my viewpoint and my skepticism of this treaty in the first place.

To think that the administration did not counsel their senior commander in the field before they went into this negotiation.

I feel like we really are put in a box here in the Senate. But I do not believe that I buy the argument that there will be a great deal of political devastation in Europe if this treaty is not ratified. However, I think it probably will be ratified.

But I think that the damage has already been done. And it is going to take tremendously strong leadership now, on the part of the Western alliance, to motivate people to recognize that Gorbachev is probably one of the finest Trojan horses that we have ever seen.

I mean, I do not see changes in their war machine. I do not see changes in Afghanistan. They are getting their tail handed to them there. And in other parts of the world they are still an empire that only holds itself together by force and tyranny and oppression. And their definition of peace is not an acceptable definition of peace. I think you said that rather well. I refer to your article, your interview in U.S. News & World Report. You made it very clear that peace and freedom are not separable. They are inseparable. And while Gorbachev always talks about peace.

His definition of peace is the same kind of peace they have behind the iron curtain where they shoot people when they try to crawl over the wall. I think that we have got ourselves in a real jam here.

I share Senator Humphrey's concern. I do not know how it will finally break out. But I think the story needs to be told to the American people. And I greatly appreciate your testimony here.

As I said at the outset, it is badly needed to have someone come in here and explain the historical background of INF. I only wish that it would have been better understood sooner by more people.

We had one witness last week, former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, who made the point that now in Western Europe, 50 percent of the German population in a recent poll thought that the Soviets were no longer a threat to their security and their freedom.

If you get that kind of a political feeling there, I think that the administration will find out here, if they think it was hard to get a defense budget passed in 1985 and 1986 and 1987, wait until 1988 when they have had the love-in with Mr. Gorbachev and he no longer represents the evil empire but he is our new partner in peace.

And that is the end of my editorial comment, General. I wish you well.

General ROGERS. Thank you.

Senator EXON. Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, General Rogers, for your forebearance.

The conventional wisdom has now become that failure to ratify means great dissension, perhaps the dismantling of NATO. That is the conventional wisdom. And I think you have added yet another paragraph to the conventional wisdom today.

A thought that had not occurred to me before was that the INF weapons are coming out anyway, because the expectation has been built up and that no government, given their instability as it is, perhaps no government would be able to resist popular will on that point.

But let me challenge the conventional wisdom for a moment. Supposing we do not ratify, are the Soviets going to take out their SS-20s unilaterally, do you think?

General ROGERS. No, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Are the Europeans now so blind that they would be unafraid of those SS-20s as they were terrified of them 10 years ago?

General ROGERS. Without our having the ability to deter the use of those SS-20s, which we would not have—ours would be withdrawn under any conditions—I think that there would be obviously greater fear on the part of the West Europeans.

Senator HUMPHREY. My point is that it is your opinion, absent ratification, the SS-20s will remain. Did I understand you correctly?

General ROGERS. That would be my judgment. But that is only Bernie Rogers' judgment.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, we would not have you here if you did not count for a lot. And obviously it does. That is self-evident.

But my point is, absent ratification, if the SS-20s remain, would there not then in the face of the continued targeting of Europe by SS-20s be public support for retaining the INF weapons?

General ROGERS. It would be. But I just do not believe in my own mind, after my experience there, that there is any government that would continue to keep these weapon systems on their soil after this treaty has been signed, other than the possibility of Mrs. Thatcher.

Senator HUMPHREY. You see, my point is, I am talking about popular perception and popular will. Would not popular will change if these SS-20s remained targeted on Europe?

General ROGERS. They would be more fearful because of the SS-20s. But, as I mentioned earlier, it was not because of the SS-20s that we needed to make the decision to put our cruise and Pershing missiles on allied soil. It was for deterrent purposes.

Senator HUMPHREY. True enough. But in terms of public perceptions, however foolishly they were sold to the European public as counters to the SS-20 because there was a great public fear of the SS-20s targeted on Europe. Am I not right on that?

General ROGERS. There was major concern.

Senator HUMPHREY. So I am challenging the conventional wisdom that NATO would come apart absent ratification on the grounds that, as you say, the SS-20s would remain, and therefore there would be the need, perceived need by Europeans of a counter to those SS-20s.

And therefore I think there might well be public support for retaining them until some better agreement could be worked out. I think we have got the cart before the horse here.

We ought to have been dealing, and that is my next question, ought to have been dealing with conventional reductions first, using this, our most powerful lever, as a lever.

Now we are throwing away the lever, and then we are going to confront this huge boulder and try to move it with our fingers.

General ROGERS. If we could order the world as we would have liked, it would have been, as Chancellor Schmidt had always advocated, to start on our arms control reductions by rolling up the conventional first, then rolling up the theater nuclear, and then rolling up the strategic nuclear.

And that would have been the orderly way in which to have done it. But circumstances dictated differently.

Senator HUMPHREY. Two more questions, if I may. On page 16 of your statement, you state, if the Soviets have a policy of attacking under launch, that is, releasing their strategic forces when they observe U.S.-U.K. strategic weapons headed toward Soviet soil, why should the United States and United Kingdom bear the risk of being struck by the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, because NATO was rash enough to use the strategic weapon for theater purposes?

That is a very key question. I mean, this is all hypothetical. But asking you in concrete terms, would it be rash in your opinion for NATO to respond with strategic weapons to a theater threat?

General ROGERS. To me it would.

Senator HUMPHREY. It would be rash?

General ROGERS. Yes. We went through that at the end of the 1960s and decided that massive retaliation had no place.

Senator HUMPHREY. Practically speaking, we will have no choice, in my opinion.

You can talk about your F-15Es and all that good stuff, which might or might not materialize, but is not there now. And you can talk about air-launched cruise missiles for B-52s. Where are we going to base them? And how much less credible is that as a deterrent than on-site, ready-to-fire Pershing IIs and cruise missiles? It is hokum. This is a grand delusion.

And this is my last question. You know, we talk about giving up Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missile, what most Americans miss, and I think most Senators, is that we are giving up perhaps the most useful conventional weapon with which to deal with this conventional imbalance, the ground-launched, conventionally-armed, cruise missile.

That is sort of missed in this whole thing. We are giving up not only the two theater weapons, we are giving up a very important conventional weapon that has very impressive performance, and very encouraging potential to help negate this huge imbalance, and to help retard a Soviet attack, should deterrence fail.

We are not going to have that tool. And we are throwing that one away in this package as well. My question is, To what degree are you concerned by the foregoing of conventionally armed cruise missiles in that theater?

In fact, altogether, we are not to have them or flight test them anywhere. Right?

General **Rogers**. We are not permitted to have them.

Senator **Humphrey**. Anywhere in the world, we cannot have those things?

General **Rogers**. On a global basis. We would have preferred to have had a conventional warhead on them. But as you know, it was an 11th hour try with the Defense Department to keep them as conventional.

But that did not become part of the decision here in this country, or in this administration.

Senator **Humphrey**. The question was, to what degree are you concerned about foregoing, the necessity of foregoing ground-launched cruise missile, conventionally armed?

General **Rogers**. We do not need the ground-launched cruise missiles with conventional warheads, in my opinion, in the European theater with the kind of range that it has, with conventional warheads.

But, they are a peculiar bird that flies out there. And they have to make certain maneuvers, they have to go around, as you know, to arm themselves, and a whole series of things. So that that increases the range.

But as far as I was concerned, we did not need them either conventionally or nuclear with that range of 2,500 kilometers other than with a nuclear warhead to strike Soviet targets. As a deterrent. So that you would know they were not a sanctuary.

Senator **Humphrey**. As a military man, you do not see that as a major loss?

General **Rogers**. If we can follow through on a conventional warhead for the follow-on to Lance, and if we can follow through with a conventional warhead on the air-to-surface missile with the ranges that I described, I think that will be adequate. I have always believed that would be adequate.

Senator **Humphrey**. We are giving up "have" for "if."

General **Rogers**. That is correct.

Senator **Humphrey**. Nonetheless, General, I thank you for your excellent testimony. And may I say that you have served our country magnificently, and God bless you.

General **Rogers**. Thank you.

Senator **Exon**. Senator Symms, anything further?

Senator **Symms**. I share in my accolades and praise for you, General. Thank you very much for what you have done for the country, and also for your testimony today.

General **Rogers**. Thank you, sir.

Senator **Symms**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Exon**. General, it has been a long and very informative afternoon. We will be back in touch with you to see if you could come back and help us out, as Senator Wilson suggested, in front of the Strategic Subcommittee.

As usual, you have been helpful, forthcoming, and honest in your convictions. I salute you as a great American, and wish you well. Thank you very much, and we are adjourned.

General **Rogers**. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

NATO-WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:04 a.m., in room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Dixon, Glenn, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Humphrey, Quayle, Wilson, Symms, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy minority staff director; Jeffrey H. Smith, general counsel; Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; and Andrew S. Effron, counsel; Robert G. Bell, Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dailey, Richard D. Finn, Jr., Judith A. Freedman, John J. Hamre, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, and David S. Lyles; professional staff members; Barbara B. Brown, Mary J. Kampo, and Richelle M. Turner, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory J. Weaver, assistant to Senator Levin; Gregory B. Craig and William J. Lynn, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Charles C. Smith, assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach and Donald A. Mitchell, assistants to Senator Glenn; Robert K. Griffith, assistant to Senator Wirth; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; and Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The Armed Services Committee will come to order. Our committee convenes this morning for its eighth hearing on the defense of NATO and the INF Treaty. This current series of hearings continues the review of U.S. national security strategy that the committee began last year.

Today's witness, Gen. John Galvin, brings a great deal of experience in NATO to his dual-hatted position as Commander in Chief of the U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Before taking on these demanding responsibilities in

1987, General Galvin had served almost 9 years in Europe in a variety of command and staff positions. In addition, he had been the commander in chief of the U.S. Southern Command—another important U.S. command in the U.S. military command structure.

We look forward to working with General Galvin on the military questions raised by the INF Treaty, as well as the many other NATO issues that will demand our attention.

Senator Warner will be coming in in just a few minutes. Do any other Senators have any opening comments this morning?

Senator KENNEDY. No, Mr. Chairman. I had the opportunity to visit General Galvin in the Southern Command about a year ago and I know the high regard that all of those that were associated with that command had for his leadership. I think all of us are fortunate to have him here today.

He does come from Wakefield, MA, which I think adds to his credentials as well.

It is good to see you.

Chairman NUNN. Even further, most of his family is now in Georgia, so he is going in the right direction. It is a good combination, Senator Kennedy.

[Senator Dixon's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ALAN J. DIXON

Mr. Chairman, the committee today is privileged to welcome General John R. Galvin, USA, commander in chief U.S. European Command. I am sure General Galvin will contribute greatly to our understanding of the NATO Warsaw Pact military balance.

This committee to date has heard testimony from several distinguished individuals, including Secretary Carlucci, Admiral Crowe, Ambassador Abshire, Dr. Schlesinger, and General Galvin's predecessor General Bernard Rogers (Ret). These witnesses have addressed numerous issues of vital concern to this committee and the country as a whole.

I am particularly concerned about the implications of the INF Treaty on the state of readiness of our NATO forces. We have been told that NATO is in better condition to meet the Soviet threat than ever before, and also told that the condition of our NATO forces is precarious and requires substantial improvement. These diverse opinions, while not unexpected, are disturbing. I look forward to General Galvin's contribution to the discussion and his forthright opinions on these critical issues.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. General Galvin, we are delighted to have you and we would be delighted to get your statement.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN R. GALVIN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

General GALVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I submitted a comprehensive statement which I would like to simply summarize only its conclusions, and I will proceed directly to that.

The first conclusion that I had is that the strategy of 14/3, flexible response, forward defense, is a good strategy. It is one that encompasses direct defense if deterrence, God forbid, ever fails. It follows direct defense by deliberate escalation and by general nuclear response if that ever became necessary.

That strategy developed out of earlier strategies, 14/1 and 14/2, which tried to meet the situation as it evolved after World War II in the fifties and sixties, as the Soviet force and Warsaw Pact military force built up and became more powerful in Eastern Europe.

I have had, as you say, about a decade of experience with that strategy in a variety of different command and staff positions. As I look at that strategy today and see how it meets the exigencies of the situation that exist, I still feel it is a viable strategy, it is a good strategy.

I do not see another strategy looming somehow that is going to take over from what we have, and I think that it has shown itself to be flexible and versatile enough to absorb more than two decades of change, and we really do have something that meets our requirements.

The second thing that is part of my conclusion is that the threat has not really changed. Although Gorbachev has written *Perestroika*, when you read *Perestroika* what it says is Europe is for the Europeans. In other words, Yankee go home.

It says that nuclear weapons must disappear from Europe. This is something that the Soviet Union has pressed for a long time because they recognize it as a deterrent to the expansion of Soviet power there.

The conventional threat still remains high. Senator Levin and many others have studied the force comparisons. I have over the past 6 months put a lot of attention to that, Mr. Chairman. I have looked at 169 different studies of the force comparisons, picked out about 20 that I think are really good ones, and worked those over with the staffs under me.

I have come to my own conclusions on the force comparisons and I can say, speaking in the most general sense, that the force comparisons are still unfavorable to us. So the threat has not changed.

My third point, I would strongly urge at this point that we ratify the treaty. I think that there are some risks that we run here. Those are risks, however, that are really not connected specifically into the treaty.

One of those is the risk that we would not continue in this technological age to modernize our conventional and nuclear capabilities. And the other one is that the theater nuclear force, which is the force that ties together the response of this side of the Atlantic with the response of the NATO side and is vitally important to us, that the existence of NATO's theater nuclear force might be threatened, and I hope that it is not.

I also feel that as a commander, cohesion is an important thing to me, very important. Napoleon said that the will on the battlefield, fighting will, is to anything else as 3 is to 1, and I believe that. that.

And therefore I believe that we should always consider as we discuss questions about the treaty, or something that has a major effect on the alliance, we should consider that cohesion.

I also conclude in my statement that nuclear modernization, that is the tactical air-to-surface missile, follow-on to Lance, the artillery round, air-delivered bombs and other elements of modernization of the force, that is to keep it from going obsolete, are important to us as long as nuclear forces are important to us.

The same thing applies on the conventional side, the follow-on forces attack, your own Nunn-Quayle amendment, and the conventional defense initiative. All of those are important to us in terms of the need for modernization. I also support very strongly the manufacture of the binary chemical capability because that gives us the retaliatory capability that we need in order to deter any kind of use of chemical weapons.

I conclude also that we need to maintain the theater nuclear force and we need to seek reductions in the conventional standoff that we have in Europe. I think that as we look at reductions on the conventional side we should look not only at the numbers, but at the capabilities. For example, the capabilities to mobilize, reinforce, sustain, control air space, and so forth.

There are also many external factors that need to be considered, such as the countries that are not in NATO—Austria and Sweden—and what they might do in the event of a conflict.

I conclude also, Mr. Chairman, that we ought to keep the U.S. presence, especially as we come down the wire to the distinct possibility of conventional arms reduction talks. And I would like to emphasize the need for alliance cooperation, and I do that in my statement.

In conclusion and in sum, our strategy is correct. Arms control should be a part of that strategy. Europe is important to us and U.S. leadership is important to Europe.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Galvin follows:]

STATEMENT BY GENERAL JOHN R. GALVIN
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate this chance to discuss national security in terms of the North Atlantic Alliance, especially in view of the INF Treaty and its ramifications. The primary mission of U.S. European Command is to support the North Atlantic Alliance and it is to this task that I would like to address my remarks today.

NATO is a defensive alliance. Its members are committed to use military force only in response to aggression. Therefore the Alliance does not maintain forces capable of overwhelming its potential adversaries. Because our primary objective is to deter attack we must be able to convey the message that as an alliance we have both the capability and will to protect our interests. In the event that deterrence fails, NATO forces must be able to preserve or restore the territorial integrity of Alliance nations and bring the war to a close on favorable terms as soon as possible.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

The strategy of flexible response was adopted by NATO in 1967 in order to maintain the credibility of deterrence in a changing strategic environment. In keeping with the objectives of the Alliance, it is both a deterrent and a defensive strategy, designed to respond to aggression across the entire spectrum of conflict. Flexible response incorporates three general responses to aggression:

- Direct Defense seeks to defeat aggression on the level at which the enemy chooses to fight. It rests on physically preventing the enemy from taking what he wants and places the burden of escalation on him.

- Deliberate Escalation seeks to defeat aggression by raising, in a controlled manner, the scope and intensity of combat, making the cost and risk disproportionate to the aggressor's objectives, and the threat of nuclear response progressively more imminent.

- General Nuclear Response contemplates the use of strategic nuclear strikes designed to destroy an enemy's capacity and will to continue the war.

An essential element of flexible response is the concept of forward defense. We lack the depth to carry out a more traditional strategy, in which a defender facing a numerically superior force trades space for the time needed to wear down the attacker and to organize a counter-attack. Instead, our strategy relies on the threat to escalate the conflict by employing nuclear weapons to increase the costs of aggression beyond any level the attackers would be willing to pay. Forward defense contributes to this strategy of deterrence because the Soviets recognize that any aggression will be met immediately by NATO forces defending every inch of Western soil, and they realize that they will be unable to attack NATO without running grave risks of nuclear retaliation.

Since its adoption in 1967, flexible response has accommodated numerous changes in our equipment and force structure -- and in those of our adversary. For flexible response to remain viable, however, it must be supported by a balanced triad of strategic nuclear, theater-based nuclear, and conventional forces. In other words, to deter -- and deterrence is my overriding objective -- NATO must possess a credible capability for effective military response across the full spectrum of conflict.

THE NATO TRIAD

Strategic Nuclear Forces

Over the course of the past decade the United States and the United Kingdom have pursued vigorous programs of strategic nuclear modernization designed to maintain a secure and effective strategic nuclear deterrent, which is recognized as the cornerstone of our flexible response strategy and the basis of NATO's capability at the ultimate level of conflict. The continuation of these programs is essential to maintaining the viability of the strategic leg of the triad.

Theater-based Nuclear Forces

For flexible response to be effective, NATO must be able to implement controlled escalation through the selective employment of theater-based nuclear weapons. For the nuclear option to be credible, these forces must present a wide range of options and be broadly based throughout Allied Command Europe in order to cover any eventuality and to deny any scope for preemptive strike calculations by our adversary. We must also possess sufficient capabilities to make the Soviets uncertain as to the precise nature of NATO's response to aggression.

The INF Treaty being considered by the Senate for ratification will eliminate the PII's and GLCM's, but a substantial number of nuclear weapons will remain in the Allied Command Europe area. NATO will still have in Europe some hundreds of nuclear-capable aircraft, Lance short-range ballistic missile launchers, and thousands of artillery pieces that can deliver nuclear weapons. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles of the United States and the United Kingdom will remain available to me, and we should not fail to consider the contribution to deterrence of the independent nuclear forces of France, which although not part of NATO's integrated military structure, nevertheless complicate Soviet planning considerably.

The Soviet Union will dismantle and destroy deployed missiles capable of carrying about four times as many warheads as the U.S. will give up. The USSR will also have to forego deployment of its newly tested ground-launched cruise missile. And while the INF treaty will not eliminate the nuclear threat to NATO -- an array of Soviet strategic missiles will remain -- it will reduce Soviet flexibility in planning for nuclear weapons employment. When the SS-20, SS-4, SS-5, SS-12, and SS-23 missiles are eliminated, the Warsaw Pact will no longer be able to target the channel ports or many key installations in NATO's northern and southern regions with intermediate-range nuclear missiles (although they may dedicate short range or strategic missiles to these targets). The threat of attack by missiles bearing conventional or chemical warheads will also be lessened. As a result, the Alliance capability to reinforce and sustain Allied Command Europe will be less threatened.

The treaty has a number of other positive attributes. In addition to establishing the precedent-setting principle of asymmetric reductions, the agreement includes the most extensive verification measures ever accepted by the USSR.

Most important, however, the INF Treaty represents the first negotiated reversal of the Soviet build-up, and thus offers grounds for hope that we can achieve greater security and a more stable relationship at a lower level of armaments. Since World War II there has been a costly, virtually unceasing expansion of weaponry. Negotiated reductions may be able to slow this competition and may eventually stop it. It is obviously worth trying to achieve such an objective. But in our pursuit of arms reductions, we should remember that our objective must be greater security, not reductions for their own sake.

The treaty carries some risks -- risks that are avoidable if given proper attention. The treaty could generate a sense of euphoria that stops NATO's ongoing process of modernization of weapons and equipment, or it could lead some to advocate a withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Europe, or create a perception that NATO is somehow less cohesive and less committed to defense. I believe we can and will overcome these disadvantages, and I am convinced that the treaty should be ratified. To put it another way, if military modernization proceeds as planned, NATO's strategy of flexible response and forward defense will remain viable, and I will still be able to carry out my mission of deterrence and defense. I would like to emphasize however, that continued modernization of our remaining nuclear and non-nuclear forces in Europe is a consideration entirely apart from the INF Treaty. In the highly competitive, technological world of today it would be a mistake to neglect the need for updating our defense capabilities.

Conventional Forces

An important conventional capability that deserves special mention is that of chemical warfare. To deter Warsaw Pact use of chemical weapons, NATO needs to have a modern retaliatory capability and effective defenses against the use of chemicals by our opponent -- areas in which the Alliance has been deficient. More recently NATO has made progress toward reaching an acceptable defensive posture, and the U.S. has embarked on a program to modernize NATO's retaliatory stockpile.

The continuing Soviet superiority and declining utility of U.S. stocks prompted the United States, with NATO's support, to begin manufacturing modern binary chemical weapons. Production commenced in December 1987 with assembly of artillery shells, and will subsequently extend to the BIGEYE bomb, a chemical round for the multiple launch rocket system, and a new deep-strike standoff system. To ensure that the chemical weapons stockpile does not exceed the minimum essential level, one unitary chemical artillery projectile will be destroyed for each binary artillery projectile or aircraft-delivered binary aerial bomb that is produced.

NATO's demonstration of determination in deploying PIIs and GLCMs led to an agreement eliminating SS-20s, and I am hopeful that by continuing our deployment of binary chemical weapons we can stimulate progress in negotiations. In lieu of an agreement on a global, effectively verifiable elimination, NATO must maintain a modern retaliatory capability. I applaud your recent approval of the resumption of chemical weapons manufacture and urge your continued support for production of binary weapons and their associated delivery systems, as well as for further research and development of a standoff chemical weapons delivery system.

The INF Treaty places added importance on the last leg of the NATO Triad -- conventional forces. NATO has never had sufficient conventional capabilities; instead we have tended to rely heavily on nuclear weapons, even though the Soviets achieved parity with the West in nuclear weapons and continued to build an ever-stronger conventional dominance.

We do not need to match the Warsaw Pact man for man or tank for tank. What we do need is a conventional capability strong enough to frustrate aggression and increase the time before nuclear weapons would have to be used. Such a capability would preclude hasty decisions to use nuclear weapons and enhance NATO's strategy of flexible response. Deterrence would be more credible because Soviet planners could not be sure of gaining the objectives of aggression so swiftly that NATO would be unable to consider the use of nuclear weapons. Robust conventional capabilities would also demonstrate the collective will of Alliance members to make the sacrifices necessary to ensure Western security, thereby adding to the credibility of NATO's overall deterrent posture. Finally, strong conventional forces would bolster the self-confidence of NATO nations and ensure that the Soviet Union would remain unable to intimidate or coerce Western Europe in order to obtain political, economic, or military concessions.

MEASURING THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE

In order to know what action needs to be taken to maintain adequate conventional forces, we must have a clear understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two alliances.The NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance is a measure of the relative capability of military forces that results from a complex combination of factors that together form military power. Although a military commander cannot limit his assessment of the balance to a comparison of the quantity of forces each side can bring to the battlefield, numbers are important when it comes to calculating relative military capabilities. Numbers also matter when it comes to determining the reductions that might be made in forces on both sides. In order to use force comparisons to help us decide where to go in conventional arms reductions, we must come back to counting actual, concrete, physical things such as equipment, weapons, people, and units as we consider how to achieve arms reductions while maintaining an environment of assured security.

Quantitative Comparisons

Even a quantitative comparison is not simple. At Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe we have examined more than 150 analyses of the East-West balance. These reflected a great variation in analytical techniques -- and a wide variety of conclusions.

It is difficult to know exactly what forces the Warsaw Pact has. We are an open society, as are our allies. Unfortunately this is not the case with the nations of the Warsaw Pact. While it is difficult to compare weapons, it is more difficult to compare capabilities of military forces. Quantity and quality of units and equipment vary among nations and even among units. To complicate matters, large quantities of equipment and personnel are not organized into units at all, but contribute to overall combat power as war reserve stocks and mobilizable reserves. Finally, there are forces that are organized along military lines and could contribute to the war effort, yet their missicn is not strictly military, such as the more than 200,000 Soviet KGB border troops. In many cases, experienced military judgment is needed to sort out what the numbers mean and how they contribute to what matters -- combat power.

Even after we sort through all the numbers we must determine how many of the available forces will be used in an attack. Because the attacker has the advantage of choosing the time, the place and the means of attack, NATO must be able to respond to a number of possible attack scenarios. We must have sufficient forces to counter a surprise attack as well as to respond to one that is fully reinforced by a massive buildup of Soviet forces. Thus, we should compare in place forces as well as reinforcements. If we look only at forces stationed in Western or Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact outnumbers NATO only slightly in personnel and more than 3 to 1 in tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft. If we look at both sides when fully mobilized and reinforced, the Soviets advantage declines, but is still greater than 2 to 1 in tanks and artillery. The Soviet advantage in combat aircraft declines considerably, to 1.2 to 1 in favor of the Warsaw Pact. While the value of such ratios is limited, it is clear that the Warsaw Pact has a significant numerical advantage in both in place and reinforced force levels, an advantage that must be factored into our assessment.

Pact advantages in numbers of in-place forces are particularly noteworthy since the emphasis of Soviet doctrine is on rapid offensive operations designed to win a conventional war before NATO can take advantage of reinforcements from outside the theater. Also of note is the emphasis Soviet military doctrine places on using deception and surprise to improve their chances for success in such an attack.

The current force comparison, as well as the long-term trend, favors the Warsaw Pact. For example, in 1973 the Soviets had an overall advantage of approximately 2.4 to 1 in tanks. Although since that time NATO has increased its tank force by almost 2,000 tanks, the Warsaw Pact tank totals have grown by more than 15,000. In general, since 1973, the size of the Soviet military machine facing NATO has grown almost 50%, while NATO forces grew little more than 10%.

In the 1950s and 1960s NATO relied on the U.S.strategic nuclear superiority to offset WP conventional advantages. Since then, the Soviets have erased American nuclear advantages, yet Soviet military expansion has continued unabated. In spite of a troubled economy, the Soviet military-industrial capability is excellent. A comparison of potential arms production capabilities confirms that the Soviets have the capacity to continue to outproduce the West over the next decade even though the WP economies cannot match NATO in GNP.

Beyond the Numbers

A reliance solely on quantitative comparisons could be misleading. NATO has traditionally sought to make up for its numerical disadvantages by maintaining an edge in quality of its forces. Deployment of the M1, Bradley fighting vehicle, Apache attack helicopter, MLRS, F-15 and F-16 fighters are examples of the excellent weapons the United States has fielded in the last decade. The deployment of these weapons has greatly increased the military capability of the forces under my command.

Unfortunately,the Soviets have also made great strides in improving the quality of their forces, and are rapidly closing the quality gap. The latest Soviet tanks rival the best we have: the T-80 has a laser rangefinder, NBC protection (not available in M1), a bigger gun than its NATO counterparts (125mm), and special armor that seriously degrades the effectiveness of NATO antitank missiles and tank rounds. Soviet deployment of over 1800 of these tanks into Eastern Europe, combined with the fielding of reactive armor on several varieties of Soviet armored fighting vehicles, gives the Warsaw Pact an advantage over NATO in the critical armor/anti-armor balance.

The Soviets have also greatly improved the quality of their artillery in the last decade. They have increased the number of self-propelled artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers in their forces, and the latest models of Soviet artillery outrange equivalent caliber NATO weapons and have a higher rate of fire. The West still retains an advantage in fire control, but the Soviets have made great strides in integrating artillery with maneuver forces to better support rapid, deep offensive operations. The Soviets now have the capacity to combine fires from artillery, attack helicopters, and close air support aircraft in support of a breakthrough attack, allowing them to improve combat power without the necessity to mass as large a number of forces as previously.

The Warsaw Pact also has improved its air combat capability, fielding MIG-29 and SU-27 fighters with look-down/shoot-down radar and sophisticated missile capability against aircraft and cruise missiles. In addition, they have improved air command and control by deploying a new airborne early warning aircraft similar to our AWACS. While the West still retains some advantages in the air balance, we cannot become complacent; the Soviets are obviously catching up. NATO capabilities are further reduced by the fact that the Soviets have built one of the most extensive and well integrated air defense systems in the world to protect their ground forces from NATO air attack.

The readiness of NATO forces is generally higher than those of the WP, and we have improved readiness throughout NATO with better training, but there is still considerable variance in readiness levels among military forces within the Alliance. Interoperability is also an important element of readiness, and here NATO does not do as well. While the Warsaw Pact has a great deal of commonality of equipment, NATO has 6 different main battle tanks, firing 4 different kinds of ammunition. In the field of communications, NATO has 6 different systems, none of which are designed to talk to each other. Although we can understand why nations would want to maintain independence in the area of weapons development and production,in an era of constrained resources we can no longer afford the inefficiencies created by this approach.

NATO is very dependent on timely mobilization and rapid deployment of forces to defense positions in order to gain the advantages that accrue to the defender. For example, in the northern region, the terrain is very favorable to the defense, Yet NATO has few active forces forward deployed, and is very dependent on mobilization. These advantages will be of little use if we do not get to our defensive positions before the attacking forces arrive.

In the central region NATO battalions must move a considerable distance to occupy forward defense positions. Worse yet, in the critical Northern Army Group sector, the majority of the Dutch and Belgian corps are not located in Germany and must be deployed from their home territory. Even the active units already deployed in the FRG would need several days to move to and prepare their general defense positions once a decision was made to mobilize.

The Warsaw Pact could mobilize quickly. The Soviets have imposed rigorous mobilization statutes on their allies, enabling them to call up the forces of the Eastern European nations without consultation with their governments. The Stockholm accords will make covert mobilization more difficult and are an important step forward in reducing the danger of a surprise attack.

A look a the map will demonstrate how geography favors Soviet reinforcement efforts over those of NATO. The United States must reinforce 6000km across the Atlantic and must defend the limited number of seaports and air bases available for debarkation of reinforcements. WP reinforces 800km over land, where it is easier to organize the defense of forces moving up. While the loss of a relatively small number of ports and airfields would lessen our ability to reinforce in a timely manner, the capacity of the transportation system through Eastern Europe is considerably larger than needed for Soviet reinforcement. In addition, the Soviets have taken a number of steps to further reduce their vulnerability to interdiction, to include forward stockpiling of ammunition and fuel, and development of new rail lines, and a rail ferry in the Baltic. Even the withdrawal of Soviet forces to locations east of the Urals does not eliminate this inherent Soviet advantage. Their forces would still be almost 2700km closer to the Central Front than forces withdrawn to the U.S. -- and even closer to NATO's northern and southern flanks.

Comparing Strategies

Any force comparison is incomplete without considering what the forces are trying to accomplish. The strategic doctrine of the two alliances are in sharp contrast. NATO's strategy is entirely and exclusively defensive, rejecting the advantages of initiative that accrue to any attacker; that is, ability to select the time, place, and nature of an attack. NATO military forces do not contemplate attacking the Warsaw Pact, and there are no NATO doctrines or plans or exercises that prepare for such operations. The same cannot be said of the Warsaw Pact. Every aspect of Soviet military posture -- weapons, force structure, training, and doctrine -- are all designed to maximize the potential for rapid offensive operations over long distances.

Conclusion

While analysts may argue over the various aspects of the conventional balance, it is clear to me as a military commander that the current conventional military situation in Europe is unfavorable. This assessment is shared by all my subordinate commanders, the men who bear the responsibility for defending NATO should deterrence fail. I do not mean to imply that deterrence is in imminent danger of collapse, but we cannot allow the conventional balance to deteriorate further without weakening our strategy of flexible response.

AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE

As we look to the future, we must establish an agenda that will guide our efforts to maintain deterrence and defense. At a minimum that agenda should include:

Ratify the Treaty

The first step we must take on the road ahead is to ratify the treaty. As I said earlier, the agreement has some positive attributes and it carries some risks -- risks that can be minimized if we take the steps necessary. Failure to ratify the treaty would have a serious adverse affect on the cohesion of our alliance.

Recognize the Nature of the Soviet Challenge

We have heard a lot of rhetoric lately about perestroika and glasnost. While we should welcome any flicker of reform in the Soviet Union, we must not allow ourselves to mistake words for deeds. In fact, Secretary Gorbachev's own words demonstrate that the Soviet goal of dividing the NATO alliance and pushing the United States out of Europe remains unchanged.

To date there has been no glasnost or perestroika in the Soviet military. Their military might continues to grow and their military posture continues to be oriented on offensive operations against Western Europe. Unless we put pressure on them to change, we can expect the threat posed by their conventional superiority to continue. The Soviets have not responded to NATO unilateral force reductions and restraint in the nuclear and chemical fields. We should not expect them to do so in the future unless we take decisive action that pressures them to do so. A clear lesson of the PII and GLCM deployment is that the Soviets will agree to reduce their military capabilites only when faced with a resolute stance on the part of the NATO allies.

Retain Nuclear Deterrence

While the INF Treaty reduces the number of nuclear weapons in Europe we must not let the Soviets achieve their goal of denuclearizing NATO Europe. No realistic level of conventional forces could substitute adequately for the deterrence provided by theater nuclear forces. We also need to continue to share the nuclear burden among members of the Alliance. This is particularly important as it demonstrates to an aggressor a high level of cohesion and will.

Maintain the Strategy of Flexible Response

Flexible Response remains the keystone of our Alliance. With a balanced triad of forces we can continue to deter aggression. We must not allow the balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact military capabilities to deteriorate to the point that NATO members become susceptible to pressures to accommodate Soviet interests, or to the point where credible deterrence is jeopardized.

A major element of our strategy should be the pursuit of a dual track approach to our relationship with the Soviets. By combining a willingness to seek negotiated solutions to security problems with demonstration of will to provide for our security in the absence of negotiated solutions, we can induce the Soviets to agree to arms reductions that enhance the security of both sides. It was NATO's determination to deploy PII and GLCM in the face of intense Soviet pressure that caused the Soviets to reopen arms reduction negotiations and to agree to the elimination of SS-20s. By demonstrating our determination to redress the conventional imbalance in Europe we can cause the Soviets to see that negotiating an agreement that reduces the threat to the West is preferable to an arms competition they cannot win.

For the dual track approach to be successful however, a clear understanding of what outcomes we desire is essential. That understanding must be based on a clear picture of the military balance and an understanding of how it should be altered to enhance our security. This assessment should include an analysis of the capabilities of each side to apply military power to achieve its objectives.

Continue to Modernize

Modernization is a never-ending process, an important element of competition in our technological world. A firm that fails to modernize its equipment when new technology becomes available soon loses its share of the market. In our military competition with the Soviets, modernization is even more important, and we stand to lose more than just a market share if we allow the Soviets to gain a technological as well as numerical advantage. The Soviets are continuing to pursue vigorous modernization of both nuclear and conventional forces; for example, actively developing improved short-range nuclear missiles and reportedly deploying a follow-on to the T-80 tank.

In order to gain the greatest benefit from our modernization programs, we need to identify and develop those systems which will maximize NATO's comparative advantages. To help nations focus their research and development efforts we developed the SACEUR's Conceptual Military Framework (CMF). This document examines the missions Allied Command Europe must perform and identifies key capabilities that serve as important force multipliers. In addition, the CMF looks beyond national research and development cycles in order to take maximum advantage of emerging technologies.

Nuclear Forces. Modernization of our remaining nuclear forces must continue if we are to avoid increasing risks after the INF Treaty. In 1983, well before an INF treaty appeared likely, NATO agreed to a level of modernization that was deemed necessary to maintain our deterrent posture.
It will be especially critical that the United States -- the Alliance's leading nuclear power -- implement its plans to modernize American nuclear forces based in Europe. Foremost among them is the development of a standoff air-to-ground nuclear missile. Also important is the enhancement of our aircraft that can deliver nuclear weapons. It is essential that we improve the ability of these aircraft to penetrate Warsaw Pact air defenses and also reduce their vulnerability to Pact attacks against their home bases. We can do this through the upgrading of avionics and electronic warfare equipment and by other active and passive defense measures at our airbases.

In order to keep our adversaries from being able to concentrate on stopping our aircraft, we should also seek a replacement for the aging Lance short-range ballistic missile, as well as improvements to our nuclear artillery. For the United States to pursue these programs, Congress will have to lift restrictions on the overall number of modernized artillery munitions and on the use of the Army Tactical Missile System as a dual capable follow-on to Lance. Our present 8-inch and 155-millimeter artillery rounds were deployed in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It is important that we not delay in replacing them with more modern munitions.

Conventional Forces.Each of the service components in the European theater is stronger as a result of the buildup of the 1980s. Our ground forces, for example, have benefitted from the deployment of new tanks, armored fighting vehicles, artillery, and attack helicopters. The M1A1, armed with a 120mm smoothbore main gun, began its deployment in 1987 and should be fielded in all U.S. Army units in Europe by the end of FY89. Deployment of the Bradley is on schedule and should be completed by FY91. The AH-64 Apache attack helicopter is also a welcome addition to our forces in Europe as it is faster, more robust, and more lethal than the Cobra attack helicopter it is replacing. Deployment of the AH-64 in Europe began in FY87 and should be completed by FY92. The Patriot air defense system now being fielded in Europe will be the centerpiece of the theater's air defense network. Fielding of this system to Europe began in 1985 and is on schedule for completion this year, while procurement of missiles and fielding in reinforcement units will continue into the mid-1990s.

Communications for tactical commanders will be improved as well by the Ground Mobile Forces Tactical Satellite Communications Program and the Mobile Subscriber Equipment which will provide units with the field equivalent of a secure commercial telephone system beginning in FY89, while the Single Channel Ground-Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS) will soon provide secure combat-net, very high frequency radios to replace obsolescent systems now in use. Fielding of SINCGARS will commence in 1988.

There has also been progress in the modernization of our tactical air capability in Europe Our newest aircraft (F-14s, F-15s, F-16, and F/A-18s) are more maneuverable and equipped with more advanced sensors and weapons systems than their predecessors. Deployment of future systems such as the upgraded F-16 fighters and the F-15E all weather attack aircraft will provide further improvements that will exploit our technological advantages in aviation technology over our adversary. We are also capitalizing on new technologies in the beyond-visual-range targeting capability that a large proportion of our aircraft in theater now have in the form of the Navy's Phoenix missile and the joint Navy/Air Force medium range AIM-7M Sparrow. The Phoenix will be deployed in sufficient quantities by FY89, and the majority of our requirements for Sparrows will be met by FY92. In coming years, it will be important to extend this capability for all aircraft by fielding, commencing in FY89, the AIM-120 advanced medium range air-to-air (AMRAAM) missile system. Another priority in coming years will be development of integrated navigational target location and identification devices for our aircraft, such as LANTIRN, and we anticipate it arriving in Europe in FY88. To reduce the current intra and inter-theater airlift shortfall, the C-17 cargo aircraft should remain a high priority item. We look forward to its initial operational capability scheduled for FY92.

I also see several naval programs as important to our theater capabilities. The completion in 1987 of the SL-7 roll-on, roll-off ship program has increased the ability to reinforce Europe with fast sealift. The construction of LHD-1 amphibious lift ships will provide the increased lift needed for the Marine forces that could be committed in Europe. We hope that five of these ships will have been completed by FY91. The Surface Effects Ship (SES) program under development for the late-1990s will further enhance fast sealift capability and cut the time in transit from the east coast of the United States to Europe from the current 10-19 days to three days.

Implement FOFA

Soviet forces and doctrine are tailored for offensive operations. In order to achieve rapid penetration and exploitation of NATO defenses the attacking forces are structured in a series of echelons. While the first echelon forces are initiating the attack on NATO's main defensive belt, other 'follow-on' forces are moving up or are poised to exploit any breakthrough that the first echelon might achieve. Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) is designed to destroy these formations.

FOFA provides three advantages. First, we can reduce the number of Warsaw Pact forces arriving at the main defensive positions, thus helping to solve in part the problem that arises from NATO's lack of depth. Second, we can wrest part of the initiative from the aggressor by attacking his 'vertical' flank, which is likely to be most vulnerable to long range munitions. Finally, we can attack Warsaw Pact command and control nodes, making it difficult for Pact leaders to control their forces.

There are a number of programs beyond the aircraft I have already mentioned, that will be the keys to making FOFA a reality. The multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) is a key element of Follow-on Forces Attack. Its fielding is on schedule and is projected to be completed in FY97. And as part of a multinational program with Germany, France, and Great Britain, the Army is working on a warhead for the system that will be able to dispense terminally-guided submunitions accurate enough to strike point as well as area targets. MLRS will be complemented by the development of the Army tactical missile system (ATACMS), which is critical to being able to reach deep behind enemy lines to strike advancing formations.

In addition to the weapons systems, improving our command, control, communications, and intelligence systems to support our operational forces will enable us to get the most from our joint and combined warfighting capability, and will also provide the key systems needed to identify and target the adversary's follow-on forces. The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) will make it possible for our fighting units to exchange battlefield information using digital communications among tactical units. We hope to see this system in Europe by the early 1990s. Emphasis should also be given to the continuing efforts to develop a robust theater intelligence capability, another area in which we may be able to apply Western technology to offset somewhat the Soviet and Warsaw Pact numerical edge. In this regard, continued support is essential for key programs such as the Joint Tactical Fusion-Limited Operation Capability Europe intelligence automation system (JTF-LOCE), the all source Battlefield Intelligence Evaluation System (BICES), the Joint Tactical Fusion Program in Europe, and our Theater Intelligence

Architecture Program and its associated Joint Intelligence Center.

Together, these systems will improve the collection, fusion, and dissemination of intelligence to the battlefield commanders. And when linked with the attack and command and control systems I have discussed, these intelligence programs will provide the capabilities that are needed to make the Follow-on-Forces Attack concept a reality. As I mentioned earlier, our NATO allies are also moving to develop FOFA capabilities, but they are watching our lead very closely. As in all areas of Alliance endeavor, the magnitude of our effort will do much to influence the contribution of our allies.

Pursue Integrated Arms Control

A key element of our strategy must be effective arms control. If properly addressed, arms reductions have the potential for enhancing our security and fostering greater stability at lower levels of forces. We must be sure, however, that we pursue arms control as a means to enhanced security, not as an end in itself.

Having made significant reductions in theater nuclear forces in the INF Treaty, we need to pause before pursuing further these negotiations on nuclear forces in Europe and turn our attention to redressing the conventional force imbalance. Conventional arms control may hold promise if Mr. Gorbachev means what he has said about willingness to accept deep asymmetrical cuts in conventional forces to reach equality between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. And equality -- that takes into account the asymmetries of the two alliances -- should be our goal. We should be wary of proposals that do not achieve that objective: small reductions, for example, would be largely symbolic and would have little effect on the military imbalance in Europe. Their pursuit would merely divert our negotiators from what we should seek: common ceilings in the weapons systems that cause us the most concern-- tanks, artillery, and possibly, infantry fighting vehicles. Now is the time to find out whether Mr. Gorbachev is serious or not. An agreement that achieves conventional parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be a major step forward in achieving greater security for the West.

Maintain Readiness and Sustainability of Our Forces

While we seek to modernize our forces to cope with the challenges of the future, our other principal task is to make the most of the forces we have today by achieving the highest possible standards for manning, equipping, training, maintaining, sustaining, and reinforcing. In particular, we should not degrade the readiness and sustainability of the forces that occupy forward defensive positions and might have to fight heavily outnumbered against the attacking echelon of the Warsaw Pact.

With your support, the readiness and sustainability programs that were jointly prepared by the Services and CINCs will enable U.S. forces to maintain marginally acceptable levels of support. I would prefer higher levels. We have made some substantial progress in recent years. We have increased the fill of our POMCUS stocks. We have received funds -- with this committee's support -- for essential upgrades to better manage our prepositioned equipment and the reception and onward movement of U.S. reinforcements. And we have drawn closer to delivery of the C-17 transport aircraft. Our preparedness for the reinforcement of Europe has improved substantially as well, largely due to recent increases in the levels of Wartime Host Nation Support to be provided by our allies and the recent Collocated Operating Base (COB) agreements that will make European airfields available to U.S. reinforcing air units during wartime -- and thereby greatly reduce the number of aircraft at any one base.

We remain, however, unable to meet fully our reinforcement commitment to NATO. This is the result of continuing shortages in a number of interrelated areas: support unit readiness and availability; POMCUS fill; strategic lift; theater war reserve stocks of preferred munitions, equipment, spare parts, and medical supplies; availability of warehousing to support prepositioning and other theater storage programs; and host nation support. Each of these items must be addressed. Because they are so closely related, efforts to make improvements in one area often yield true dividends only if accompanied by progress in others. Increases in our POMCUS stocks, for example, must be accompanied by increases in warehouse space necessary to store those stocks. On the other hand, greater POMCUS fill can decrease our need for strategic lift that would otherwise be needed to carry equipment from the United States. In short, we must be continuously alert to the interrelationships among these capabilities as we work to improve the overall posture.

I hope Congress will preserve the progress made during the past few years of emphasis on readiness and sustainability programs. Warsaw Pact forces deployed against the Central Region of NATO have sixty to ninety days of operational spares and supplies deployed. Our own stocks in Europe do not compare. Serious shortages remain in certain ground-to-air munitions, high technology surface-to-surface rounds, and anti-radiation missiles, and in the readiness of support forces. They are compounded by continuing shortfalls in the areas of strategic sea and air lift. Thus it is crucial that we improve upon our existing levels of readiness and sustainability.

Enhance Cooperation among Allies

Our efforts to improve the deterrent posture of NATO will require cooperation among the members of the Alliance. There has been progress in this regard. We have been greatly assisted by new Allied agreements to provide for reception, onward movement, and other logistical support that will be needed by deploying U.S. forces. We have made progress also in obtaining host nation assistance. We are now in the implementation phase of a program through which 93,000 West German reservists are dedicated to accomplishing U.S. support requirements.

The 1984 decision by NATO to double the size of the common-funded infrastructure program to over $10 billion for the period 1985-1990 also has been a step forward. This increase is providing urgently needed facilities, including hardened shelters at reinforcement airfields, theater reserve storage warehouses, ammunition storage facilities, and upgrading of airfields and naval bases. The commitment by NATO's Defense Ministers to raise the level of ammunition stocks should also improve readiness in coming years, and Alliance acceptance of the long term planning guidance for Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA) is a promising development The procurement by several NATO nations of the Tornado and the multiple launch rocket system, and the purchase of components to provide links to America's Battlefield Intelligence Collection and Evaluation System (BICES), Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS), and TR-1 high altitude reconnaissance aircraft will help to locate, target, and strike with conventional weapons the operational maneuver groups, reinforcing echelons, and reserves of the Warsaw Pact before they can reach our defensive positions. Finally, NATO nations are pursuing a number of cooperative efforts encouraged by the Nunn-Warner Amendment, including the NATO frigate replacement program, the anti-tactical missile system, a family of surface-to-air missiles, and a variety of improved anti-armor systems.

Maintain U.S. Leadership

It is in the interest of the United States to continue to provide the same strong leadership within NATO that has helped keep the peace in Western Europe for nearly four decades. Measures such as a unilateral reduction of American troops will be viewed by our Allies either as reflecting a U.S. view that the Soviet military threat is reduced (which is not the case), or as indicating reduced American interest in Europe. Neither of these messages would contribute to U.S. objectives. Beyond that, a unilateral withdrawal would sap Alliance resolve and undermine efforts to achieve negotiated reductions in Soviet conventional forces. The most visible U.S. commitment to the collective defense of Europe remains the 326,000 American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines standing shoulder to shoulder with their NATO counterparts. Their presence will be even more important as the Pershings and cruise missiles are withdrawn and as we embark on a new round of conventional arms talks.

CONCLUSION

The challenge facing NATO after an INF Treaty is the same as it has been for almost 40 years: 'How do we maintain effective deterrence at an affordable cost?' We cannot accept any answer to this question that increases the risk to Western security and reduce our commitments to Allies and friends. American forces are deployed in Europe because it is in the U.S. national interest to do so. Those forces must be maintained and supported in a manner that allows them to face with confidence the Warsaw Pact forces deployed on the borders of NATO.

There are no easy solutions for the challenges we and our European Allies face in deterring Soviet aggression and intimidation in Europe. I am confident, however, that our strategic approach, so successful in the past, remains correct. Our collective challenge is to ensure that the Alliance has sufficient military capabilities to carry out NATO strategy. In order to accomplish this task most effectively we need to maximize our comparative advantages in technology to negate Soviet numerical advantages.

We cannot hope that the competition between East and West will go away; what we need to do is ensure it does not become war. If Allied Command Europe ever has to fight in defense of the West it will be ready, but my primary mission is deterrence of war. The strength of NATO's military forces and the unity of the Alliance will remain the basic and indispensable ingredients to future security and peace with freedom in the West.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, General.

I have several questions, and we will rotate around between the Senators here on a 6-minute basis, as is our normal custom.

General Galvin, your predecessor, General Rogers, testified yesterday and had several comments. One comment struck me particularly. He was under the impression that there was something in this INF Treaty that would preclude the development of an air to ground standoff missile within the ranges of the INF Treaty, that is roughly 300 miles to 3,300 miles.

Have you heard that or do you know anything in this treaty or any understanding outside the treaty that in any way impedes the development or use of an air to ground type of standoff missile?

General GALVIN. I know of nothing in the treaty that says that. I have read the treaty. I do not consider myself an expert, and I think you always have to go to the true experts. But I read the treaty and I find nothing in there like that.

The treaty says ground-launched missiles from 300 to 3,300 miles in range, or 500 to 5,500 kilometers. It does not say anything about air-launched missiles, it does not say anything about sea-launched missiles.

Chairman NUNN. So your understanding of both the treaty and in any conversation, you have not heard anyone say or suggest that there is any kind of backdoor agreement or implicit understanding or secret codicil or anything of that nature whatsoever that would preclude the development of a standoff air-launched missile in that range?

General GALVIN. No, sir. I think it is really important for us to know precisely what is in the treaty, because there is a lot of pressure to say that, because we have an INF Treaty in some generalized way, that means that we stop all modernization, that we stop doing a lot of things.

What we stop doing is having on either side any ground-launched missiles in the range from 300 to 3,300 miles. And there, of course, we are talking primarily about nuclear capabilities.

Chairman NUNN. I notice in your testimony on page 11 that you talk about nuclear modernization and you say: "Foremost among them is the development of a standoff air to ground nuclear missile." You are saying that is right at the top of your list.

General GALVIN. Right at the top of my list.

Chairman NUNN. And that is the case whether or not we have INF, is that right?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. General Rogers also said that using strategic weapons for theater purposes was inappropriate. He argued that SACEUR's submarine launched ballistic missiles are tethered to the release of the rest of the U.S. strategic forces.

Moreover, not knowing whether SACEUR's submarine launched ballistic missiles were being used for strategic or theater purposes, the Soviet Union might respond with its own strategic forces.

How do you respond to that position?

General GALVIN. Within the strategy of forward defense, flexible response—that's MC14/3—there is a requirement for the use of nuclear weapons to stop an overwhelming war, whether it be conventional or nuclear, against us. And that requirement shows different phases in the use of nuclear weapons.

And obviously, these proceed from the initial use up to other uses. In the initial use, it would be awkward to consider a strategic weapon for use as a theater weapon. The advantage of a theater nuclear weapon, if it ever came to use in war, is that it very clearly shows that it is a theater decision, not simply a United States decision, that it would involve all the nations in NATO, and that it would be launched from the mass of the nations of NATO in Europe.

That is very important, to make that distinction between a theater weapon within the NATO Triad of weapons, strategic nuclear, theater nuclear and conventional weapons. There is a very important place for the theater nuclear weapon, and I think that that may be what he was touching upon.

Chairman NUNN. What do you believe, General Galvin, is the priority in terms of NATO's nuclear modernization? How would you list the priorities in the order which you would assign to them?

General GALVIN. I would list them, the tactical air-to-surface missile, the follow-on——

Chairman NUNN. What approximate range are you talking about there?

General GALVIN. I would like to see a tactical—we have right now a tactical air-to-surface missile, but it is carried on a heavy bomber, it is not carried on a fighter. So a follow-on to that missile would be one that could be carried by a fighter which could penetrate air defenses if necessary.

That extends the range of that fighter. I would like to see it extended as much as possible, obviously.

Chairman NUNN. Excuse me. I interrupted you on your priority listing.

General GALVIN. The tactical air-to-surface missile is the first. The follow-on to Lance would be the second. Some kind of a ground-launched nuclear capable missile, because if I do not have that and all I have is the tactical air-to-surface missile, that means the airfields can be targeted, the aircraft can be targeted, the air defenses on the Soviet side can be built up, and we would not have a good deterrent. So therefore, the follow-on to Lance is also right up there at the top.

After that, the modernization of artillery. We need to look at lifting the congressional limit on the number of modernized nuclear artillery rounds.

Also with the surface-to-surface missile, that is the Lance, which would fall outside the treaty, under the 500 kilometer or 300 mile limit, under that limit we need to look at whether or not that can be incorporated into the Multiple Launch Rocket System, using the Army Tactical Missile System, ATACMS, A-T-A-C-M-S, which is an extended range surface-to-surface missile.

After that we need to look at the modernization of our artillery rounds and the air-delivered bombs. Those are at the top of my list.

Chairman NUNN. I believe my time has expired. I would assume by that answer, though, that you would like to get the longer range missiles. That would be right at the top of your list, the longer range. Within the overall legal ability of us to implement those longer range missiles like the Lance and the standoff, that would come first?

General GALVIN. Yes. The range of the tactical air-to-surface missile would not be limited by the treaty because it would be air-to-surface, not surface-to-surface. But the surface-to-surface would be limited to 500 kilometers, and I would like to get as close to that as I can.

Chairman NUNN. So there is no limit on the air. There would be a limit on the ground?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. I agree. Thank you.

I believe next under the early bird rule is Senator Humphrey.

Senator HUMPHREY. Not that I am an early bird. It is just that the other birds were late.

Chairman NUNN. Everything is relative in this body.

Senator HUMPHREY. Amen.

General Galvin, good morning and welcome.

General GALVIN. Thank you, sir.

Senator HUMPHREY. Were you consulted prior to the signing of this INF Treaty?

General GALVIN. No, sir, I was not in this position during most of the INF Treaty negotiations. I did brief President Reagan and some members of the Cabinet, in August about my views after I had arrived on the new job in June.

Senator HUMPHREY. Can you tell us how you advised? Did you say you briefed the President? Whom did you brief?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir, I briefed the President.

Senator HUMPHREY. Can you tell us how you advised the President?

General GALVIN. Yes, I can say basically that I indicated that, if the INF Treaty as I saw it then coming into being continued in that manner—in other words, if the details of the treaty remained as they were—I could still do the mission of deterrence and defense assigned me in Europe as the SACEUR and as the CINCEUR.

Senator THURMOND. Excuse me, General. Would you speak a little louder. The acoustics are terrible in this room.

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

In that briefing I said that if the treaty were ratified, I could still carry out my mission of deterrence and defense.

Senator HUMPHREY. Now, you said something a moment ago, I think in response to Senator Nunn's questions, about the need for a follow-on to Lance. You asked that this proscription on the development of a nuclear warhead be eliminated, for example.

Supposing there is no follow-on to Lance. Then what?

General GALVIN. Then I will have to relook again at my capabilities to carry out the mission and decide whether or not in the mix that I have of the theater nuclear force, the theater conventional force, and obviously the strategic backup, whether or not I still can carry out the mission of deterrence and defense.

Senator HUMPHREY. What level of confidence would you have in our deterrence absence a follow-on to Lance?

General GALVIN. I do not know if I could describe the precise level of confidence. I wou%T have to look very hard at that. If I ever reached a level of confidence that was not adequate, then my next step would be to relook at the strategy and see whether or not a change in strategy were necessary.

I do not think that you can tie a strategy to one particular weapons system. There is a mix involved there, and there may be other ways to achieve your strategy within that mix.

So, answering your question more precisely, if we do not get the follow-on to Lance we will have to look at other ways to carry out the mission.

Senator HUMPHREY. Well, this is your chance, really, to help pave the way or at least improve the chances of getting what you think you are going to need. So I hope you will not be too terribly diplomatic here. This might well be your last chance.

This treaty is more than likely going to be ratified, and it is important that we get advice about what is needed in the way of follow-on equipment to make up for the loss of these INF weapons.

I mean, it is a material and substantial loss, is it not, to you and your responsibilities to lose Pershing II and the ground launched cruise missiles, is it not?

General GALVIN. It is, and the loss of the Lance would mean that I would not have a surface-to-surface missile capability in the lower ranges which would still be permitted by the treaty, and therefore I would have to substitute for that with aircraft.

And the more that I substitute with aircraft, the more the aircraft become targets. The aircraft are always going to be on a limited number of bases, and that number can be easily targeted.

The Soviet Union can put more effort and more priority into air defense, and when they do that penetration is going to be more costly to us to get in to where we would have to go with those aircraft, and we will lose more of them.

So what I need is the flexibility of the mix. I need that versatility. I need to be able to threaten a response that deters war by saying, we have missiles, we have artillery, we have these aircraft, and we have other things.

Now, each one of those that gets removed means that there is one less opportunity, there is a little bit less flexibility, until you finally would come to the point somewhere along the line at which you would have to say the strategy that we have of flexible response and forward defense just will not work under this situation of resourcing that we have for that strategy.

Senator HUMPHREY. With respect to our losing the ability to strike Soviet soil at a level lower than strategic weapons, with respect to the loss of that ability, some have suggested that we might put air launched cruise missiles on B-52's as a way of making up for that defect, that gap in our flexible response.

Where might we base B-52's that would be close enough to be of practical use?

General GALVIN. Well, B-52's—remember also, and I am sure you do, that if we were at the stage in a war in which we would have to use B-52's, I would assume we would be at least 2 weeks into the war. So it might be better to have B-52's stationed back in the United States where they are not involved for that first 2 weeks, where they are not under as much of a threat.

So since the B-52's range with refueling is tremendous, really the basing is only one consideration and perhaps not as important as it is for a fighter.

Senator HUMPHREY. What about basing of fighters?

Chairman NUNN. Senator Humphrey, your time has expired.

We probably ought to let that be the last question on this round.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you.

What about—some have suggested, again as a way of making up for that gap, hanging a cruise missile, nuclear-armed cruise missile—I will tell you what. I will wait my turn on this.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Humphrey.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.

General Galvin, yesterday when General Rogers was testifying, he listed the various nuclear weaponry that was available to the NATO forces. He mentioned the depth charges, the artillery, the dual capable planes, the F-111's.

He stated that the depth charges are of little value, the artillery was limited in its range, the dual capable aircraft could only penetrate maybe 150, 200 miles, the F-111's were going to face increasing antiaircraft capability. And therefore he suggested that there were important targets that the INF forces were able to reach which would be less vulnerable with the post-INF NATO capability.

I think he was more harsh than that in his use of words, but his point was that the Warsaw Pact would be a good deal less vulnerable, unless we were prepared to use strategic weapons, and that this changed the whole mix in terms of our nuclear deterrent in Western Europe. He had many other things to say about the ability of the Europeans and other factors.

How do you respond to the suggestion that there are going to be important targets in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. that are vulnerable today that will not be vulnerable to any forces within NATO when the treaty is completed?

General GALVIN. There is no doubt, Senator, that we have taken some important weapons out with Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missile. But at the same time, so have the Soviets with the SS-20, SS-4, SS-12, SS-22, SS-23, and so forth.

What the question really is, I think, can we still carry out the mission, based on the weapons that we have left. That is the most important question to me. I think we still can.

Obviously, there are a lot of things that are classified, but anybody can take a string and tack and put the tack in the map where the aircraft have to leave from and take a string which is the range and see where the aircraft can go. And we can strike the targets that we need to strike. Maybe we cannot strike as many as before, but neither can the Soviets.

Senator KENNEDY. How do you respond to the suggestion that, with the removal of these 400-odd missiles that build up to over 500 if the dual-track decision were fully implemented, that we are really changing the doctrine of flexible response back to massive retaliation?

You talk about the flexible response doctrine in your opening statement as your first point. You have commented that you still believe that you will have a strong deterrent and can complete your mission.

But could you develop that a little bit? Because I think in listening to General Rogers one would have to gather that at least he believes that if this treaty goes forward, there will be a rather dramatic change in terms of policy, that we are reverting back to a policy of massive retaliation, effectively abandoning flexible responses.

I think General Rogers testified about the time that NATO might be able to hold out. Specifically he said: ". . . SACEUR would be required to request the release of nuclear weapons in less than 2 weeks after the Pact attacked." But would you develop your own thoughts in that area more completely? Do you think that the concept of flexible responses will be alive and well if this treaty is implemented?

General GALVIN. I think the concept of flexible response would be alive and well. It depends on the NATO Triad that is still there, and that is strategic nuclear weapons, theater nuclear weapons, and conventional forces. We have not taken those away.

We have taken some of the theater nuclear weapons out and we have had the occasion of seeing the other side take out quite a great number of weapons.

I think we also need to look forward to these conventional arms reductions, and if we can get down to some kind of parity there that will be important. I think we also should look forward to some of this effort with the strategic weapons.

But the strategy was never dependent on the number of weapons. It was dependent on the mix of weapons as you looked at the other side to see what they had also. And this is always true. We always have to take the adversary into account.

Sometimes we forget that the adversary has taken a step back here too. So I think the strategy is viable, and I think if we move forward with more arms reductions, which I believe should be a part of our strategy, that it will remain viable.

Senator KENNEDY. How do you react to the point that the Soviets are able to retarget their SS-24's and SS-25's based in the Soviet Union against the targets previously assigned to their SS-20's, and therefore what might be perceived as some marginal gain by the West in terms of less vulnerable ports, depots and prepositioned material areas, is effectively washed away because the Soviets can retarget these other weapons?

General GALVIN. I believe that the Soviets will take a careful look at the treaty and they will say, what is not permitted by the treaty, and that will be out. I do not expect, although one never knows, but I do not expect that we will see the Soviets doing something that is prohibited.

But what is not prohibited is the strategic weapons and the weapons under 500 kilometers. So the Soviets will readjust as best they can to take up targets that were lost when they had to take out the SS-20 and the others.

When they do that, of course, they will lose some flexibility. They will have to retarget some of these strategic weapons away from Asia, where they had them, and move them into the Western Military District. None of that would be in violation of the treaty.

What it does is it cuts down their flexibility. But if we are concerned about this retargeting, then we have to take that up in START.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

My time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Next is Senator McCain.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Galvin, for being here today. I appreciate your testimony.

You know, it is obviously not an accident that you follow General Rogers' testimony. I notice that there is a great deal of similarities in both of your testimony, particularly on the issue of the conventional imbalance that exists. I think your assessments, from my reading of both your statements, are very similar.

Yet you reach different conclusions. General Rogers, if I understand it, is deeply concerned about ratification of the INF for various reasons, including the imbalance in conventional forces. You, on the other hand, not only acknowledge but state, very succinctly, that there is an enormous problem, and that you are concerned about further treaties without correcting that imbalance.

Is that correct?

General GALVIN. I do not know how much difference there is between myself and General Rogers. I have never heard General Rogers say he could not do the mission if we had the INF Treaty. I, however, would not want to put any words in his mouth.

I will simply say that the INF Treaty, if ratified, will still allow me to carry out my mission. I am not saying that I am delighted that we have less resources than we had before, but I can understand that a little more clearly when I look at the loss that the Soviet Union takes.

The real question is, given the treaty, can we still feel that we have a deterrent capability and a defensive capability that is adequate. And I say yes. I do not know what General Rogers has said, sir, on that.

Senator McCAIN. Is it also relevant then to ask you, if you say you can still carry out your mission, you can carry out that mission more easily or less easily if the INF Treaty is ratified?

General GALVIN. There are some ways in which the mission will be easier. One of those ways has to do with not the deterrent part, but the war-fighting part, and that is that since I do not have all those SS-20's on my back any more and the SS-12's and SS-22's, the SS-23's, since I do not have those things that are going to interrupt my capability to reinforce, to get into the port systems, to move my logistics, to maneuver and do some other things, that is an advantage.

That I do not have the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missile, that is a disadvantage. And I have to weigh all those things again.

To my view of this, right now that comes out about even and I still can do the mission. I think that there are some risks that are involved here. Specifically, the risks are that you get some euphoria out of this, that you would then not want to modernize. I am talking about the NATO nations as a whole.

The second thing is that somebody would say, let us take out all the nuclear weapons out of Europe. And the third thing is that you might get really a loss of cohesion, of a feeling of unity, of a fighting will there in the countries.

But those risks are really aside from the question of the treaty itself. Modernization would have to take place anyway.

The theater nuclear force would have to stay anyway, and you would have to have fighting will anyway.

Senator McCAIN. General, in General Rogers' statement he recommends that the United States should "retain leverage on the Soviets by linking any START agreement to a satisfactory agreement on conventional forces."

Do you agree with that?

General GALVIN. No, sir. I think that any agreement we make in START, in conventional, or in theater nuclear ought to be an agreement separate in itself. Yes, we have to take into consideration those other things and lots of other things besides that, but I feel that if we start linking these things together we are simply going to have a very complex situation made even more complex and more difficult to resolve with any agreement.

Senator McCAIN. Then are you saying that without any progress as far as addressing the conventional imbalance is concerned, you could still support a START Treaty?

General GALVIN. That is correct.

Senator McCAIN. Could you summarize your impressions of the changes the U.S.S.R. has made in its forces in Europe since 1984, largely as a result of the thinking of Marshall Ogarkov, and state how they are affecting the balance?

General GALVIN. I think that Marshall Ogarkov's thinking has been offensive in nature. That is, aiming, always at a long range, fast moving, high level offensive operation, which he would call in the defense of the Soviet Union. In order to accomplish that, he has continued to push for modernization, and there has been a steeper curve of modernization of essential fighting equipment in the Soviet Union in the past 5 years than there was in the 5 years before that.

I am talking about submarines, aircraft, ground maneuver capability such as tanks and artillery.

Senator McCAIN. What is your view of the conventional imbalance as far as trends are concerned? One of the issues that was raised earlier is that we may not give enough attention to both qualitative factors and trends.

I would like to know your view of the trend in force modernization is concerned on both sides and as to its impact on the conventional imbalance. In other words, is it becoming a larger imbalance over time, or do you feel that the NATO forces are closing that conventional balance gap?

General GALVIN. It is becoming a somewhat more unfavorable balance to us over the last few years. The reason for that is that the Soviet Union has moved toward a higher technology level in a number of their production capabilities.

I am talking about aircraft, communications, and other things.

Senator McCAIN. My time is up.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Glenn.

Senator **Glenn**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, we had testimony a few days ago here from our recent NATO Ambassador, Mr. Abshire, and his testimony was very disturbing to me because he basically said that we are not making the proper use of our conventional forces in Europe.

CSIS has done quite a study. I am sure he has talked to you about this—he said he had talked to all the NATO commanders in Europe.

The points he made were that we are maldeployed, particularly on the northern front, and that our readiness is down and our sustainability is way down.

Do you concur with that assessment and what should we do about it? He made quite a convincing case for this, with a lot of charts.

And it was almost to the point where he would lead us to believe that it is almost an invitation to the Soviets to attack. In the very area where he says we are maldeployed and not ready and do not have sustainability, that is where the Soviets and the Pact nations are increasing their strength the most.

What would be your response to that?

General **Galvin**. We have always had a certain amount of maldeployment in Europe, because after World War II, as you know, the forces tended to stop where the war ended. The United States was in the south and not in the north, and the North German plain was judged to be the major avenue of approach. The North German plain is the major avenue of approach. It continues to be.

But there are some others also, such as the Fulda Gap and the Hof Gap and the gaps down in the Nuremberg area. What we have there now is eight corps of two or three divisions apiece. Eight corps from left to right, they are lined up.

It is true that the two American corps, 5th and 7th, are in the center south. But there are three German corps in there now that were not there in the beginning. So if you look at the beginning maldeployment and look at it now, the maldeployment is much less.

We have a German corps in the north, one in the center, and one in the south. You have a very strong British corps in the north. So there is a combination of British and German up there.

And in view of the continuing maldeployment, we have moved a U.S. brigade to the north, to Osterholz-Scharmbeck by Bremen. And this year in Reforger we exercised the 3d U.S. Corps coming from Fort Hood all the way over, not to the south but to the north.

Senator **Glenn**. Are our allies in place there or are those hollow assignments right now?

General **Galvin**. The allies are in place to a degree. I would like to see them be in place more. I would also like to see the American reinforcement be a lot better than it is.

We are supposed to have 10 divisions in 10 days. But we have made a number of corrections in the maldeployment. At the present time, we do have in the north the countries that are also in the north—that is Belgium, Holland, the United Kingdom, and

Germany—in the reinforcement of the northern side. That shortens the routes.

As you said, there is a problem, and as Abshire brought out. There is a continuing problem of maldeployment. It is not as bad as it was before. We have taken quite a few corrective actions to it.

I still feel that if something happened in the North German plain we could respond to it in a way that would be appropriate.

Now, your other part of the question, though, on sustainment, we do have sustainment problems. We have them in the United States. The sustainment of the force that the United States has planned to put there is not complete and not close to complete.

Nor is that true of the other forces. Some of them, however, their capability to bring forward things like ammunition and repair parts and other things is a lot better than ours, because they do not have 3,000 miles of ocean in there.

So there are sustainability problems, it is true, and there are some maldeployment problems. But they are not as bad as the Abshire report makes it out to be, and that is what I told him.

Senator **Glenn**. How fast are we correcting this? It seems to me that is vital, because it is almost an invitation to attack before we address the maldeployment problem.

And it means we would have to cross the nuclear threshold earlier rather than later in any potential conflict.

General **Galvin**. Under the new JCS reform, of course, I have had a lot more to say about that than I think the CINC would have had in years gone by. I have gone to the Defense Resources Board 3 years in a row and, especially in this last year, have pushed that particular question that you just brought up, Senator.

I would say that if we got the buy out of the POM, that is the 1988 to 1992 budget, I would be in much, much better shape by the time 1992 rolled around than I am right now, because I think the services have taken into account the need to get better.

Senator **Glenn**. It is not just us. It is our allies that have to be on the line there, too. We cannot do the whole job for them. Apparently they have been even more laggard than we have been in some respects.

Another area. General Rogers pretty much downrated our capability with regard to aircraft.

But what will fill in this gap? I thought General Rogers was a little too pessmistic on that.

For instance, we have several nuclear capable aircraft. We have the F-16, F-15, F-18, F-111, all with ranges that go out well beyond what you said you would like to see.

Almost all these aircraft can get out somewhere the 400- to 500-mile range, and the F-111 of course goes way beyond that. So is that not a pretty good fill-in, in addition to taking the SLBM's, to be reassigned to theater targets, instead of looking at them always for their longer range strategic purpose?

So we have the aircraft, and I think they have a capability well beyond what you said that you would like to have as the minimum if I understood you correctly.

General **Galvin**. I did not say that exactly, Senator. What I said was that the tactical air-to-surface missile that would be hung on that aircraft should have that range.

Senator GLENN. OK, fine. I do not disagree with that.

But we have the aircraft capable of going in. Now, you have to give us the capability of penetrating Soviet defenses with some of those aircraft.

My time is up. If you could please comment.

General GALVIN. The tactical air-to-surface missile that is on that aircraft, first of all, increases the capability of the aircraft to stand off if necessary and let the missile go in by itself.

But it also, obviously, increases the range of the aircraft at full radius. And so I am concerned with both of those things. And yes, the aircraft do have a great capability.

The problem is you need a mix because the aircraft become vulnerable if they are the only thing you have got.

Senator GLENN. Standoff then, that adds to the additional range of the 400 to 500 I am talking about on all those aircraft. So it seems to me we are pretty well covered.

General GALVIN. It is not a range of 400 to 500 on the aircraft, Senator. It is a longer range than that, as you know.

But it is true that it increases the range of the aircraft. The range of some aircraft could be well over 1,000 kilometers and the missile would increase that.

Senator GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Glenn.

Next is Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I am glad to see you again and I hope you and your family are well.

General Galvin, we received testimony concerning the dual track decision that would lead us to believe that the deployment track was of paramount importance, as opposed to the negotiating track. Would you agree with this assessment?

General GALVIN. I think the dual track approach worked because we did a deployment and a negotiation at the same time. I do not know which one was most important.

Senator THURMOND. General Galvin, we also received testimony from General Rogers, and he felt that the sea-based deterrent assigned to you is not credible in the minds of the Soviets because the Soviets could not discriminate whether or not the warheads were being deployed as theater or strategic assets.

Do you agree with that statement?

General GALVIN. To some degree I do. I think that the strategic weapons, the sea-based weapons, are not the same as a weapon that is actually physically in theater in Europe. It would be quite simple for the Soviets to tell whether a weapon came from in the theater, but it would be more difficult for the Soviets to discriminate whether the weapon came from in the theater in Europe and this was a concerted effort by all the NATO nations or whether it came as a strategic weapon if you were out at sea with them.

Senator THURMOND. General Galvin, can NATO determine whether or not Soviet strategic assets are targeted against NATO or the United States during launch or in flight?

General GALVIN. I am not sure of how that is determined on the launch of a missile, a strategic missile from the Soviet Union. I am not sure how that is determined, whether it is going to go to Europe or whether it is going to go to the United States.

Senator THURMOND. General Galvin, the fact that the Soviets have a predominance in conventional weapons has disturbed a great many people. According to the figures I saw, I believe they have about a 3 or 5 to 1 advantage, the Warsaw Pact over NATO.

Now, if this treaty is signed, I mean is approved by the Congress, do you have any concerns along that line?

General GALVIN. I am concerned with the imbalance that exists in the faceoff between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. I am concerned whether the treaty is signed or not. I think that we ought to try to redress that imbalance by going toward conventional force reduction talks and try to get the Soviets to make, as they have in this case with the INF, to make an asymmetrical reduction down to some kind of parity with us.

Senator THURMOND. You do feel the importance to try to get some agreement on reduction on the part of the Soviets, so that we can be more on an equality with the Soviets in conventional weapons?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir. But I do not think we ought to tie that to the INF Treaty. I think we ought to take that separately.

And it looks to me as if the Soviets are increasingly more willing to take up that question of conventional force reductions.

Senator THURMOND. General Galvin, if this treaty is approved, as commander over there—you are the commander, of course, of SACEUR and CINCEUR both—what concerns do you have or what do you feel that the United States should do in order to protect itself and the free world?

General GALVIN. I think the United States should continue along with the other nations of NATO to modernize the conventional and nuclear forces, as they agreed to do at Montebello in 1983, at Luxembourg in 1985 and at Monterey in 1987. But they have been talking about that modernization since 1978.

Some of that modernization is done and the rest of it needs to be done.

I think that the United States should hold fast on the question of any further theater nuclear reductions, at least until we have looked at START and looked at conventional reductions. And I think that we ought to continue our leadership of the alliance and continue to support the cohesiveness of the alliance.

Senator THURMOND. A great many people in this country feel that Europe is not bearing its proper share. I wonder how you feel and what you would recommend along that line.

General GALVIN. There is no doubt at all that the European countries do not contribute the same percentage of the gross national product of their countries to defense.

Once you get beyond that point, however, there are some considerations in here. One of those is that the European countries, for example, almost all of them except for the United Kingdom, do not have a volunteer force. They have a draft force which tends to cost less in the manpower area of the costing.

Another thing is that we over the past decades have been the producers of much of the military equipment that the other European countries have to buy. So that if an aircraft corporation here produces an aircraft and we buy it for defense, we also benefit from the fact that workers are hired to build it and people pay taxes and so forth and so on, whereas if another NATO country then has to buy an aircraft from us, they don't have that added benefit.

There is also the question of the amount of military expenditures which really apply to our ability to be a world power as well as our ability to be a NATO power.

Nevertheless, it is true that the countries of NATO do not spend on defense as large a percentage of GNP as we do.

If we look at the U.S. increases in defense spending from 1971 to 1987, it is less than 1 percent if you look at that whole thing. It looks pretty good if you look just at the 1980s. If you compare 1971 through 1985 with all the countries of NATO, U.S. defense budget growth was about 1 percent in real terms while NATO budgets on average increased nearly 2 percent.

So it is correct in some ways, and in some ways there are some mitigating circumstances, you might say.

Senator THURMOND. The last question, some people in this country feel that maybe we should withdraw some troops from Europe. What is your opinion on that?

General GALVIN. I think that it would be a bad mistake to withdraw troops from Europe, especially if we are looking forward to some kind of conventional arms reduction talks at this time.

I also think it would be a sign to other nations that we somehow thought the threat was lessened, and they would also remove troops from forward deployment.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

Senator Wirth.

Senator WIRTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Galvin, thank you very much not only for being here but for helping so many of us on the committee with your good wisdom and perspective.

You spent a good deal of time in your testimony talking about Soviet strategy and the fact that they are offensively organized compared to the way that we are organized.

Have you ever sat down with your Warsaw Pact or Soviet counterpart and explained to him your perception of how they configure their forces?

General GALVIN. No, I have never had the opportunity to do that.

Senator WIRTH. Are you precluded from doing that? Would you like to do that? Would that be a productive thing to do?

General GALVIN. I think that there was some initiative. I know that there was some initiative on the Soviet side or on the Warsaw Pact side to have a meeting of senior military commanders. My counterpart, for example, is Victor Kuilkov, who is the military head of the Warsaw Pact forces.

That sputtered out, however. It did not happen.

Senator WIRTH. Did we say you could not do that, or did we have a policy that it could not happen?

General GALVIN. It was before my time, and I am not completely familiar with the details. I think there might have been a feeling in NATO that they would be uncomfortable if the military people got together and talked.

Senator WIRTH. Would it be useful to have that kind of discussion of strategy and doctrine?

General GALVIN. I think it would be.

I would like to, for example, be able to talk to my counterpart, especially on the conventional side, and say you may have some things that worry you about our side but I definitely have some that worry me about your side in the size of some of your organizations and the way you seem to be oriented in an offensive manner. I would like to just sit down and talk to him about some of those concerns.

Senator WIRTH. It seems to me as we talk about conventional arms control, clearly one of the areas should be discussions of strategy and to see if we can at least get them to understand how we perceive their strategy and, perhaps, if in fact they are defensive as they claim, how they ought to be changing their strategy to meet the goal that they espouse.

General GALVIN. Yes. We have had some of that. Akhromeyev has visited the Pentagon and has talked with Adm. Bill Crowe.

I think that our Secretary of Defense and Minister of Defense Yazov may get together.

Senator WIRTH. I think that would be productive and useful.

Let me jump on, if I might. You note in your testimony on page 10, "We must not mistake words for deeds."

That raises the question of what deeds would be indicative of a change in behavior of the Soviet Union, and this again focuses particularly in the area of conventional armaments.

Second, how long do you think it would take the Soviets to exhibit enough deeds that, in fact, they were serious about conventional arms control?

General GALVIN. I think that General Secretary Gorbachev has got his hands full when it comes to trying to achieve something like that with the Soviet military.

It was a little easier for him to do that with the INF Treaty because the Soviet military has always relied far, far more heavily on the conventional side and, in fact, had hoped that the nuclear defense in Western Europe would go away.

Now, when it comes to getting into the question of ceasing production or slowing production on conventional equipment, when it comes to drawing back the forward deployment of stocks of ammunition and other supplies, when it comes to clearly changing the offensive orientation of the doctrine, when it comes to building pursuit and interceptor aircraft instead of long-range fighter bomber aircraft and heavy bombers, and when it comes to ceasing production of several different classes of submarines under construction at the same time and ceasing development of a fleet that is far more capable of expanded cruise effort than it was before, in the conventional side when some of those things start to happen, I would consider that to be significant in terms of change of direction.

Senator WIRTH. How long would it take, do you think, one, for us to come to a meaningful agreement with the Soviets on conventional arms control and, two, related to the question of how long would it take them to show a change in behavior, how long would it take to satisfy you that they were serious?

General GALVIN. Of course, on how long would it take to agree, when you have an adversary that is difficult to say, because he controls half of that time.

As to how long it would take if you had an agreement to see some change, I would say that could happen fairly soon, maybe 2 or 3 years. Their production effort extends out farther than ours. Ours is 5 years, and theirs is about 10 to 15 years; that is, the production planning, funding and budgeting.

You would be able to see a change in that, however, in obviously less than that cycle, maybe 2 or 3 years, maybe 4 years, somewhere in there.

Senator WIRTH. Maybe I am incorrect in this, but it seems to me that we may run a kind of a risk; that if we are asking the Soviet Union to downsize their armed forces and conventional capability and if, in fact, significant changes are going on in the Soviet Block, do we run the risk of discouraging those changes if we are dramatically increasing some of the capability that they might perceive as being offensive? Is there any kind of a danger in that?

I realize we have a difficult two-sided sword here, but where is that balance point? How do we define that?

General GALVIN. Well, we in the West think that the Warsaw Pact has several areas of capability that are much better than ours.

It may be that the Warsaw Pact feels that we have some areas of capability that are better than theirs, such as perhaps our use of computers, maybe our training levels or something else. We would have to talk that out.

The basic thing we need to do is have a reduction to parity. If that causes us to come down in some capabilities, then we would have to accept that.

Everything that I see means that, just as it was in the INF, it is the other side that would have to come down if we were going to try to get to parity. I think that the capabilities as well as the numbers would show that.

Senator WIRTH. Finally, can you comment very briefly on what we have learned from the inspections and observations coming out of the Stockholm Agreement and if, in fact, we ought to be building upon what we have learned from that?

General GALVIN. The Stockholm Agreement, which provides us the opportunity to get in and inspect even into the Soviet Union in terms of what kind of exercises are going on, what they are doing militarily in certain areas, has been very important to us.

I would say in general that we have found what we expected to find on those inspections, but even that is important to us.

The fact that we do have this kind of intercommunication going on with the possibility of a relatively big number of exchange inspections in any given year, and if you add into that, of course, the INF Treaty where I could be having 10 different teams inspecting at any given time and, of course, that would apply to them, too, I see that is basically an advantage for us, because with their closed society and our open society, anything that we do in terms of an inspection exchange is beneficial.

Senator **Wirth**. General, thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Wirth.

Senator Symms.

Senator **Symms**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General, for being here today and for your testimony.

You made an earlier statement that interested me with regard to another question, and that was on the plus side you did not have to worry about the SS-20s and other missiles having you targeted, and on the minus side you had to give up the Pershing IIs and the cruise missiles which are valuable deterrents to a Soviet Warsaw Pact attack.

Do you really believe that the same targets that are now targeted by SS-20s will not immediately be targeted by SS-25s as soon as the SS-20s go?

General **Galvin**. I think that the Soviets will take whatever they can do outside the treaty, including SS-25, SS-24 and the other strategic weapons, and they will retarget. Of course, they will have to take those off targets that they are already on. Then as they do that they may construct more weapons in order to retarget the ones that they have had to give up.

Senator **Symms**. Well, if in fact they continue to target the same areas that are critical targets now, what advantage will you have as a commander over the current situation?

General **Galvin**. I will not have a great advantage over that. I will have about the same disadvantage that the Soviets have.

The thing is we are talking about well less than 5 percent of the warhead inventory of either side, so in a treaty like that which is, as someone here said, probably good for the precedent it sets, you are not having a major change in overall capability if you want to move out into the strategic area and talk about retargeting. There is not a lot of change.

Senator **Symms**. General, you mentioned on page 12 of your testimony that Congress will have to lift the restrictions on the overall number of modernized artillery munitions and the use of army tactical missile system as a dual capable follow-on to Lance.

What kind of a priority would you give that in terms of your priorities as commander in Europe?

General **Galvin**. I would put that right at the top along with the tactical air-to-surface missile. I need a ground surface-to-surface missile within the 500 kilometer range that is allowed by the treaty in order to make sure that I do not have everything from our adversary targeted on those aircraft, which are the only other things that can go relatively deep.

Senator **Symms**. So in other words, it is of the utmost priority that Congress lift these restrictions and get on with the follow-on to the Lance?

General **Galvin**. Yes, it is.

Senator **Symms**. Thank you very much.

General, one other question. I saw you on the "Today Show" this morning, where you made a comment, if I understood you correctly, was something about we would have to get some kind of a conventional arms agreement.

How do we get a conventional arms agreement with the Soviets? What would be the incentive for the Soviets to sign a conventional arms agreement with us?

General **Galvin**. The same incentive that has led them toward the INF agreement.

If I am correct, what we have seen all along and I seem to see it, too, is that the Soviet Union is in big trouble in terms of its own economy and its ability to control that economy.

The conventional side is the most expensive side. It is more expensive than the nuclear side. It is more costly to buy that equipment and maintain it and train for it and so forth.

So that is the major incentive; that is, the Soviets need a pause while they get themselves straightened out economically and in terms of the management of the country, and they need the funds involved.

Senator **Symms**. So you believe that there is a possibility that just due to the economy, not necessarily from the position of strength that we are dealing from but just the economy, that they might be willing to lessen the imbalance of tanks and other conventional equipment?

General **Galvin**. I think that is the major thing. You are seeing this talk now about sufficiency rather than some kind of an overwhelming capability.

Even the Soviet military in some few cases has also taken up this phrase. That means to me that we are getting some signals that they are ready to talk about conventional reductions.

It could not be sheer altruism. It must be because the weight of the production of that conventional capability is hurting them.

Senator **Symms**. General, in terms of deterrence, which is what, of course, we have felt that NATO has been successful for the last 40 years, do you think that NATO would provide a better deterrence if the political statement from the NATO alliance was that if, in fact, the Warsaw Pact ever attacked that the war would not stop until we liberated all the countries over to the Soviet Union border and make that a doctrinal policy?

General **Galvin**. I do not think that policy would ever be possible in NATO. I think that the nations of NATO hang together on the question of mutual defense and not giving up one inch of their own territory and so forth, but that a NATO offensive strategy would not be palatable to most of the members of NATO.

Senator **Symms**. Well, only offensive insofar as if they were ever attacked but that the war would not end until Eastern Europe was reliberated.

General **Galvin**. I think that is a speculation that could be put in front of NATO. I personally think it would not work.

Senator **Symms**. In other words, you do not think the political backbone is in Europe to do that?

General **Galvin**. I do not think an offensive strategy would be possible in NATO.

Senator **Symms**. Or in this country, either, probably for that matter.

General **Galvin**. If you want to call it that. I do not think that the political approach in this country or in the NATO countries is one in which they would threaten something like that.

Senator SYMMS. As field commander, though, and from a deterrence standpoint, if the political backbone were in the United States and Western Europe and the NATO alliance, would that make your deterrence much stronger if that were the statement and the policy?

General GALVIN. It is possible that it would make it stronger. I would have to consider that speculation, because it also might have an effect on the other side, and I have not thought that through. Maybe the other side would feel so threatened that we would create an instability there. That is something I would have to think about.

Senator SYMMS. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

Now, I am talking about only in the event that we were attacked, but I thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Symms.

Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Galvin, I am a little troubled here by some of your statements. I was thinking about Ambassador Abshire's testimony the other day before this committee about the maldeployment of the troops in Europe which you have talked about. Perhaps some of them should be redeployed in different areas.

You are commander in chief of the forces there, are you not?

General GALVIN. I am.

Senator SHELBY. As commander in chief, will you have or do you have the authority to redeploy troops?

General GALVIN. I do have the authority once the fighting starts, and that is why I am not too worried about what is called the maldeployment.

I feel that I have the authority to change the current deployments anytime that I feel it is tactically necessary.

Senator SHELBY. Would that involve the movement of the Dutch and the Belgian troops from their homeland over to the North German plain or wherever you wanted to put them?

General GALVIN. In peacetime I do not have the authority to move Belgian and Dutch troops there, but in wartime I have the authority to change the configuration. If we are under attack, I can change it to whatever I want.

There is a certain amount of maldeployment, but when you look at the cost, for example, of redeploying and reconstructing garrison areas and so forth in order to, say, take the whole U.S. 7th Corps, which I used to command, and the 2d German Corp and move them north, compared to the cost of using the money to modernize the force, there is no question in my mind that we are moving in the right direction as it is now and that we should leave the maldeployment question alone.

It is not that significant, and that is what I would say to Ambassador Abshire about that.

Senator SHELBY. General, you have probably been asked this question before, and it has been asked of everybody but I would like to ask you the same question.

Why did the Soviet Union sign the INF Treaty? What advantages are there for them?

General GALVIN. First of all, the Soviet Union has long wanted to take all nuclear weapons out of Europe. Gorbachev's book, *Perestroika*, says that very clearly.

Second, the Soviet Union would like to destroy NATO as an alliance. Gorbachev's book says that also in the latter part of the book. In fact, I cannot understand why so many people think it is a super book, but I think those things are very true.

Also, the Soviet Union at this time finds itself in an enormously difficult economic environment and has fallen behind in its capability to manage the economy.

So for those reasons in some mix or other, the Soviet Union would like to make the first step in taking all nuclear weapons out of Europe. What we have to make sure is that the INF Treaty is ratified, but it is not that first step.

Senator SHELBY. General, is it going to be politically hard to keep the short-range missiles in Germany, given the political climate of Germany today? In other words, the third option is obviously a logical step politically, is it not?

General GALVIN. It is politically difficult for the Germans right now to support that question. Nevertheless, it is not politically impossible to support the question.

We are an alliance that has said if one nation is attacked, all the other nations will respond.

It is true that the Germans are the point man in this case because they geopolitically speaking, are on the front line; but just as with any point man, the point man also has the whole platoon behind them. We, the other 15 nations, are the rest of the platoon.

It is not true that the INF Treaty would mean that the Germans would be struck and nobody else would by nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom would be a gigantic aircraft carrier and would certainly be struck. I do not think that if we got into a strategic exchange that the United States would be free from being targeted in any sense.

So there are many considerations here that have to be looked at in the German question on the short-range weapons.

Senator SHELBY. On the German question, since we are already talking about it, I understand you to say or imply that the long-range goal of the Soviet Union was to weaken or break up NATO.

How do you do this? You take away Germany, do you not, from NATO? Then what do you have left?

General GALVIN. That would be a goal of the Soviet Union, yes.

Senator SHELBY. Is that an achievable goal, looking at Germany, looking at the breakup of Germany, looking at the political ideology that is moving toward neutrality in Germany?

I am not speaking of today. I am talking about 5 years, 10 years.

General GALVIN. I do not really think so. I think that we do have a new generation in Germany. There is no doubt about that. The last of the people who knew something about World War II and knew something about the Marshall plan are passing on now.

The important thing is to maintain the relationship that we have had with Germany over the last few decades, which has been an extraordinary relationship, beneficial to both sides, and I hope that in the alliance and outside the alliance we can continue to do that.

Senator SHELBY. Let us talk briefly about nuclear modernization in light of the INF Treaty, which is a done deal.

As NATO commander, what would you rank in the order of your priorities as far as the defense budget for such things as nuclear modernization versus airlift versus sealift versus sustainability versus conventional force modernization?

What would be your single highest priority?

General GALVIN. Nuclear modernization.

Senator SHELBY. Nuclear modernization?

General GALVIN. That is correct. To continue the plan that we have had since 1983 to bring in a tactical air-to-surface missile, a surface-to-surface missile that fits the treaty and modernized artillery rounds and other nuclear capability; not to increase the number of warheads in Europe but to modernize.

Senator SHELBY. Do you think that is possible, with both the political ramifications in this country, that is the budget constraints, and also in Europe?

General GALVIN. I believe it is possible. We have to look at priorities. Obviously, we cannot have everything because there will be budget constraints. But I do believe it is possible to get the nuclear modernization. I do not only think it is possible; I think it is essential to us to do that.

Senator SHELBY. When you are talking about nuclear modernization, you also have a political equation there, do you not? In Europe, I mean.

General GALVIN. Yes, we do, in Europe and in the United States.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Senator Quayle.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General Galvin, welcome. I just arrived. I have not had time to read or absorb your entire testimony, but I intend to do so.

Let me just ask a couple of general questions. I notice at the very beginning in just a quick reading that you start off a discussion on the doctrine of flexible response, which became operative in 1967 when we changed from massive retaliation to flexible response.

I asked Admiral Crowe and also General Rogers, who appeared before this committee as a part of these hearings, if they thought that the conventional balance, using 1967 as an important reference point, where we said that we were going to do more in conventional forces as we got away from massive retaliation, more to the flexible response strategy, if they thought that the conventional imbalance gap had grown or narrowed.

Both of them said that the gap had gotten wider, that the imbalance is greater today than it was in 1967. They went on to say it is not the fact that we have not done more, that we have done more. The point is that the Soviets have done more, considerably more.

My question is, Since 1967 when we adopted flexible response as a strategy, has the conventional imbalance gotten worse or gotten better?

General GALVIN. It has gotten somewhat worse, as the others said, because we have not been willing to make the sacrifices to quality of life that the Soviet Union has been willing to make in order to get an enormous buildup.

Also, the Soviets control their economy. They are now finding what a mistake some of that is. But because they control it, even though their economy is not as strong as ours, they are able to dedicate more of it to production of military equipment.

So that the imbalance has grown somewhat worse.

Senator QUAYLE. The balance has grown worse. And as we look to the trend lines, how do you see this balance changing? Do the trend lines, considering political factors, economic factors, military factors, do the trend lines look favorable, unfavorable, or rather status quo?

General GALVIN. There are some indications that the massive production is really hurting the Soviets, and there are some minor indications, that would be in a classified sense, that the Soviets may want to slow down in some particular areas.

But the Soviets still have the capability to keep on. I would think that unless we take advantage of what appears to be Soviet moves toward more arms talks, unless we can steer that into the conventional area, we will probably continue to have a trend line that, even if it slows down on the part of the Soviet Union, will still be a more steep curve than our own.

Senator QUAYLE. So in other words, as far as narrowing that gap and changing the trend that we have had in the past decade looking forward, you are placing a great deal of emphasis and importance on an arms control process for conventional arms? Am I reading you correctly?

General GALVIN. Yes, I think that arms reduction ought to be a real part of our strategy. If we cannot build up as much as they can, maybe we can build them down.

Senator QUAYLE. Let me ask you, what leverage do we have with the Soviet Union to really come to grips with the conventional arms imbalance? I mean, they have a conceded favorable ratio right now. They are certainly not going to do this out of the goodness of their hearts.

What leverage do we have with the Soviets to get them to come to the negotiation table and to really get serious about negotiating away the asymmetrical balance that they have in their favor right now?

General GALVIN. I do not think the leverage is by any means all on our side. In fact, most of it is leverage that comes from somewhere else in the Soviet Union. That is, this is really costing them, this production that they are doing in the conventional defense.

They have made tremendous sacrifices to get to the levels that they are at. There are some indications that because of the economic situation and the lack of management within the country, that Gorbachev and others are concerned with lowering that cost.

So a lot of motivation comes from inside. About the only motivation that comes from outside is that they probably do feel that we are more capable than they are in certain areas, such as in the aircraft area and maybe some others.

Senator QUAYLE. So we are really going to rely more for leverage on what happens internally, rather than what we can apply externally.

Let me go on to what we need to do now. You talked about modernization, something that is necessary, in response to Senator

Shelby's question. You talked about nuclear modernization as your highest priority.

I presume with that that you need to have flexibility in pursuing a follow-on to Lance perhaps an ATACMS?

General GALVIN. Yes.

Senator QUAYLE. The restrictive language, that has been adopted in the past is not helpful to what you consider to be the number one priority, is that correct?

General GALVIN. That is correct. I need to get that restrictive language lifted on the ATACMS which would be the surface-to-surface missile under 500 kilometers, because if that were not lifted and I needed that missile, which I do, then when we came in with that you would have two programs that looked almost alike.

You would have ATACMS, which is the conventional, and then another missile which is nuclear. And it would not make economic sense.

Senator QUAYLE. One quick question. My time is up. Are you familiar with the competitive strategies task force, and if so do you endorse some of their recommendations as to modernization programs?

General GALVIN. Yes, I do.

Senator EXON. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

General Galvin, it is always great to have you here. General, I understand from your testimony that you have looked at a whole host of factors that exist in the conventional structures in Europe. You have looked at your own material, you have looked at other assessments and reports, and you reached your conclusion that there is a conventional imbalance overall, a conclusion which I happen to share.

I do not think it is simple or simplistic as to where the imbalances are. I think we have some strengths we ought to build on and some weaknesses we ought to—Soviet weaknesses—that we ought to exploit.

And your testimony indicates, and it is testimony I happen to agree with, that the quantitative factors are important. The location of troops and forces are important, but there are other factors, too, which have to be considered to give any realistic assessment of the conventional balance.

Is that a fair statement?

General GALVIN. Yes, it is.

Senator LEVIN. I notice that in a number of areas, the quantitative area for instance, the deployment location area, you would say that the Soviets have an advantage. Your testimony indicated that.

In the sustainability area, I believe you indicated the Soviets have an advantage. I also notice that you indicated that in the readiness area you think our forces are more ready than the Soviets', is that correct?

General GALVIN. I do. But of course, as you know, that one is difficult, too, because I am not sure that you could apply that to the reserve components. You know, there is some lack of readiness in some of that.

Senator LEVIN. In the qualitative factors, as I read your testimony, you indicate that while we still maintain a lead, that lead is eroding essentially. Is that correct?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. So that you, like I, have looked at a whole host of factors, in essence, and you have reached your own conclusion, I presume, relative to each of those factors, and then an overall conclusion?

General GALVIN. That is right.

Senator LEVIN. How many factors would you say you have looked at. How many components would you estimate make up the overall balance? Are you able to say in your mind that there are 10 important ones, or 20 or 30 or whatever?

General GALVIN. We pared it down to about 30 that we are looking at, a matrix of what we call capability, such as mobilization, deployment, air space control, all things like that.

Senator LEVIN. Is your report completed?

General GALVIN. No, it is not, sir. We have been working on it 6 months. It is complete enough now where I can use it.

But what I am looking at is, as you know, there are many, many excursions that have to be taken off the report in order to satisfy questions of, well, what areas are we really talking about, what roles for the aircraft, for example, and a whole lot of other things like that.

Senator LEVIN. Do you share the conclusion of the International Institute for Strategic Studies that a Soviet invasion of Western Europe would be a risky venture for them, despite the imbalances that exist?

General GALVIN. I think that the Soviets feel that an invasion of Western Europe would be risky to them, and that is why we have had deterrence all along. But I do not think it is entirely on the basis of the conventional balance.

I think that if we did not have the nuclear weapons in Europe they would be much, much more confident about being able to make a quick push through to the Rhine or maybe beyond.

Senator LEVIN. Just given what you know or believe about the balance and Soviet objectives, do you think that your Soviet counterpart could be highly confident—I use the word, highly confident—that he could achieve his military objective in a purely conventional conflict?

Would he have a high degree of confidence, some degree of confidence? How would you assess that?

General GALVIN. I would say he would have some degree of confidence, but not a high degree of confidence. I think that there are too many imponderables in there for him, things he cannot really know.

Senator LEVIN. What about your confidence—well, let me ask you about the trend line. I think Senator Quayle asked you about trend lines. I believe he said since 1967. Have the trend lines also worsened for us in your view since 1980?

General GALVIN. Yes, they have. There has been increased Soviet production, especially in the last 5 or 6 years, and it has caused the curve to go up more sharply.

Senator LEVIN. General, I mentioned my report, and I do not know if you have had a chance to look at it.

General GALVIN. I have.

Senator LEVIN. The components that we have identified, do you recollect whether you would differ in your estimate as to any of those 13?

General GALVIN. There were one or two that I was not quite on track with you on, Senator. And I would have to get my report back out again. I noted those. If you would like to know, I can get that for you.

Senator LEVIN. If you could submit that either to me or for the record, it would be useful.

General GALVIN. I will submit it to you, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Did you think overall that those 13 components are relevant and useful components to look at?

General GALVIN. Yes, they are. They are relevant and useful, and they are not very far off track, if at all.

Senator LEVIN. On the question I believe Senator Glenn asked you, the question about Ambassador Abshire's testimony, he testified that we have some self-created vulnerabilities. And I believe you said here that you do not necessarily agree with his comments about the deployment of forces.

He pointed out some self-created vulnerabilities in a number of areas, including, for instance, the absence of fixed barriers which might buy us a couple of days' time and create some uncertainty for the Soviets. We do not have such barriers, for political reasons mainly, and that is just an example.

Do you agree that there are some self-created vulnerabilities?

General GALVIN. Yes, but I do not particularly agree with Ambassador Abshire in either one of those things. I think that we are maldeployed. We are not as badly maldeployed as we were a few years ago, and the cost of redeploying compared to the cost of modernizing makes modernizing a much higher priority.

On the barrier thing, I am not sure that Ambassador Abshire is right at all there. I think, first of all, I worked the barrier issue for a long time. There is a barrier plan. It is a very extensive plan that goes all the way from the north all the way down to the Adriatic. There is a barrier plan.

And that is something that is very much a part of the maneuver plan, for example. And the fact that the barrier cannot be seen on any given day does not mean that it will not be there when the time comes.

And in fact, it is an advantage that nobody knows right where that barrier is going to be. But there is a lot of barrier planning that goes into the defense planning of the forces under my command.

Senator LEVIN. My time has expired.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Levin.

Senator Wilson.

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Galvin, let me pursue with you the line of questioning that Senator Quayle was taking. If I understood correctly, your response in terms of the leverage that we have to secure an asymmetrical reduction by the Warsaw Pact on conventional capability, you think we are going to have to rely on motivation that they have in terms of the economic cost that is required for them to sustain that capability and that superiority, and there is not a great deal which we can do to achieve that.

General GALVIN. I think primarily we have to rely on that, although we also are looking at it from our own eyes. I think that the military leadership in the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union have fears about us, that may not be well-founded, but they are there, and because of that have some motivational pressure to work toward an agreement.

But I think that the Soviets—I have to say that the Soviets have always relied on their conventional forces, the Soviet military leadership, far more so than they have relied on their nuclear forces.

So when you move into the question of taking away conventional forces from the Soviet military leadership, it is going to be more difficult for General Secretary Gorbachev to get that accomplished than it is the INF.

Senator WILSON. I do not argue with that. My point is I question the assumption that you are making, that there will be sufficient economic pressures upon them to achieve it. Have you seen any evidence in terms of their falling away from either constructing or modernizing any conventional weapon system?

General GALVIN. No, I have not. I have not seen, but I have heard, for example, when Gorbachev was here in the United States, at least in the news, that he appeared to insist in a statement that was made at the end of his trip that there would be something in there about proceeding to conventional arms reductions.

Senator WILSON. Well, they have indicated and he has indicated that they are willing to do so. On the other hand, I do not think we should be satisfied with an assertion.

Let me just tell you that every year of the 5 years I have been here the CIA has given me no comfort in response to my question, is there sufficient economic pressure upon the Soviet Union Internally to warrant the hope that they will begin to back away from this ever-mounting conventional and in fact, for that matter, overall military capability?

Every year the answer has been, I am sorry, Senator, we have no reason and no evidence upon which to make that assessment.

So given the fact—and I assume you agree with General Rogers' assessment yesterday that, because the deployment of our own GLCM's and P-II's was not simply a political device to respond to the deployment of the Soviet SS-20's, but really an offset to that superiority in conventional capability on the part of the Warsaw Pact, that unless you can persuade the Congress—not you singlehanded, but unless the Congress is persuaded to go along with your request for modernization, that our ratification of the INF Treaty would leave us vulnerable until such time as that very substantial superiority on the part of the Warsaw Pact were reduced.

And I see no evidence either in reduction of their efforts or in anything that I can tell about the real economic pressures that gives me optimism that in fact this is going to be forthcoming. About the only thing that we can pin that on is the assertion that they are willing to go forward.

Let me just ask you this. In connection with persuading the Congress to go forward with the kind of modernization that you have advocated here and which I agree is essential if there is no asymmetrical reduction on their side and we are instead required to build up, that will not only be very expensive, but the real question in my mind is, are there some legal blocks to doing it?

Specifically, have you looked at article XIV of the treaty and do its provisions in your judgment pose a problem to you in persuading Congress that we should go forward with modernization, whether it be removing the restrictions from the Lance or the ATACM or giving technology to our allies?

General GALVIN. I have looked at article XIV and I have asked some of the experts to look at article XIV and tell me what they think. And the general conclusion seems to be, no, that article XIV does not prohibit or would not inhibit the Congress from continuing on nuclear modernization that was outside the treaty requirements.

Senator WILSON. How about with regard to our sharing technology with NATO allies?

General GALVIN. I see that there are some things in there where, if we were prohibited from manufacturing a weapon that was a ground-launched missile in the range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, that paragraph might be read in the sense that we could not work with anybody else to do that, either.

Senator WILSON. We could not, for example, provide our NATO allies with the means to develop a guidance system?

General GALVIN. I am really not the expert in that, Senator. And I think I have gone about as far as I can to tell you, and the rest is all speculation and a lack of expertise on my part. I really do not know.

Senator WILSON. Well, I do not know whether you are, but let me just conclude—my time has expired—by saying that I am troubled by the fact that recently Mr. Shevardnadze has indicated that he felt that very clearly modernization of the kind that we have been talking about here would violate article XIV.

It seems to me that that is a very real problem and one that the committee, Mr. Chairman, needs to explore thoroughly.

Thank you, General.

Chairman NUNN. I agree that that has to be gone into very thoroughly, and I think when we have our negotiators before us, we will be posing that question, I am sure, from several angles.

Senator Quayle has raised it, I have raised it, and you have raised it. So it is obviously an important point in our minds.

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

General Galvin, welcome. We think you are doing an excellent job with your heavy responsibilities over there in an area that we are all very concerned about. And I appreciate very much your taking the time out of your schedule to come over here and give us your ideas and advice on this matter of the INF Treaty.

There are two basic things I would like to go into in the brief time allotted to me this morning. Number one, let us assume that the INF Treaty is ratified and the terms of that treaty are carried out by both sides.

What would you, the NATO commander, do with regard to planning for what follow-on activities we might be able to work out with the Soviet Union to resolve the conventional imbalance?

What would be your next most important concern? What would you like to see done first if we could come to some understanding on conventional forces with the Soviets, which I think we should have before we rush into a START Treaty?

I have said I am for INF, but I recognize the imbalance of the conventional forces there and the problems that gives you as the NATO commander. What would be the next most important concern that you would have with regard to our proper response on the NATO front, should there be a conventional attack by the Soviets?

I assume it would be the forward deployment of many of Soviet tank units, is that correct?

General **Galvin**. I would be concerned with any kind of an indication that would show an offensive intention on the part of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. I think that what we need to do is move toward the conventional arms reductions and get a reduction to parity on both sides. That would be my overall aim.

In the meantime, I would be concerned about the possibility of surprise attack. I am always concerned about that. That has to be the major thing that I think about because that is the most damaging thing that could happen to us.

There are things the Soviet Union could do along with the Warsaw Pact to put them in a better position to execute a surprise attack. I watch that all the time and devote a great deal of intelligence collection and analysis capability to that.

Senator **Exon**. My question has to do with warding off a surprise attack. If we could get some arrangements with them, what would be your number one request?

If you had the right to say, OK, step number one, I assume it would be forward deployment of Soviet tank units. Would that be number one?

General **Galvin**. That would be a great opener.

Senator **Exon**. Now, are there other things that would rate simultaneously or higher than that, in your opinion?

General **Galvin**. Simultaneously, the artillery units, the air units, but I would take tanks for openers. That would be alright with me.

I do think we would have to make a large significant reduction rather than nickels and dimes. If they said how about if we take out a couple of divisions if we take out one, I would say no, that is not getting there.

If we can prove that the Soviets are three to one in tanks and that would be through inspection and verification and they would be willing to come down, I think that would be the best move.

I do not think we are going to get a single isolated move like that. I think it is going to have to fall within some kind of arms reductions talks.

Senator **Exon**. Let me turn to your opinion of the posture of the political leadership in Europe, our NATO allies primarily with regard to the INF Treaty.

I just returned from a national security trip to the South Pacific, including a visit with our rock hard ally, the Australians, with whom I am very much impressed. They are the star, I think, in that area as far as stability is concerned. Yet, over and over again we were asked questions that indicated a fear on the part of the Australians that we might not indeed ratify that INF Treaty.

I told them I did not think that was a likely scenario in the U.S. Senate, and they seemed very much assured by that.

I also have gotten the impression that by and large, and maybe totally, ratification of the INF Treaty is supported by all of the political leadership in NATO.

Do you agree with that? Is there any hesitation or opposition on the part of European leaders with regard to not ratifying INF?

General GALVIN. I would say that the ratification of the INF Treaty is supported all over Europe, with the possible exception of some political leaders in France.

Senator EXON. We had testimony yesterday from your predecessor that indicated very clearly on the record that, at least when he was there in the fall of last year, indeed, that was not their position, at least off the record to him. He said that may have changed during the period between when he was there and now.

You are telling us, then, that you have had no indication officially or unofficially on any of this typical talk that we hear so much of, such as "well, I was told at a dinner meeting that this and that and such", which is maybe different than our official policy? You have not heard or seen any of that?

General GALVIN. I have seen none of that, and I have had the opportunity to be told that but I have not been told that.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much, General Galvin.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General GALVIN. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, General Galvin.

I apologize for being late. Mr. Exon and I had breakfast with the Secretary of Defense this morning. We learned a lot but got a little behind in our schedules today.

I put this question to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and I basically repeat it to you. You have addressed it in one perspective this morning, as I understand it from one of my colleagues, but I will restate it in much the way I put it to Chairman Crowe.

I still have a good deal of concern about the internal motivations of the Soviets moving forward with the INF Treaty and ambivalence on whether it is economic reasons, as you stated this morning, or other reasons.

I am wondering if you would search your mind as a military commander, even though you may not have what we call in the law direct knowledge of what the Soviets have in mind, are you able to hypothecate as a military commander to determine if there is any strategy as the motivation for the Soviet actions to move forward on this treaty? How would you propose to counter that strategy?

General GALVIN. As I think about it, and I obviously think about it all the time because the strategy of our adversary is very important to me as I try to work our strategy, I think that there are several things that are coming together here.

One of them is that the Soviets feel they have done too much saber rattling with reference to Europe and that saber rattling has got them nowhere. It has probably built more cohesion and more willingness to support NATO into the 16 nations than it has built in anything else.

So banging the shoe on the table and rattling the saber has not worked out too well. I think there is a recognition of that.

Next, I think that the Soviet Union, we all know, has an economic situation that I do not have to describe, but it has a lot to do with management and with the ability to computerize and the ability to be modern. Let me put it that way.

That has had an effect, and the effect is it does not have the resources available to do everything it would like to do, and it needs a pause right now in order to be more competitive at a later time.

Next, the Soviets have always wanted nuclear weapons out of Europe. They have always wanted the United States out of Europe and the Soviet Union into Europe.

I think all of those things are motivational aspects of why the Soviets would agree to an INF Treaty which is basically asymmetrical in their disfavor, because they see it as a step in the right direction if you take that environment that I just described.

Senator WARNER. With the eventual goal, which we have all known about for many years, of hopefully trying to further weaken, if not even break off, the relationships between the United States and our allies in NATO?

General GALVIN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. I watched with interest your very good presentation on television this morning, while I missed, unfortunately, most of your testimony.

You have addressed in your direct testimony and, indeed, in response to questions, how we fill in and take certain steps to minimize the risk, if not even eliminate the risk.

Then you suddenly think the converse. If we were able to take certain steps to eliminate the risk and take steps to put in place other weapon systems to compensate and so forth, what do we achieve by the treaty?

General GALVIN. Of course, that does not take into account the other side, and we have to do that.

What we have achieved is we have backed off the Soviet Union from its SS-20, SS-12s/22, SS-23, SS-4, SS-5. So there has been a successful turnaround, first of all, in an expansion that was not favoring us; that is, the Soviets were on a bigger expansion curve than we were in the nuclear side and as they are still on the conventional side.

Also, we have gotten into this question of verification, which means inspection, which means much more contact in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and a few things that are beneficial to us in this whole complex equation.

Senator WARNER. You are quite accurate in that. I think there have been some extraordinary breakthroughs in the area of verification. The same principles and some expanded versions will hopefully be carried forward in START.

I concur in your observation that we are eliminating two classes of weapons and the like.

Then I come back and say, well, there is a counterpart to yourself over there in the general staff of the Soviet Union, and he has sat down and figured out his compensatory steps to fill the gap.

Have you covered what are the likely steps that your counterpart has taken to compensate for the elimination of the weapons?

General **Galvin**. Yes, sir.

First of all, of course, as you know very well, but I think it needs saying in this context, we are talking about less than 5 percent of all of the weapons inventory.

Senator **Warner**. I am quite familiar with that.

General **Galvin**. The compensatory steps and so forth and so on, therefore, in proportion to the warhead capability we are talking about is not the major issue. I think the major issue is one of those other questions, such as the fact that we have a treaty at all as a start for some other things.

But, yes, Victor Kulikov, my counterpart who heads the Warsaw Pact military, has looked at all of this and has said to himself, how can I shift around and get some help here to fill the targets that have been emptied.

I think that any military man who is given a set of resources would use them the best he could, or he ought to be fired. That would apply to my side, too, to me. I am sitting there saying what is left and, without circumventing the treaty, what can I do to make sure? If I have had some stones taken off my wall of defense, how do I rearrange the stones I have left? How can I do the best possible with what is left?

That is happening on both sides.

Senator **Warner**. In your judgment as a commander, he has at his disposal certain assets to take compensatory measures to eliminate the risk as he foresees it?

General **Galvin**. Yes, sir, he does.

Senator **Warner**. That is very clear.

I thank the chairman and the witness. My time is up.

Chairman **Nunn**. Thank you, Senator Warner.

General Galvin, a couple of years ago, I guess 3 years ago, we embarked on improvements—the CDI Program, Conventional Defense Improvements Program in NATO.

Among those things, whether it was in that program or whether it is outside of that, were the goal to increase ammunition stocks to meet NATO's goal; also, to fulfill NATO's pledge that took place in the late 1970's to have minimum essential facilities, including shelters for air bases for American aircraft coming over in a crisis.

Could you give us, and if you could supplement for the record I would like to have it if I could this week, how we stand on each one of those, sort of a progress chart for how we stand in terms of the ammunition stockpiles, whether it is classified or unclassified; and how we stand on minimum essential facilities for American aircraft coming over; how we stand on the CDI Program?

Could you just give us a capsule and then perhaps supplement it for the record?

General **Galvin**. Yes. I can give you a capsule, and I will supplement it for the record.

[The information referred to is retained in committee files.]

General GALVIN. The capsule is that we are working across the board, and under the new JCS reform I have a much stronger voice in questions such as these, and that was what was intended, obviously.

I have gone before the Defense Resources Board several times. The last two times have been quite specifically on those subjects; that is, sealift, airlift, POMCUS stocks, ammunition, host nation support, sustainment, et cetera, all across the board.

There are a number of those areas which fall into CDI on the basic overall rubric of sustainment on which we are working. There has been over in the Defense Department a general officers and flag officers steering committee created to follow the progress in all of that.

In the 1988 through 1992 POM, the worst areas there, the ones that need the most priority, which are strategic lift, preferred munitions and sustainment, and readiness of combat service support elements, are getting the most priority, and the others are also getting work.

I am fairly optimistic that, if we have not turned the corner, we can see where the corner is in these things. If we get the kind of budget support for the POM as it stands now, I think we will be in pretty good shape.

I will, however, provide you the classified version of that.

Chairman NUNN. I am concerned about the allies and probably more concerned about them particularly when it relates to the ammunition supplies.

So, really, I am asking the question regarding both your U.S. hat and your allied hat, but particularly the latter.

In all or most of these categories, we are so far out in front of the allies that you have to really question how much further we are going to go. For instance, on ammunition stocks, how much further we are going to go on aircraft relief to go to Europe in a crisis, how much further we are going to continue to go in terms of preparing a huge amount of reserve forces to go over, how far we are going to go on sealift and airlift if, when we get there, the allies are out of ammunition.

I mean, at some point this committee and others are going to say why should we continue to spend this money if, when they get in a crisis situation, the allies have finished fighting and the conventional war is over.

So, really, I am asking for the allied effort here more than I am the United States.

General GALVIN. I will provide that to you. There are some areas, Senator, in which we have seen some improvement, in ammunition stockage in certain countries, for example. But I will provide you that information.

Chairman NUNN. In other words, I guess my question to you is why should we continue to build sealift and airlift for the European scenario? We may need it for other scenarios, but why should we continue to build that when by the time the sealift gets there, in particular, there is not going to be any conventional war.

General GALVIN. Allied willingness right now, for example, to move to a 3 percent real growth is there and the figures are there in about five countries.

If you look back over the amount of real growth in defense spending from 1971 to 1985, the U.S. real growth is about 1 percent, while NATO defense budgets on average increased nearly 3 percent. Some countries, in other words, are doing some things. I am not saying that they are doing what I would call satisfactory.

I have, under the NATO Defense Planning System, a set of force goals. I deal with each country individually and tell them what I think they ought to do. Their response to that is not entirely satisfactory, nor is it in the United States, but it is coming along, I think.

Chairman NUNN. I will look forward to getting that for the record, as much unclassified as possible but also what you have to have in classified form.

Could we get that sometime this week?

General GALVIN. Yes, you could. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Good.

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. One last question. I ran out of time, and this is my final question. It is in regard to my last line of questioning to you, General, with regard to the fact that wherever I went in the South Pacific people were saying we certainly hope that you ratify the INF Treaty.

I followed up on that with a question of you, to which you directly responded.

I just wanted to give you a chance, if you could, to answer this question: how serious do you think it would be for the posture of the United States in Europe and around the world, how negative would the reaction be if the Senate would fail to ratify the INF Treaty?

General GALVIN. I am concerned with that question because I am concerned with cohesion of the fighting forces within NATO. Napoleon said that the fighting will is, as to anything, as three is to one.

I think that if we did not get the ratification, we would lose an element of cohesion, because there was a decision that the NATO nations made to come to us in June of last year and say go for a double zero if you can get it.

That, I think, took a lot of effort on their part, and after that they all fell into line, and they all think we are moving in that direction.

So to make a change now, I think, would be damaging to the overall cohesion of NATO. How damaging is pretty hard to say.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much, General Galvin.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

General Galvin, I am going to ask Senator Warner and Senator Exon to close this out. I have to go to another meeting, but thank you so much for being here. We appreciate your leadership, and we appreciate your sharing your thoughts here with us this morning. We look forward to continuing to stay in touch with you, and I believe that our paths are going to cross in Munich very shortly.

Thank you for being here.

General GALVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I wish to associate myself with those remarks.

We hear nothing but the finest of reports in terms of your service, and we are glad to have you here today.

I would like to turn to the question of the conventional arms control talks. I will not go through what I perceive to be a convoluted chain of procedures that are taking place in the forum of 23 nations that hopefully will commence these discussions. As you know, it goes through the CSCE and on down, where they hopefully will get a mandate so the talks may commence.

But I do not see any thoughts that those talks will coincide with the tentative time frame of the START negotiations being completed and possibly a treaty or a Vladivostok-type accord being effected with this President.

What urgency do you attach to the conventional arms control talks and the outcome in terms of your duties as a military commander, considering the risk situation that will be developed by an INF Treaty?

General GALVIN. I can still carry out my mission of deterrence and defense if we get no arms control talks at all.

Senator WARNER. Conventional arms control?

General GALVIN. Conventional arms control. But I would like, however, to see conventional arms control talks because the imbalance is unfavorable to us in the West, and if these talks would lead to a balance favorable to us or a balance that was at least parity, then we would be better off than we are now.

Senator WARNER. It is our understanding that the military segments of NATO are now actively working on a framework that presumably would either be utilized or would provide the basic instructions to our negotiators in commencing these talks.

Are you familiar with that?

General GALVIN. Yes.

Senator WARNER. Have you addressed that already today?

General GALVIN. No, I have not, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Fine.

General GALVIN. There is, as you say, a comprehensive arms reduction approach being looked at by NATO——

Senator WARNER. Conventional. I think if we use the word conventional——

General GALVIN. Conventional, that is correct. It is comprehensive conventional arms control. It is being looked at right now by NATO. I have had an opportunity in my headquarters to look at that, also.

Senator WARNER. When you say "look at it", are you directly involved? At what level is this?

General GALVIN. I am indirectly involved. This is the North Atlantic Council, the Secretary General and the NATO Military Committee looking at this. Obviously, I am a source of information for them, among other sources.

Senator WARNER. You would eventually have a chop, so to speak, on whatever recommendations that they come up with?

General GALVIN. I would not necessarily have a chop on that. I would be able to comment to the Secretary General or to the Chairman of the Military Committee, and I would assume that I can be helpful to them. But that is not something that is tasked to me to do; that is, to chop on that, to decide on it.

Senator **Warner**. If you had some grave concerns about the conclusions being reached, you certainly would have the opportunity to speak out and be heard?

General **Galvin**. I most certainly would, yes. I would be given that opportunity.

Senator **Warner**. I would urge you to look at a study that was recently completed by the Rand Corp, if you have not already done so. It addresses the conventional force reductions and how certain ratios, at a bare minimum, would have to be incorporated if those talks were to be effective. For example, given the asymmetries today and that we have some accurate knowledge about those asymmetries, they are advocating at least a Pact-NATO reduction ratio of 5 to 1 as a baseline, along with reductions of at least three or four NATO divisions.

You are familiar with all of that analyses, of course. It is available to you, and you can use it as a guidepost as you make your own anaylsis of what is to be done in NATO.

General **Galvin**. Yes, Senator, we are already using that Rand study.

Senator **Warner**. General, do the recent announcements with regard to the future Spanish plans concerning NATO forces and, most particularly, the U.S. elements there in that southern flank, have any bearing on the INF agreement?

The Spanish decision seems to me to have a risk element to it, and it adds to the INF risk development. Are we compounding a problem here?

General **Galvin**. We do have a risk if we take the wing, the 401st Wing, out of the southern region. I think it should stay in the southern region.

As to a compounding of the risks that we take, probably yes, but it is not a major compounding of that risk.

Senator **Warner**. They are, however, linked? They come together in the same proximate time frame?

General **Galvin**. Those 72 aircraft represent a lot of combat power in the south flank. That is something that I would have to consider if that were, say, moved back to the United States or taken off the books or something else. That would cause a weakness that I would not like to see in the south flank.

There is probably some relationship there to other risks that we are taking, but not a major relationship.

Senator **Warner**. My last question is just a simple one, and I presume you have answered this before but I would like to have it in my part of the record.

Is it your military judgment that this treaty will add to the security interest of NATO?

General **Galvin**. Yes.

Senator **Warner**. I thank the Chair.

Senator **Exon** [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Just one last question on another subject.

Senator **Warner**. I thank the witness.

General **Galvin**. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Exon. I am going to phrase this question in such a way so that it will be a little bit more difficult to duck the question, as I expect that you would probably do because of your vast experience in another part of the world before you became our NATO commander, and I am talking particularly now about Central America, and I suspect that you have left there and had other duties where you have not been able to follow the developments there and, therefore, may not want to hazard an opinion on what we are facing now in the Congress; but let me ask you this question that you might be able to answer.

With your experience when you were in Central America, on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being low and 10 being high, how much reliability would you place upon the efforts by the Arias-led presidents in that area and Cardinal Vondo Bravo with regard to their talents in bringing about a peaceful solution to the problems there?

I am not trying to put you on the spot. I am just trying to get your evaluation of those individuals that I think you know them very well.

How much emphasis, on a scale of 1 to 10, would you place on the chances of their ability to work out something?

If you do not want to answer the question, I will understand, General; but if you could help us in that regard, I, for at least one, would appreciate it.

General Galvin. I would say that the Arias Plan, in terms of ideals and principles, is a good plan, but in terms of teeth it is a weak plan. When you put a weak plan up against a very strong and determined junta led by Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, you do not have the greatest prospects in the world for success.

Senator Exon. I will accept that and expect that that is what you would say. I know you are sincere in your evaluation, and I thank you for it, General.

I thank you on behalf of the committee for taking the time to be here with us for some extremely important testimony this morning.

God's speed in your fine efforts as Commander of NATO.

We are adjourned.

General Galvin. Thank you, Senator.

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 1988

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON NATO'S SECURITY POSTURE

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Wirth, Shelby, Warner, Thurmond, Quayle, Wilson, Gramm, and McCain.

Staff present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Carl M. Smith, staff director for the minority; and Patrick A. Tucker, minority counsel; Robert F. Bott, Brian D. Dailey, Judith A. Freedman, Sherri Wasserman Goodman, George K. Johnson, Jr., Ronald P. Kelly, James R. Locher III, T. Kirk McConnell, and Mark B. Robinson, professional staff members; Tiffany E. Berger, Barbara B. Brown, Lori M. Jackson, Kathleen L. McGuire, Pamela G. Powell, Debra A. Rice, and Cindy Pearson, staff assistants.

Also present: Jeffrey B. Subko, assistant to Senator Exon; Gregory J. Weaver, assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Donald A. Mitchell, assistant to Senator Glenn; Terrence Lynch, assistant to Senator Shelby; William J. Wight, assistant to Senator Warner; Henry D. Sokolski, assistant to Senator Quayle; Mark J. Albrecht, assistant to Senator Wilson; Alan Ptak, assistant to Senator Gramm; and Anthony H. Cordesman, assistant to Senator McCain.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The Senate Armed Services Committee will come to order.

We are pleased this afternoon to have Ambassador Richard Burt, who represents very ably our country in the Federal Republic of Germany. He gained a great deal of background and experience in arms control matters prior to assuming this post, and I think it is particularly important for us to hear from our Ambassador and get a perspective about the views of Germany, of course one of our most important NATO allies, in particular relating to the INF Treaty itself and to the aftermath of the INF Treaty.

Unfortunately, Mr. Ambassador, as I mentioned to you a moment ago, I have an Intelligence Committee meeting that I must attend, and I am going to have to rely on catching up after I get back. I am going to get back for as much of the hearing as I possibly can.

I have asked Senator Levin to preside today. There will be members coming and going, but I can assure you that everyone is interested in what you have to say, and either the members will be here personally or they will catch up with your testimony I am certain.

So we thank you for being here.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This afternoon the committee meets, as our chairman has indicated, to continue the hearings on NATO defense and the INF Treaty. Although this hearing is the ninth overall on that subject, it is the committee's first of several that will focus specifically on political assessments of the alliance.

The other hearings on that subject will take place during the third week of February. We would have preferred to hold them all in sequence, of course, but the schedule of this afternoon's witness would not permit such an ideal grouping. We are pleased, nevertheless, that you could accommodate us today, Mr. Ambassador.

Our witness this afternoon is, as our chairman has indicated, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Richard Burt. It is a particular pleasure to welcome you to the committee.

Ambassador Burt distinguished himself as a journalist before entering Government service. His service with the Department of State has been equally distinguished, first as Director of Political-Military Affairs and then as an Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and currently as our emissary to the Federal Republic of Germany.

We have invited Ambassador Burt to share with us his knowledge of the European perspective on NATO's security posture, including implications for the alliance of the INF Treaty.

This primary focus, however, need not inhibit the committee or the witness from exploring any of the broader issues before us.

Before we hear from you, Mr. Ambassador, let me ask my colleagues, either Senator Wirth or Exon, who is now with us, do you have a statement?

Senator EXON. I have no statement. I just wish to welcome the Ambassador back before our committee again. He has been here many, many times in the past, and we are delighted to see you back at this time for what we think will be very important testimony on the matter at hand.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

Senator Gramm.

Senator GRAMM. I just wanted to welcome the distinguished Ambassador. I have enjoyed working with him over the years and I appreciate his good work in keeping Ivan back from the gate and doing other good work in Europe and elsewhere.

Other than that, he is doing just an okay job.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Gramm.

Unless someone else has come in here while I looked in the other direction, it is now your turn. We again are very grateful to you for accommodating us. We know the kind of traveling schedule and schedule generally that you lead, and we are very much indebted to you for coming by.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD R. BURT, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Ambassador BURT. Thank you, Senator. After listening to those very nice remarks that you and others have made, I am reminded of a remark that one of your colleagues, Senator Moynihan, likes to make when he receives a nice introduction.

He always says that he wishes his parents were present, that his father would have liked those remarks and his mother would have believed them.

As you know, Senator, I have submitted a statement to you. I do not intend to read that statement in full, but with your permission I would like to read just a section of my statement which deals, I think, in particular with some of the issues that directly involve the Europeans and more specifically involve the West Germans.

The INF Treaty which is now before you has not solved all the problems of European security. At the same time, the treaty does resolve one major problem confronting the alliance, and that is the problem of the SS-20. Soviet deployment of that missile which began in the 1970's did not simply represent a new military challenge to the alliance. It represented a broader strategic threat.

Against the background of Soviet conventional superiority and in an era of strategic nuclear parity, deployment of the Soviet SS-20 was the culmination of a set of Soviet steps designed to decouple the defense of Europe from the United States.

As you know, beginning in 1979, the alliance addressed the SS-20 challenge in a unique way. Rather than simply building up a counterforce to the SS-20, NATO found it necessary to pursue a double track approach. The linkages involved with the 1979 double track decision have confronted the U.S. Government and allied governments with some very difficult alliance issues.

But the double track approach has succeeded. I would like to emphasize this point because it is terribly important, I think, for understanding politics in Western Europe today.

During the 1980's, the early 1980's, unilateralism was a very strong force, particularly in Western Europe. The unilateralist thesis was that a freeze on Western nuclear forces, and specifically renunciation of INF deployment, would prompt the Soviets to exercise parallel restraint and even to reduce their own deployments.

In my view, the INF experience has convincingly shown that real arms reduction can be achieved only through negotiation backed by strength. The arguments of the peace movement in Europe which were so appealing to European public opinion only a few short years ago have thus in my view been thoroughly discredited.

As for the agreement itself, it is possible to dream up a better accord than the one we have. It would be nice, for example, to have the Soviets dismantle their SS-20s while we retain some Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles.

But a negotiated agreement must represent a balance of interests and concessions, and the issue before you is not whether this is the best imaginable agreement, but whether our negotiations have achieved an outcome that clearly and significantly serves U.S. and allied interests. My answer is yes.

If there are risks associated with this treaty, they do not flow from its provisions. What risks there are flow from the wrong lessons that people, especially in Europe and in West Germany in particular, might draw from the INF experience.

One such wrong lesson is that, having achieved this accord, NATO can cut back on its defense effort. This is incorrect. Public opinion in Western Europe must understand that we cannot afford to reduce defense spending.

A similar wrong lesson is that in solving the problem of the SS-20s NATO has solved all of the problems of European security. But the problems remain, most notably the root problem of European security, which is Soviet superiority in conventional forces and their offensive capability.

A third wrong lesson from the INF experience which many on the West German left are drawing is that this treaty represents the first step toward the denuclearization of Europe and the abandonment of nuclear deterrence. But deterrence will remain an essential component of alliance strategy for the foreseeable future.

As Secretary Shultz testified before the Foreign Relations Committee last week, NATO will need to proceed with the modernization of its nuclear forces. A denuclearized Europe would represent the height of Western strategic folly.

By stripping away NATO's nuclear deterrent, Western Europe would be exposed to the full brunt of the Soviet Union's conventional offensive capability.

The INF Treaty, by removing some 400 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe, does not alter the alliance's strategy of flexible response, nor was it meant to. The United States after the treaty is fully implemented will continue to deploy some 4,000 nuclear weapons throughout Europe.

Now, if the left has some mistaken idea about what the treaty means, so do many on the conservative side of the political spectrum in Europe. It has become popular for West German conservatives, for example, to argue that the treaty strategically singularizes their country by virtue of the fact that after INF reductions short-range Soviet missiles in East Germany will still be able to strike targets in West Germany.

And it is also noted that under the accord many of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in West Germany will be nuclear artillery shells, which could in a conflict be used on German soil.

But West German singularization in my view is a myth. Prior to SS-20 deployment, nobody argued that West Germany had been singled out as a nuclear target, and now we are getting rid of the SS-20s.

In fact, the singularization argument vastly exaggerates the impact of the INF accord. While West Germany after INF elimination will still be vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, so will the rest of Western Europe and indeed the United States.

The idea that the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe could only be used on German soil is also wrong. After INF withdrawals, we will still possess a considerable number of nuclear munitions based in Europe, based at sea, and based in the United

States that can threaten targets throughout Eastern Europe and in the Soviet homeland.

It is true that West Germany, because of its front line geographic position and its own nonnuclear status, finds itself uniquely exposed in Central Europe. The presence of U.S. nuclear forces, as well as the presence of U.S. troops, has been an important means of reducing this exposure. If NATO starts down the road to eliminating this presence, West Germany could find itself genuinely singularized.

Let me make one last point, Senator, and that is simply that in assessing the treaty we must address the consequences of the failure of ratification in Western Europe and in the Federal Republic of Germany. The INF Treaty is unique in many respects, but most importantly because it flows out of a collective commitment that the NATO governments made to their people.

That commitment, made by President Reagan in 1981, was clear and simple: If the Soviet Union was prepared to eliminate its unwarranted SS-20 threat against Europe, NATO would forego the deployment of INF missiles. Throughout the entire course of INF negotiations, and especially during those difficult days of late 1983, when American P-II and ground launched cruise missiles actually arrived in Europe, the United States and its key allies reaffirmed this commitment.

In other words, we were able to deploy because European publics had faith in NATO's pledge to seek the removal of all INF missiles.

If, having now achieved that goal, we were to repudiate NATO's longstanding commitment by repudiating this treaty, the consequences in my view would be extremely serious. Not only would it be highly unlikely that we could maintain public support for keeping U.S. missiles in Europe, but over the longer term the credibility of the NATO alliance would more broadly be called into question.

If I were Mikhail Gorbachev, I doubt I could think of a more welcome development.

Thank you, Senator.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD R. BURT

IN SUPPORT OF THE INF TREATY

Mr. Chairman:

The INF Treaty which now lies before you is the culmination of more than a decade of American and European effort. The process began with what was then called the TNF or theater nuclear force debate of the late 1970's, which was triggered by the unwarranted, unilateral Soviet buildup of its nuclear forces directed against Western Europe. The debate led to the joint meeting of NATO defense and foreign ministers in December 1979, at which the decision was taken to deploy American Pershing II and cruise missiles while opening negotiations with the Soviets. The process continued through eight more years of intense East-West and transatlantic diplomacy, punctuated by the arrival of the first American missiles in 1983, the Soviet walk-out from the negotiating table, their return in March 1985, and finally, the signing of an agreement in Washington some eight weeks ago. The resultant Treaty is perhaps the NATO Alliance's most significant political achievement in its nearly forty-year history.

Clearly, the INF Treaty has not solved all the problems of European security. At the same time, the Treaty does resolve one major problem confronting the NATO Alliance--the SS-20. Soviet deployment of this missile, beginning in the late 1970's, represented not simply a new military challenge to the Alliance, but also a broader strategic threat. Against the background of Soviet conventional superiority, and in an era of strategic parity, deployment of the SS-20 was the culmination of a set of Soviet steps designed to decouple the United States from Europe, to destroy the credibility of the American strategic deterrent, and to expose Western Europe to Soviet coercion.

Beginning in 1979, the Alliance addressed the SS-20 challenge in a unique way. Rather than simply building up a counterforce, NATO found it necessary to proceed along a dual path of deployments accompanied by an arms control offer. This double-track approach, which linked a military program to East-West and Alliance diplomacy, has been subjected to no little criticism. The complex linkages involved have been difficult to manage, even within the U.S. Government, let alone within the Alliance. But the the double-track approach has succeeded. In doing so it has conclusively demonstrated Winston Churchill's dictum that we must be prepared to arm if we wish to disarm.

I would like to emphasize this point, for it is perhaps one of the most important results of the INF process. During the early 1980's unilateralism was a strong force in both the United States and particularly Europe. The unilateralist thesis was that a freeze on Western nuclear forces--and specifically renunciation of INF deployment--would prompt the Soviets to exercise parallel restraint and even to reduce their own deployments. The INF experience has convincingly shown that real arms reductions can be achieved only through negotiation backed by strength. The arguments of the peace movement, so appealing to European public opinion a few short years ago, have thus been discredited.

As for the agreement itself, it is possible, of course, to dream up a better accord than the one we have. It would be nice, for example, to have the Soviets dismantle their SS-20's while we retain some of our PII's and GLCM's. But a negotiated agreement must represent a balance of interests and concessions. The issue before you is not whether this is the best imaginable agreement, but whether our negotiations have achieved an outcome that clearly and significantly serves U.S. and Allied interests. My answer is yes.

If there are risks associated with this Treaty, they do not flow from its provisions. What risks there are flow from the wrong lessons that people, especially in Europe and in West Germany, in particular, might draw from the INF experience. One such wrong lesson is that, having achieved this accord, NATO can now cut back on its defense effort. This is incorrect: public opinion in Western Europe must understand that we cannot afford to reduce defense spending in the face of what is still a very real and potent Soviet threat.

A similar wrong lesson is that in solving the problem of the SS-20, NATO has solved all of the problems of European security. But problems remain, most notably the root problem of European security -- the Soviet superiority in conventional forces and consequent offensive capability.

A third wrong lesson from the INF experience, which many on the West German left are drawing, is that this treaty represents the first step towards the denuclearization of Europe and the abandonment of nuclear deterrence. But nuclear deterrence will remain an essential component of Alliance strategy for the foreseeable future. As Secretary Shultz testified here last week, NATO will need to proceed with the modernization of its nuclear forces, as agreed in Montebello in 1983, so that they maintain their capability to fulfill their mission of deterrence.

A denuclearized Europe would represent the height of Western strategic folly. By stripping away NATO's nuclear deterrent, Western Europe would be exposed to the full brunt of the Soviet Union's conventional offensive capability. The INF Treaty, by removing some 400 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe, does not alter the Alliance's strategy of flexible response. Nor was it meant to. The United States, after the Treaty is fully implemented, will continue to deploy some 4,000 nuclear weapons throughout Europe.

If the left has some mistaken ideas about what the Treaty means, so do many on the conservative side of the European political spectrum. It has become popular for West German conservatives, for example, to argue that the treaty strategically "singularizes" their country by virtue of the fact that after INF reductions, short-range Soviet missiles in East Germany will still be able to strike targets in West Germany. It is also noted that under the accord, many of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in West Germany will be nuclear artillery shells that could, in a conflict, be used on German soil.

But West German "singularization" is a myth. Prior to SS-20 deployment, nobody argued that West Germany had been singled out as a nuclear target, and we are now getting rid of the SS-20s. In fact, the "singularization" argument vastly exaggerates the impact of the INF accord. While West Germany, after INF elimination, will still be vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack, so will the rest of Western Europe and, indeed, the United States. The idea that the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe could be used only on German soil is also wrong. After INF withdrawals, we will still possess a considerable number of nuclear munitions based in Europe, at sea and in the United States that can threaten targets throughout Eastern Europe and in the Soviet homeland.

It is true that West Germany, because of its "front-line" geographic position and its non-nuclear status, finds itself uniquely exposed in Central Europe. The presence of U.S. nuclear forces has been an important means of reducing this exposure. If NATO starts down the road to eliminating this presence, West Germany could find itself genuinely "singularized."

I am confident that in the end Europeans and Americans alike will draw the correct lessons from the INF experience. The Senate deliberations can make a decisive and positive contribution to this process of opinion-molding. European leaders such as Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Thatcher have expounded the right lessons. They have defended the continued validity of the strategy of flexible response and have expressed confidence in the solidity of the U.S.-European security partnership. It is precisely the closeness of European-American cooperation and our strong dedication to the principles of the Alliance that have made possible the achievement of the successful implementation of NATO's double-track INF decision.

Finally, in assessing the treaty, we must address the consequences of failure of ratification. The INF treaty is unique in many respects, but most importantly because it flows out of a collective commitment that the NATO governments made to their people. That commitment, made by President Reagan in 1981 on behalf of the entire Alliance, was clear and simple: If the Soviet Union was prepared to eliminate its unwarranted SS-20 threat against Europe, NATO would forego the deployment of INF missiles. Throughout the entire course of the INF negotiations -- and especially during those difficult days of late 1983 when American Pershing II and cruise missiles actually arrived in Europe -- the United States and its key allies reaffirmed this commitment. In other words, we were able to deploy because European publics had faith in NATO's pledge to seek the removal of all INF missiles. If, in having achieved our goal, we were to now repudiate NATO's long-standing commitment by repudiating this Treaty, the consequences would be extremely serious. Not only would it be highly unlikely that we could maintain public support for keeping U.S. missiles in Europe, but over the longer term, the credibility of the NATO Alliance would more broadly be called into question. If I were Mikhail Gorbachev, I doubt I could think of a more welcome development.

In the years ahead we will continue to need a solid framework within which to undertake our common defense and arms control efforts, both in the conventional and nuclear fields. In my judgment, the following principles can provide us such a framework:

- First, the engagement of American power on the European continent, in terms of both troops and nuclear weapons, is and will continue to be essential. For the credibility of Alliance strategy this engagement must be substantial, not token.

- Second, nuclear deterrence will remain an irreducible component of Alliance strategy. This implies that the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil as well as the retention by the United States of viable central strategic forces will remain an essential element of Western security.

- Third, the Alliance must have sufficient conventional forces to sustain a strategy of flexible response. In the current context, a concerted effort to rectify the existing conventional imbalance--whether through force improvements or a combination of force improvements and arms control--is indispensable.

- Fourth, there needs to be equitable burden-sharing within the Alliance, to be measured not simply in economic terms. Non-financial burdens, such as the density of stationed military forces and the frequency and scope of training activities, should also be taken into account. There must be burden-sharing within the Alliance with respect to out-of-area responsibilities as well.

- Fifth and finally, the principle of equitable risk-sharing within the Alliance must be preserved. No one member of the Alliance, or group of Allies, can be asked to assume risks substantially greater than the other Allies are expected to bear. The territory of the European Allies cannot be conceived of as the exclusive battlefield for nuclear or conventional conflict; nor can there be a trip-wire strategy that would lead to swift and inevitable escalation to a central strategic war.

Adherence to these five principles I have outlined helped bring us the INF treaty. If we are to build upon our success in the INF arena, we will need to maintain and modernize our remaining nuclear forces in Europe. There is nothing in the INF treaty which will interfere with our ability to do so.

We will also need to take steps to remedy the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe, through force improvements and arms control. I recognize that, in a time of budgetary stringency on both sides of the Atlantic, the prospects for obtaining significantly higher funding for conventional forces are slim at best. Nevertheless, I believe that we can increase the effectiveness of NATO conventional power at acceptable cost, particularly through exploiting the Western lead in high technology.

Arms control cannot of course by itself redress the conventional force imbalance in Europe. Nevertheless, the proposed talks on conventional stability do afford the Alliance an important opportunity to address the central problem of European security, the Warsaw Pact's offensive capability. Our approach to these talks should, in my view, be guided by the following criteria:

- First, our proposals should focus on the principal elements of Soviet conventional advantage, as a means of highlighting the current imbalance in the European theater. They should have as their aim to disrupt Warsaw Pact strategy through substantial asymmetrical cuts in equipment associated with Soviet offensive capability, particularly in Soviet armored forces in the Central Region.

- Second, we should not accept any outcome to the conventional stability talks whose effect would be to undermine NATO strategy. In this regard, it will be essential to resist proposals that would substantially reduce the U.S. military presence in Europe, since this would undercut the forward deployment "pillar" of Western strategy.

- Third, in order to garner necessary public support any Western proposal should incorporate simple and readily-understandable units of account.

- Fourth, any Western proposal should be designed in such a way as to permit continued modernization of NATO forces and adjustments in force structure. It should be quantitative rather than qualitative, and should not restrict our ability to introduce new systems in Europe.

- Fifth, any Western proposal should be durable yet flexible. We should be able to sustain it over time, while allowing for adjustment and growth.

- Finally, it goes without saying that any conventional arms control proposal we make must be verifiable and consistent with our proposals in other areas of arms control. We should, for example, resist potential pressures to expand the concept of regional arms control, for instance into the areas of chemical or nuclear weapons, where only global limitations are meaningful.

A conventional arms control agreement that meets all of these criteria would be very much in the Alliance's interests. It would limit the Warsaw Pact's offensive capability while shoring up NATO strategy. My understanding of the Alliance position at this stage is that it is consistent with these criteria. Whether an agreement on these terms would be feasible only time will tell. Certainly, it cannot be achieved without long and difficult negotiation.

The debate on which the Senate is now embarked is not simply about the INF Treaty but also about the overall U.S. commitment to Europe. I personally welcome such a debate, because I believe it will reinforce a fundamental strategic truth, namely that the American commitment to Europe is indispensable to our role as a world power.

Over a period of several hundred years, British policy was governed by the maxim that the nation could not be secure if a hostile power were to control the continent of Europe. This same principle holds true for the United States as we move into the twenty-first century. Twice in the past seventy years we have learned to our regret that ignoring Europe in time of peace obliges us to come belatedly to Europe's rescue in time of war. The U.S. commitment to and presence in Europe is not a favor to the Europeans, but rather an essential pillar of American security.

The INF Treaty is the product of our commitment to Europe, and of Europe's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance. Pride in this common achievement will further reinforce our solidarity and help secure further common achievements--in arms control, in overcoming the division of Europe, and above all in assuring peace with freedom.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Ambassador Burt.

We are going to revise our order a bit here and I will switch places with Senator Exon because he must leave in a few moments. Senator Wirth, who was with us for your testimony, had to leave because he must go to chair a program that apparently involves a Soviet-American exchange of some kind.

Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome again, Ambassador Burt. I just have one question that I have tried to ask of all our witnesses. I was in Australia last week, and if there is a rock-hard ally that the United States has, there would be few, I think, that would be any better, including our NATO allies, than our friends south of the equator in Australia.

Those representing all political beliefs and stripes were concerned about the fact that we might not approve the INF Treaty. I was asked that over and over again. I assured them that from my perspective at least, I thought that the Senate would likely, very likely approve the treaty.

We had testimony yesterday from the former NATO commander that indicated that European political leaders had told him privately what he said they might not tell to the administration. He said they probably would not even tell that to a Member of the U.S. Senate. But they told me that they are not in favor of this treaty and think it should be rejected.

Now, that witness put in the caveat that that was last fall and possibly they have changed their mind at this juncture. All of the information that we have had except from two witnesses would indicate that there is near-universal feeling of approval among the people of Europe.

And we have received testimony from other witnesses to the extent that it has received universal approval by the political, elected political leadership of our NATO allies. I would just like to ask you this question, do you have any information that what I hear is not accurate? And is there to your knowledge total support of this among the elected political leadership of Europe?

And if that is so, and if what I picked up in Australia and elsewhere—my question would then be, aside from the military potential problem with parts of this treaty, would it not be in your opinion pretty much of a disaster for the United States of America and its foreign policy should the U.S. Senate not approve this treaty?

Ambassador BURT. Senator, as I mentioned in my statement, I do think that the consequences for the alliance and for the United

States-German relationship of not ratifying this treaty would be extremely serious. And I think we need to understand the reasons why.

I was a bystander in the late 1970s during the debate on SALT II, and there were arguments made at that time that failure to ratify SALT II would create severe disruption within our alliances.

I think those arguments in my view at that time were exaggerated. I think we have to distinguish between this agreement and SALT II and, more importantly, between this process that led to the INF agreement and SALT II.

This agreement flows out of a decision taken collectively by the NATO alliance on December 12, 1979, to both seek an arms control agreement and to deploy American missiles in Europe as a means of achieving that arms control agreement. Moreover, when Ronald Reagan announced his proposal in November 1981 to seek the elimination of all INF missiles, that was not an American proposal. It was an alliance proposal that had been agreed to over many months of consultation.

And that proposal was embedded within that December 1979 decision. The only reason, in my judgment, we were able to deploy in 1983 the American missiles in Europe is because the governments of Europe were able to convince their people, their publics, that we were serious in seeking an arms control agreement.

They put their political credibility on the line. And sometimes we Americans forget what the situation was like in Europe in late 1983. There were hundreds of thousands of protesters in the Federal Republic of Germany, in The Netherlands, in the United Kingdom.

And it was because Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, Prime Minister Craxi in Italy, Prime Minister Martens in Belgium, Prime Minister Lubbers in The Netherlands, because they told their people that, we are not simply building up nuclear weapons, but we are doing this in order to achieve results at Geneva, it was because they were able to make that argument and because they believed that we were able to deploy.

Thus, at this stage if we were to simply announce that, having achieved our goal, the goal that we publicly endorsed in these negotiations, that we have now had second thoughts and that we were not going to go forward and implement this agreement, there would be not only a serious reaction against the United States and its leadership role within the alliance, but all of our allied friends would face a serious reaction from their publics.

That is why all of these allied leaders support this agreement, because they as much as President Reagan were responsible for and architects of this agreement.

Senator EXON. I assume you directed your answer properly to the elected leadership. I suspect that the average person in the European nations might conclude that, if that is the attitude of the United States, then we wonder whether they are really and truly concerned about meaningful arms reduction.

Is that not a major fear?

Ambassador BURT. Well, that was a problem all through the 1980s. One of the major arguments that was used against our proposal in 1981, not only by critics here in the United States but by critics in Europe, was that we were not serious, that we would never be able to achieve this agreement.

And we did achieve this agreement.

Senator EXON. So we are as much, if not more, on trial now than the Soviet Union in your mind?

Ambassador BURT. I do not think we are on trial. But what we have done is we have succeeded, as I mentioned in my statement, we have decisively succeeded in undermining the case of the nuclear unilateralists. We have convinced the European public, as Winston Churchill said, that you arm to disarm.

Now we have to follow through on that success and ratify this agreement.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Exon.

You have touched on the issue of linkage. Let me press you a bit further on that issue. A major question in the debate on INF ratification is the sequence in which we should pursue future arms control negotiations and agreements. Some say that we should not ratify INF without some agreement on conventional arms reductions.

Others say that we should not conclude a START agreement until such conventional reductions are agreed upon. Can you give us your comments on that, and also what the European allies feel about linkage, either INF to conventional or START to conventional?

Ambassador BURT. Well, Senator, I think the first point to make on this question of linkage is it makes a big difference whether linkage is a going-in strategy or a coming-out policy.

Linkage has not been a going-in strategy of the Reagan administration in pursuing this agreement, and it was certainly not an issue over the course of 7 years of negotiation, either in consultations with the Congress or in consultations with the allies.

Had we perhaps begun these negotiations establishing the relationship between the nuclear and conventional, we might perhaps be on stronger ground at this stage in talking about such a linkage.

But to raise the question of linking the INF agreement to either progress in START or on the conventional negotiations in my view would raise the same kind of serious political problems that I alluded to a few minutes ago. There is also—well, to be quite blunt about it, people would view it, I think, in Europe and elsewhere as an excuse not to go forward with the implementation of the treaty.

Second, there is a conceptual problem in arms control that deals with linkage. You can never deal with one category of weaponry without having some impact on another category.

It was interesting, for instance, that the whole INF issue in a sense flowed out of concerns in the 1970's about strategic arms limitation. Helmut Schmidt raised the question of the impact of the SS-20 when, in 1977, it appeared that the Carter administration was going to reach agreement with the Soviets covering strategic arms. So there are obvious relationships.

And the elimination of INF weapons will have consequences for the conventional balance, it will have consequences for the remaining tactical nuclear weapons we deploy in Europe. The problem, however, I think from the arms control standpoint is, how many linkages can you create and still have the chances for success in negotiation?

In the 1950's we tried to pursue with the Soviets comprehensive disarmament, where we talked about everything from ground forces in Europe to strategic nuclear weapons in one large comprehensive negotiation. I think the linkages were in fact so complex in trying to work out such an approach that the result was paralysis.

So in my view we have to strike a balance between recognizing relationships between different categories of weapons, but having a discrete negotiating category that allows us to achieve success.

Senator LEVIN. The linkage that I was referring to was linkage of either INF to conventional or START to conventional. One of the possibilities that some at least are considering during the INF ratification debate is whether or not to make a statement in advance about linking a START agreement yet-to-be-signed to the signing of a conventional arms agreement.

As a matter of fact, I would think the likely issue or a likely issue during INF ratification proceedings will be various amendments or resolutions relative to a START agreement in connection with conventional reductions.

Now, can you tell us something about our allies' position on that? Have any of them spoken to you about their support of or opposition to linking a future START agreement, a 50-percent reductions agreement, to an agreement on conventional reductions?

Ambassador BURT. They have not specifically raised the issue with me. I would expect that in general they would be opposed to such a linkage. They would like to see progress made in both these areas.

I think also they understand that the START process is much further along than the conventional process, and that the conventional process could in fact turn out to be a long, complex, and protracted process. So I think, particularly given the fact that strategic systems can compensate for INF elimination, and an SS-24 and an SS-25 can hit targets in Western Europe that were previously assigned to the SS-20, I would expect them to support progress on START without reference to progress on conventional stability talks.

Senator LEVIN. There is also a question of linkage of the battlefield weapons to conventional cuts. There are some who feel that we should be willing to negotiate for reductions in the battlefield area, even if we are unable to make progress in the conventional area.

We have opposed that delinkage, as I understand it. Allegedly the German Government is more prone to be willing to discuss reductions in the battlefield area, since those weapons, they view, are limited to German soil basically. What is the position of the German Government on that issue? Would they be willing to see negotiations include reductions in battlefield weapons absent progress in the conventional area?

Ambassador BURT. No. I think that the alliance foreign ministers looked at the relationship of these various negotiations—strategic, conventional, the chemical, and the so-called short-range SNF issues. Those are the weapons below 500 kilometers, possibly including the battlefield systems.

There is an obvious desire on the part of the West Germans to move into negotiations covering those weapons, the short-range systems.

Senator LEVIN. Is their position different from the position of the British, for instance?

Ambassador BURT. I think not in principle, but possibly in terms of sequence, in terms of timing.

Senator LEVIN. So is the short answer then, the Germans would be willing to negotiate reductions in the battlefield area prior to the conclusion of a conventional agreement, but at least the British would not be? Is that a fair statement?

Ambassador BURT. No, I would not go that far in describing either the German or British view. I think the specific linkages that you talked about are just too concrete.

Right now, within the alliance, we are discussing the relationship of these different negotiations. So I do not think you can at this point specify the precise position. It is, just as I said before, the Germans have an obvious interest to get into this area.

Senator LEVIN. We heard from Ambassador Abshire the other day that some of our vulnerabilities are self-created vulnerabilities, as he phrased it, that some of our critical deficiencies conventionally exist primarily because of the lack of willingness to accept certain political costs in a number of systems, for instance the number of predeployed tank barriers, our maldeployment of forces in terms of the northern sector, and possibly the forward defense doctrine itself.

Do you have a comment on that?

Ambassador BURT. Well, I do. I think on the one hand, I agree with David Abshire's analysis. We do have some self-inflicted wounds within the alliance and they reflect the fact that we are all democratic countries. We do not have the flexibility for deploying military forces and generating the kinds of dispositions of military forces that might be optimum, because public opinion is a very important force in all of our countries.

Now, let me say just a word about the Federal Republic of Germany. From a political standpoint, forward defense is a necessity. We cannot say that, in order to defend part of the alliance, we are prepared to lose another part of the alliance.

We cannot tell the Federal Republic of Germany that, in order to protect Belgium and France, that we are going to pursue a defense in-depth strategy on West German territory. Politically, we long ago within the alliance agreed on the concept of risk-sharing, which means that we are prepared to defend a square acre of land in Michigan with the same tenacity that we are prepared to defend a square acre of land in the Federal Republic of Germany.

So forward defense is a policy that I think, for very sound political reasons, we had to sustain. But going beyond that, the Federal Republic of Germany is a country about the size of the State of Oregon or Colorado. There are 60 million people in that country, so it is densely populated, fairly crowded.

They not only have a standing army of roughly one-half million forces, but they have 400,000 foreign forces on their soil—American troops, British troops, Belgian troops, Canadian troops. There are seven different air forces which fly in the air spaces of the Federal Republic of Germany, some at very low altitudes.

There are over 2,000 major military maneuvers on West German territory. What I am getting at, Senator, is there is a tremendous density of military activity on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. And thus, the people of the Federal Republic of Germany are prepared to make sacrifices that other people in other NATO countries are not asked to make.

That is not a defense for the problem of maldeployment. It is not a defense for some of the other shortcomings of defense in the central front. But I think what it is is an examination of some of the political realities that the government in Bonn has to address, with this tremendous density of military activities that take place in a very densely populated country.

This is not meant to say we cannot improve the situation, and in fact in a variety of ways we have. But it is going to require persistence, and it is going to require tenacity on the part of both the U.S. Government and the other European allies.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome home, Ambassador Burt. It is wonderful to see you again. Senator Gramm and I have had the opportunity of visiting you in your modest middle class tract home in Berlin, and I hope that your accommodations here are in keeping with the lifestyle to which you have become accustomed.

Ambassador BURT. No comment. I am going to have a transition problem when this administration is over.

Senator McCAIN. It is good to see you again, and many of us appreciate the very find job you are doing. And I think it is clear that you have earned the respect not only of our friends in the Federal Republic of Germany, but throughout the NATO alliance.

I would like to ask you, first of all, what your view would be of the European reaction to a killer amendment or a long delay in ratification on the part of the U.S. Senate?

Ambassador BURT. Senator, I mentioned a few moments ago that the nonratification of the treaty would have very serious consequences. I believe that a killer amendment or a protracted ratification debate would also have very serious consequences.

Again, I would just emphasize that this is not just another arms control agreement. The Europeans bought into this process at the very start. They feel as much authorship for this agreement as we do.

We consulted every step of the way with them in this process. We came up with the original negotiating formula, the elimination of all systems, the formula that was successfully achieved with the Soviets, with their help, with their assistance and their advice.

So in many respects, it would have to be viewed as a serious betrayal of an understanding that we have had with the allies for over 7 years.

Senator McCAIN. What risk do you see in Europe either unilaterally cutting its defense efforts in anticipation of future force reductions or becoming trapped in slippery slope reductions in NATO's remaining theater nuclear forces?

Ambassador BURT. Those are both very real risks and we have to avoid them at all costs. And in my view, the way we avoid them is to understand the lessons of this agreement. The lessons of this agreement are that it was only through deploying the cruise missiles and the Pershing IIs that we were able to achieve arms reductions.

If the European public concludes after this agreement that it can relax on conventional defense improvement or that somehow this agreement represents a step toward the denuclearization of the alliance, then we will not only undermine future prospects for arms control, but we could very well undermine alliance strategy.

This agreement does not represent a step toward the denuclearization of Europe. The strategy of flexible response, the strategy of extended deterrence, is as real now as it was before the negotiations got under way. And if anything, this agreement should be a very powerful argument for every member of the alliance that, if we want to get anywhere in a conventional arms negotiation, we will have to strengthen, rather than weaken, our conventional capabilities.

Senator MCCAIN. In light of the INF Treaty, how do you view the viability of the Montebello decision?

Ambassador BURT. I think the Montebello decision is viable. In other words, as Secretary Shultz said last week before the Foreign Relations Committee, we should follow through on the modernization of our nuclear capabilities in Europe.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe, Ambassador, that there is a signficant conventional imbalance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces?

Ambassador BURT. Yes, I do.

Senator MCCAIN. Would you feel that that imbalance should be corrected prior to the negotiation or agreement of a START Treaty?

Ambassador BURT. No, I do not think it should be.

Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe that the trends in force modernization and warfighting capability favor Warsaw Pact or NATO?

Ambassador BURT. I think that it depends on what your frame of reference is. If you look over the last 20 years, there are some very disturbing trends in overall warfighting capability, the emergence of a Soviet combined arms capability, their ability to train and deploy forces that are capable of taking the offensive.

I believe in recent years we have been able to make some progress. It has been difficult, but we should continue this progress.

Senator MCCAIN. On page 5 of your testimony you say: "A third wrong lesson from the INF experience which many in the West German left are drawing is that this treaty represents the first step toward the denuclearization of Europe and the abandonment of nuclear deterrence."

I might add they are referring to a trend which leads us to a trend toward the triple zero option or a third zero option. Are you not concerned that it is not only the West German left that seems to some degree to be embracing this idea, but also people like the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany and Franz Josef Strauss of Bavaria.

Are there not some significant leaders in the center of FRG politics that are leaning in this direction? Do you view that to be the case?

Ambassador BURT. Senator, let me say first of all that I view the idea of the triple zero option as a potential threat that we must strongly resist. We must not conclude after this agreement that the next steps is the total elimination of short range nuclear forces in Europe.

That would simply permit the Soviet Union to use its superior conventional capabilities to coerce and blackmail Western Europe.

I have discussed these issues with members of the German Government, and I am not aware of any German officials who support the idea of a triple zero. As I was discussing with Senator Levin a few minutes ago, there is indeed interest in negotiating the area of short-range nuclear forces. But that is distinct from negotiating the elimination of those systems.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Shelby.

Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I would like to follow up on the thrust, of what Senator McCain was getting into. Assuming that one of the objectives of the Soviet Union in signing the INF Treaty is part and parcel of a grand strategy to weaken NATO, the eventual neutrality of the Western German nation, are they not making progress in this regard?

You know, you go step by step. And would not the third item that you just mentioned, the third zero option, would that not be a logical step in that direction in the political climate of Germany?

And you are there as our Ambassador and have witnessed what has been going on, especially a new generation of Germans coming on. What is to prevent this? I am not speaking of right now, you know. You voiced that you did not know of any responsible—and maybe that was not the word—German leaders that were advocating this.

But the German leaders will do like a lot of people in this country and in the Senate. They will listen to the drumbeat of their people. And is not the drumbeat of the people sort of looking that way, toward a nuclear-free Germany?

There have been a lot of writings about it. There has been a lot of talk about it. Sometimes there is a lot of smoke before you see the fire. It might be 5 years, it might be 10 years.

But has not the Soviet Union basically been patient on their objectives? I would like to hear your comments.

Ambassador BURT. That is a very interesting question, and I am thinking about how to construct an argument, because I would like to make a couple of different points.

I think the first point I would make is that for 40 years we have been wringing our hands over Germany. Germany is in a unique situation. It is a divided country. That exposes it to some unique pressures.

Second, unlike France, it is a nonnuclear country. It has renounced the ability to deploy its own nuclear forces. So it is dependent on an extended nuclear guarantee from the United States which by definition makes that situation more complicated. They cannot rely or do not rely on a national deterrent.

Third, as you know, Senator, they are the most geographically exposed country in Central Europe. They face the GSFG, the most capable element of the Red Army, directly.

So for those reasons, it is not surprising that they are very security-conscious and are anxious to reduce the threat that they face.

Now, that has led some in Germany to endorse what I consider to be fairly utopian and romantic ways out of the German security dilemma: nuclear-free zones, neutralization.

But it would be a major mistake to assume that there is a preponderant body of opinion in Germany that supports those types of options. Konrad Adenauer in the 1950's said that the most important value for the West German people, the most important value for all German people, was freedom, and that the Federal Republic of Germany had to remain part of NATO and part of the Western community to remain free.

In my view, there has been a consensus on Adenauer's policy over the last 40 years, and it remains the consensus today. And while on the one hand you can see the antinuclear demonstrations and worry about German neutrality, on the other look at what the government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl did in late 1983.

Well, I do not want to score points in this room, but we have had a lot of trouble over the last 15 years trying to deploy a mobile missile in this country.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Ambassador, he did that, but at the same time he used tremendous political capital, did he not?

Ambassador BURT. He did it. He used a lot of political capital. But in Geneva and in Washington just last year, when President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev signed that arms control agreement, he got the return on his investment.

He told the German people: I know this is not popular with parts of the population, I know it is controversial, but I am deploying because I believe this is the way to achieve an arms control agreement. And he was right.

And if you look at public opinion polls in Germany today, you have results which show that there is over 80 percent support for NATO. Those are historically high findings.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Ambassador, just to take a step, because my time will be limited here, let us talk about the third zero option that I mentioned, and you have, too. What if that did come about—and there are forces there to bring it about, and let us hope they will not.

But the forces are already talking about eliminating the nuclear weapons from the German soil. In other words, they are saying, as you well know, that if there is any fight with nuclear weapons, it is going to be in East Germany or West Germany, and that is an emotional argument to get the third zero moving, is it not?

Ambassador BURT. It is an emotional argument, just like the emotional arguments that the peace movement—I will tell you, the peace movement in a bizarre way argued against INF deployment because the weapons would not be used on German soil.

They argued against the deployment of the cruise missiles and the Pershings because they would be targeted against Soviet territory. Now they have completely changed their arguments and now they are focusing on the short-range systems.

But we make a big mistake if we underestimate the common sense of the German people. As I was pointing out a few minutes ago, they have been prepared to make substantial sacrifices, living with foreign forces on their soil, providing U.S. forces with over 2,000 military installations on a rent-free basis.

They are prepared. They understand that their security resides in the presence of American troops and nuclear weapons on their soil. So I think it is a mistake if we make this triple zero a self-fulfilling prophecy.

What I can do and, quite candidly, what you can do, Senator, is make the case, use these hearings to make the case against that kind of nuclear slippery slope.

Senator SHELBY. My time has expired.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Shelby.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. I am going to defer to Senator Thurmond.

Senator LEVIN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Burt, in your prepared remarks you state that NATO found it necessary to proceed on what has come to be known as a dual track of deployment and arms control discussions. Was it necessary to have two tracks for political reasons within NATO to achieve a deployment?

And if this is the case, why not use that same approach for chemical weapons deployment in theater?

Ambassador BURT. Well, it was necessary. I was not a member of Government in the late 1970s when this decision was taken, but I was watching that process very closely from the outside. And I think the simple fact of political life was at that time that the governments, the governments of the alliance, were not prepared to simply sign up to the deployment of American missiles in Europe.

They wanted an arms control option that they could also pursue, and so the compromise of working out both a deployment track and an arms control track was generated.

On the chemical side of the question, your question is one that sort of catches me off guard, to be quite serious with you, Senator. I would want to think about the consequences of pursuing a double-track decision in that area.

My own personal view is that, while the double track approach on INF worked, it is not necessarily the greatest model for arms modernization. As I pointed out in my testimony, it produced an enormously complicated problem of coordination, both within the U.S. Government, with the State Department and Defense Department constantly trying to keep in sync, and also within the alliance.

So I am not sure that, while this process was successful, that it should be a model for other approaches.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Burt, I take it from your testimony that you support the Montebello decision to modernize the remaining nuclear forces in Europe.

Ambassador BURT. That is correct.

Senator THURMOND. In an era of constrained defense spending, how would you prioritize scarce resources? Would you place nuclear weapons systems modernization as the first priority, or conventional weapons systems as the first priority?

Ambassador BURT. I would love to give you a detailed answer on that, but I feel a little bit constrained to do so, Senator, by virtue of the fact that I am the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany and not the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

I would be sort of getting on the Defense Department's turf in trying to give you my views. I will only say—and I want to make this point very strongly—that I am a firm believer in a strong nuclear component of alliance defense, that I do not believe in the concept of conventional deterrence.

We saw it break down twice in the 20th century in Europe. And without getting into the question of what is the priority attached to different systems, it is vital in my view that we maintain a large, capable mix of nuclear systems in Europe.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Burt, General Rogers testified that he felt that the sea-based strategic systems assigned to NATO were not a credible deterrent in the mind of the Soviets, because the Soviets cannot discriminate whether or not these weapons represent a theater response or a general nuclear response when they are used.

Would you agree or disagree?

Ambassador BURT. Well, I am afraid I will probably have to disagree with my good friend Bernie Rogers. Maybe I have a less mechanistic view of categories of nuclear weapons. I do not think if nuclear weapons are used in a conflict, particularly if they are used against Soviet territory, that it matters very much to the Soviets from where those systems were launched.

Whether they are launched from European territory, whether they are sea-based weapons, whether they are launched from the CONUS, a nuclear weapon landing on Soviet territory I think is going to be viewed by the Soviets as a strategic attack.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Burt, our allies expended a great deal of political capital to accomplish the INF deployments. Given the coalition makeup of many of these governments, do they have the remaining strength to continue with nuclear modernization, conventional modernization, and support of out of area commitments, as you suggest they do?

Ambassador BURT. Well, let me just reemphasize, Senator, that while it is true that governments were forced to spend a great deal of political capital to deploy, that they got a substantial return on that investment when we achieved this agreement.

The arguments made by Mrs. Thatcher, by Chancellor Kohl, by Francois Mitterand on the floor of the Bundestag when he visited Germany in 1983, those arguments have all been vindicated.

It is the unilateralists that are on the run in Europe today. We demonstrated that we could deploy, and through deployment we could achieve a good arms control agreement. So my answer is yes, that what we need to do is now follow up on this agreement with the necessary modernization of conventional and nuclear capability.

Senator **Thurmond**. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Levin**. Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

Senator Warner.

Senator **Warner**. Thank you.

We welcome our distinguished friend and we appreciate his taking his time to come join us today, because you do provide a very valuable insight.

To the extent there is some concern among the allies and to the extent we have knowledge of it, it centers around the jurisdiction over which you presided. Let us talk about the timetable of the START negotiations. There has been some expression in Great Britain and France that perhaps we ought to pause a little bit here, assuming the INF Treaty is ratified, and, as we say in the military, regroup before proceeding with START.

The President, while not having laid down the definitive timetable for START, has expressed views that hopefully it will be negotiated and back before him before he departs. Do you have any thoughts on the timetable of START as it relates to the allied nations, and primarily Germany?

Ambassador **Burt**. Well, in addressing the specific question of West German opinion on this issue, I think it is fair to say that there is very deep support for progress on nuclear arms control, for the obvious reasons that we were discussing just a few minutes ago.

The Germans feel that they are in the middle. They feel exposed, and they would like to see progress on both nuclear and conventional arms control. So I have not detected this desire for a pause that you alluded to in the Federal Republic.

Senator **Warner**. I did not suggest it was in the Federal Republic.

Ambassador **Burt**. I am aware of that, Senator.

Senator **Warner**. In other words, you do not think there is a parallel concern to the magnitude as perhaps expressed by other allies?

Ambassador **Burt**. No.

Senator **Warner**. Are you comfortable with the CSCE process and concern that many of us have about conventional arms control in trying to have some clarification of those issues in a timely way, on the assumption that we will get into a START Treaty situation?

I am sure you are familiar, perhaps more than most of us, with how CSCE is going to take a look at it, and that there will be the mandate leading perhaps, to the beginning of the 23-nation discussions.

What is your view as to that timetable?

Ambassador **Burt**. Well, I think that it is very important that the alliance get a concept and general approach for conventional stability in Europe out and on the table. I think that we have to recognize—and it has certainly been the case in the INF experience, Senator—that arms control in the 1980's and into the 1990's is not just a technical negotiating process.

It is part of a battle for public opinion. The whole INF process was a battle for the soul of Europe.

Senator WARNER. Very well expressed.

Ambassador BURT. And you cannot beat something with nothing. And I think it is very important that we demonstrate to our publics that we have got a concept for dealing with the conventional imbalance. And I think we can get our publics to support a good proposal, and a good proposal is clearly a proposal that is going to have to call for significantly asymmetrical reductions in Central Europe.

The key problem, in my view, of European security is and has been for 40 years a Soviet proposal invasion capability. We call it sometimes an imbalance of conventional forces. It is a Soviet invasion capability.

And that, we have got to get across to our public, is that it is inconsistent with glasnost. We have got to get it across to our publics that the results we want to see in a conventional negotiation is that that capability be stripped away.

And I think we can get that support from our publics. But we need, obviously, to work out these problems within the alliance and go forward.

Senator WARNER. I regret not being here when you delivered your prepared text. Did you touch on the military cooperation between the Federal Republic and France and how that might portend things for the future?

Ambassador BURT. No, I did not. I would be happy to say a few words about it.

Senator WARNER. I would appreciate that very much.

Ambassador BURT. Let me say, the position of the administration is generally positive on the new relationships that are being formed in the security area between the Federal Republic of Germany and France. And I say that for two or three different reasons.

First of all, as you know very well, President DeGaulle took France out of the integrated military system of the alliance in the 1960s, and that meant that there was a gap, an important gap in alliance defense.

To the extent to which Franco-German military cooperation brings the French in a de facto way back into the alliance or, more specifically, back into the task of providing or contributing to the defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, it is a very positive development.

It is also a positive development that Germany not feel isolated in Central Europe, that it knows that it has allies next door with whom they can talk to and address these problems. So it is helpful in terms of the development of security thinking in Germany.

But most importantly in my view, Senator, John F. Kennedy 25 years ago gave a speech at American University where he talked about a twin pillar approach to the alliance. He argued that for the alliance to succeed over time it could not be an uneven proposition, it could not be an alliance in which the United States was always the dominant partner; that the Europeans had to have more of a security and defense identity themselves, so that you could have an Atlantic bridge with an American pillar and an European pillar.

And I think the Franco-German relationship could be an important part of constructing this European pillar.

Senator **Warner**. I thank you, Ambassador.

Senator **Shelby** [presiding]. The Senator's time has expired.

Senator Wilson.

Senator **Wilson**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, let me ask whether you concur in the judgment of another witness who has earlier appeared before us, that the real hope that we have for achieving some sort of asymmetrical reduction in terms of conventional capability on the part of the Warsaw Pact is their own economic distress?

That has been put forth as recently as this morning, and General Galvin specifically indicated that he did not see that we had a great deal of external leverage to achieve the kind of conventional build-down on the Soviet and Warsaw Pact side that we would all like to see.

Do you concur that it is the economic distress of the Warsaw Pact that is going to bring about any motivation and implementation of a build-down?

Ambassador **Burt**. Well, I would certainly say that that sounds plausible. But let me just add something, Senator. I think that in designing our proposals that we probably should not place too much emphasis on Soviet motivations.

Going back to my point before about the tremendous public affairs dimension of arms control now, arms control has become domestic politics. Because of that, I do not think that the issue of negotiability in my view should loom very large.

We have an opportunity, it seems to me, with the conventional arms control negotiations to get the spotlight off this obsessive concern about nuclear weapons and put it on an area that badly needs attention with our publics, that is the Soviet invasion capability.

So while I would certainly hope that General Galvin is correct that Mr. Gorbachev would find major incentives in a conventional build-down, an asymmetrical conventional build-down, that would be less important to me than the fact that here we have an opportunity to really focus attention on what is the major cause of tension in Europe.

Senator **Wilson**. Well, let me just say that I agree that this whole question has become domestic politics in the West. But I do not see it having nearly the same force in the East, in the Warsaw Pact.

When I asked General Galvin this morning whether or not he was aware of any evidence in terms of the Warsaw Pact abandoning any building program they had with respect to any missiles system, he said no, he really did not. And I shared with him the fact that I have hoped that that were true, that there would be some breaking point in terms of the domestic pressure, the economic pressures on the Soviet Union in particular.

And every year that I have asked that question at the CIA, they have always said: Senator, we are sorry, but there really is no evidence that points to any economic pressure sufficient to warrant the hope that the Soviets are going to abandon the massive military buildup, conventional, strategic, that they have been engaged in.

So I really do not find a whole lot of basis for hope for the opinion that he expressed. In the absence of that, he seemed to find no leverage that we could exert to bring about that kind of conventional reduction, which we all agree is essential if we are to address the basic tensions that underlie the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

I raise that with you, as I did with him, because I would love to believe that that is possible. But I do not see much basis for it.

Ambassador BURT. Well, Senator, let me respond just briefly. I basically share your assessment, but I think that I would just add two things.

First, I think it is going to be easier for us to step up efforts to enhance our own conventional capabilities, which is necessary regardless of what we are doing on the arms control front, if we can enhance public understanding of Soviet conventional capabilities and if we can make the case, as we have done in the INF area, that in order to achieve any kind of outcome down the road in those negotiations, that we will have to enhance our conventional capabilities.

I certainly was not suggesting that domestic politics were a factor in Soviet thinking. What the Soviets are doing is playing on Western public opinion, and the big change between now and 5 years ago is that Gorbachev is very good at it.

You know, Brezhnev or Chernenko, they helped us in a sense with INF deployment because of their ham-handed threats against Western Europe, their decision to walk out of the negotiations after deployment was started. But we cannot assume any more that we are going to get that help from the Soviets.

And so I think we are going to have to become very adept ourselves at making the case to our own publics to get the necessary support for these programs.

Senator WILSON. My time I suspect has just about expired, but let me just close, Mr. Chairman, if I may, with a comment that I think is appropriate in light of what Ambassador Burt has just said to us.

And that is that I think we have an extraordinarily difficult educational job ahead of us, and by way of one anecdotal example I am advised, not directly but second-hand, that recently Chairman Nunn was before an audience in New York, presumably well-informed and sophisticated business leaders, and one of the questions put to him after he had spoken to them was how much of a reduction in defense spending we could anticipate as a result of the INF agreement.

And the premise underlying the question clearly was that this is going to permit us to cut way back on defense spending. And he, with commendable candor and I think experiencing a little shock, said: It is not going to save us money; we are going to have to engage in a very expensive increase to beef up our conventional capability, unless there is some means by which we can obtain leverage to secure an asymmetrical reduction on their part.

The general public, I find, much as was his audience in New York, are laboring under the serious misapprehension that INF brings with it the great fringe benefit of massive cutbacks in defense spending.

Ambassador **Burt**. I agree with that assessment, and I would just only add that, as a student of the history of arms control, one of the conclusions that one is forced to draw is that you do not save money with arms control.

Senator **Shelby**. Senator Quayle.

Senator **Wilson**. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Quayle**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Ambassador. It is good to see you again. Let me focus on the comment you made on page 12 concerning criteria for conventional arms control and conventional stability.

On your fourth point, it said: "It should be quantitative rather than qualitative--and this is the most important thing—it should not restrict our ability to introduce new systems in Europe."

Are you familiar and appraised with some of the repercussions of article XIV of this treaty, the so-called noncircumvention article? As we look to the potential ability to restrict the introduction of new systems in Europe, do you have some problems on how that article may be construed down the road?

For example, in the treaty we do not define what a new type of cruise missile or ground launched ballistic missile would be. It would have to be a new type. We also, from a verification point of view, it is almost impossible to determine whether a cruise missile is armed or unarmed. By the mere definitions of the treaty, a new type of cruise missile, you could just paint it and it would be a new type, I suppose, and, unarmed, would be allowed in accordance with the treaty.

That could be debatable in the so-called noncircumvention article. I wonder if you have some advice for us, how we might be able to clear up some potential ambiguities.

I am more concerned 5 years from now or 10 years from now than the next 2 or 3 years. I am very fearful that this article is really going to be potentially an Agreed Statement D debate down the road on what we are allowed to do and what we are not allowed to do.

I wonder, in reference to your statement here, "should not restrict our ability to introduce new systems in Europe." For example, hypervelocity boost-glide vehicles offer a great potential on a conventional basis. Would they come under the definition of cruise missile? Would they be circumvention?

I do not think so, but I do not have a definite answer. I wonder how this statement of yours and the concern that I share, that we should not restrict our ability to introduce new systems in Europe, would relate to article XIV of the INF Treaty.

Ambassador **Burt**. Senator, that is a very interesting question and I must confess that when I was writing this it did not occur to me in relationship to what I thought were general principles of what we should pursue in conventional negotiations and possible interaction or interrelationship with the noncircumvention issue.

Two points. One, I am not going to get into the details of that issue, because again I want to be a little bit careful. I think that it would be best if somebody like Mike Glitman addressed that for you.

Senator **Quayle**. We intend to get into it very fully when the negotiators of the treaty come up. But I really think it is good to begin to get an understanding from your viewpoint of some of the potential problems that we might have down the road in trying to do some things that I think we ought to do.

Ambassador **Burt**. My sense, and I remember working on this problem, which we really recognized early on in the negotiations, the whole conventional-nuclear problem, the ways in which we could play on the noncircumvention issue or the Soviets could play on it, and we concluded that the kind of language we have in this agreement gives us much more flexibility and running room than some other language which would have been far more constraining.

In the final analysis, the kind of language we now have gives us the chance to pursue policies which in our view are not inconsistent with the agreement and give us an opportunity if the Soviets, as they probably inevitably will, complain, to simply reject their complaints.

It was a much better approach to pursue than, say, a very technical effort to define what systems could or could not be introduced. That will depend, though, down the road on the willingness of any administration to be prepared to deal with Soviet criticism and even concerns expressed by our allies.

Senator **Quayle**. Or Congress.

Ambassador **Burt**. Or Congress.

But I think that it is much better in my view to have a vaguer noncircumvention commitment than a highly restrictive one, particularly when we are not able to predict what kind of technological opportunities are in the offing.

Senator **Quayle**. That is just the point. My preference would be—and I believe it was our position, the position of some within the administration—not to even have this so-called noncircumvention article, and we would simply prohibit Pershing IIs and ground launched cruise missiles and SS–20s and SS–4s and SS–23s on their side, have a very specific prohibition, just because we get into this quagmire and very much of a grey area, because I think that the Soviets wanted to get some very specific things into noncircumvention.

Ambassador **Burt**. That is correct.

Senator **Quayle**. We rejected that, and it is very important that the Senate during the debate and discussions, particularly getting into the negotiating record, understand what was rejected, so that some future Congress will not bind some administration down the road.

My concern and my interest, as I read through this, it struck me that we, meaning the Senate, ought to try to deal with this issue as clearly as we can amongst ourselves, and with the administration, to give the flexibility to future administrations to introduce some new systems that would be different technology than what we know today.

And it goes right along the line of what Agreed Statement D means. Under international law, you have got to give every article of a treaty some meaning. It has to mean something. That is why it is there.

That is why we got into the big debate, what did Agreed Statement D mean. It was not redundant, it meant something. Well, article XIV means something, and it says we will not take on new things that would somehow conflict with other provisions in this treaty. So it goes beyond the actual provisions of this treaty and adds something more.

That is why I was trying to ascertain from you for this committee the importance that we have a good understanding of this article, particularly as it relates not only to INF weapons, but down the road to conventional weapons and how we are going to augment our conventional stability through the possibility of using something that is to our advantage.

We have the technological edge, in the laboratory, I might add, not necessarily in the field, of being able to use that technological advantage down the road.

Ambassador BURT. Well, I hope you agree with me, Senator, that in working out this understanding that we want to retain as much flexibility as we possibly can.

But your last point is one that has to make me smile, because I have seen, and I know you have, over and over again where we have the technical options to pursue things and we do not, and suddenly we are faced with the Soviets actually pursuing some of those options.

Senator QUAYLE. That is what I want to make sure does not happen, that this article in some future Congress does not get wrapped right around our neck and start inhibiting us from something that we clearly felt we would be able to do.

Ambassador BURT. I remember very clearly in the Senate debate in 1972 and its aftermath on SALT I, a great deal of discussion about the necessity at that point to go forward with a land-mobile-hard-target capable U.S. ICBM. If you had told me some 15 years ago that in 1988 the Soviets would be deploying the SS–24s and the SS–25s and had told me what the status of the MX program in the United States was, I would have never believed it. But here we are.

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SHELBY. Mr. Ambassador, let us focus in on any future conventional arms reduction talks. It has been what, about 14 years these talks have been going on in Vienna. Not a lot of progress has been made.

Is there any hope in the immediate future there as far as bringing about a breakthrough?

Ambassador BURT. I think if we are going to be honest with ourselves, that any conventional stability negotiations are going to be very long and protracted negotiations.

Senator SHELBY. Do we have anything to really bring them to the table?

Ambassador BURT. Well, I think we do.

Senator SHELBY. What is it?

Ambassador BURT. I think that most importantly I would argue that we have in this area the political offensive. As I was suggesting before, it is I think very difficult for the Soviets, particularly for Mr. Gorbachev, given his clear effort to woo Western public opinion, it is very difficult to him to explain why he has in place this capability which is designed for offensive military operations against Western Europe.

And that is why we should continue to raise that issue and probe him to explain why he needs that mass of forces.

But beyond that, we should not in dealing with the Soviet threat necessarily bad-mouth our own capabilities. I think that is a mistake. And I can tell you one thing, Senator. One of the great opportunities that I have had in recent years getting out of Washington has been in Germany, to spend a lot of time with our forces.

And you know, conventional forces is not a nuclear bean count, where it is easy to come up with calculations, equivalent megatonnage, CEP, and hard target kill and so forth. Conventional forces have a lot to do with people and readiness and training.

And as somebody who first visited the U.S. Army in Germany in the Vietnam period, to go back to Germany today in 1988 and look at our forces there and look at their morale, look at their readiness, even with a weak dollar, it is a very exhilarating positive experience.

Not just U.S. forces, the Bundeswehr, the British Army of the Rhine, the Canadian forces. So I think that looking at our capabilities, I will not say that we have the ability, to use your word, to achieve a breakthrough in these negotiations, but I would not count out altogether the capacity to reach agreement that is in our interest.

Senator SHELBY. On another focus, a major statement that Mr. Gorbachev has made regarding what we call pro-détente campaign has been on the loosening of restrictions on high tech exports to the Soviet Union. And of course, the West German foreign minister seems to be following right along in this appeal.

What are your views on U.S. policy restricting high tech exports to the Soviet Union? Why should we do this when it generally would have adverse military repercussions or applications?

Ambassador BURT. What is my view on the U.S. policy? Well, I think it is completely appropriate, and I think that we must not only pursue it unilaterally, but we must get alliance support for it.

It is obvious that we have had differences in the past with our allies on this issue. We have had some differences with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. I will point out that those differences tend to come down to case by case disputes over computers with a certain capability and other systems.

But there is not a lack of general support for the proposition that in giving the Soviets militarily relevant technology all we are doing is increasing the military threat and in the end enforcing ourselves in the longer term to spend more.

So I just want to emphasize that this is an important issue and it is one that the Germans, both from me and from other people in the administration, have heard very firm views on.

Senator SHELBY. Do you have some suggestions how we can strengthen the COCOM regulations?

Ambassador BURT. Well, one suggestion that I used to discuss with my former colleague and current friend Richard Perle is to enhance the military role within the COCOM organization.

As I think you know, this has not been met with wild enthusiam by some of our allies. But it is not an idea we should drop.

Senator **Shelby**. Mr. Ambassador, I believe you have done such a good job that——-

Ambassador **Burt**. I have driven everybody away.

Senator **Shelby**. No, you have not, either. We appreciate your coming to the committee and we appreciate your views. We will be spending many more hours here and will keep these in mind.

Thank you.

Ambassador **Burt**. Thank you, Senator.

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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